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Religion and the Future Life

The Development of the Belief in Life After Death.
By Authorities in the History of Religions

EDITED BY
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LONDON AND EDINBURGH

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7-89

New York: 158 Fifth Avenue
Chicago: 17 North Wabash Ave.
London: 21 Paternoster Square
Edinburgh: 75 Princes Street

Preface

DURING the academic year of 1920–1921 the undersigned conducted a seminar in Yale University for the purpose of studying the history of belief in life after death in religion and philosophy. He was most fortunate in securing eminent specialists in the history of religions to contribute papers—nearly all of which were read before its members by the writers themselves. Because of the perpetual interest in this important problem, it seemed very desirable that these valuable essays should be shared by an intelligent public; and the editor asked their authors to prepare them for publication in the form of a composite volume. This they very kindly consented to do and the result is the present volume. The undersigned's contribution to the seminar dealt with the idea of the future life as developed in the history of philosophy. It will appear in a volume to be published later.

Since the preparation of these essays one of the contributors,—Professor Morris Jastrow, Jr., of the University of Pennsylvania,—has entered "the Great Beyond." His death is a serious loss to American scholarship.

E. HERSHEY SNEATH.

Yale University.

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I

THE IDEA OF THE FUTURE LIFE AMONG PRIMITIVE TRIBES

FRANZ BOAS

AMONG the many attempts that have been made to describe and explain the origin and development of the concepts of soul and immortality the one made by Edward B. Tylor in his "Primitive Culture" is most exhaustive and carefully thought out. Although since the publication of his work, much new evidence has been accumulated, the new data may well be fitted into his general treatment of the subject.

We are, however, no longer quite ready to accept his interpretation of the material which he has so assiduously collected and marshalled in logical order. To him the ideas by which primitive man expresses his sense experience are a result of speculative thought, of reasoning that leads to a consistent view of the world. These thoughts, being determined by the general state of cultural life, lead to concepts which naturally develop one from the other and represent a typical series which arises regardless of race and of historical affiliations. It is true that, sometimes, he sets aside the latter point of view and recognizes specific forms of thought which belong to various cultural groups, such as the Indo-Europeans on the one hand, the Semites on the other, but these ap-

proaches to a historical treatment are entirely subordinated to the general evolutional viewpoint in which certain cultural types appear as belonging to the evolutionary stages of primitive, barbaric or civilized society.

We are, at present, more inclined to consider the growth of ideas, not as a result of rational processes, but rather as an involuntary growth, and their interpretation as the outcome of rationalization when, together with correlated action, they rise into consciousness. We recognize that the rationalizing interpretation of an idea does not by any means necessarily represent its historical growth, and that a classification of ideas from a definite viewpoint, beginning with those that seem to be simple and proceeding to those that seem complex, cannot without further proof be interpreted as historical sequence, but may give an entirely distorted picture of historical happenings.

We may trace the development of the concepts "soul" and "immortality" in the history of Europe and of other countries in which historical data are available, but the attempt to give an historical interpretation for people without recorded history is liable to lead to quite fallacious results if based on nothing else than a classification of data according to their complexity.

Nevertheless, the problem that Tylor set to himself remains. There are decided similarities in the views held regarding "soul" and "immortality" among peoples that in measurable time cannot have had any historical connection. There is, however, danger of overlooking, on account of a general resemblance, significant dissimilarities which may have value from a historical point of view. It is unavoidable that we should base our considerations, as Tylor did, on the

data of individual psychology and that we should try to understand how, in a given cultural setting, man may be led to form certain concepts. In following out this method, we should, however, take into consideration the effects of secondary rationalization and the historical facts that may have influenced the ways by which simple ideas grew into complex dogma.

From this point of view Tylor's treatment appears to us as too schematic. He does not take into consideration the multifarious mental conditions that may lead to the concepts "soul" and "immortality," but he selects a few and bases his conclusions upon their general applicability. Now and then he does mention the possibility of alternative mental states that might lead to similar results, only to revert to his main explanation.

The difference in point of view appears most clearly in Tylor's summing up of his explanation of the occurrence of the belief in multiple souls:[1] "Terms corresponding with those of life, mind, soul, spirit, ghost, and so forth, are not thought of as describing really separate entities, so much as the several forms and functions of one individual being. Thus the confusion which prevails in our own thought and language, in a manner typical of the thought and language of mankind in general, is in fact due not merely to vagueness of terms, but to an ancient theory of substantial unity which underlies them."

We are inclined to take for our starting point precisely the opposite point of view.

The unconscious growth of concepts is expressed nowhere more clearly than in language. In many languages we find the tendency to conceptualize a quality,

[1] Edward B. Tylor, "Primitive Culture," London, 1891, Vol. I, p. 435.

a condition, or even an habitual action, which then appears in the form of a noun. It is not by any means necessary that the occurrence of such concepts must lead to an imaginative process by means of which they are given concrete form, but it gives ready opportunity for such development. We still feel the force in the use of metaphorical expressions which are based on the concrete form given to a term that from a logical point of view, is of attributive character. These metaphors may be modern or based on ancient patterns.

It is noticeable that particularly the states and functions of physical and mental life do not appear to primitive man as qualities, conditions or actions, but as definite concepts which tend to take on concrete form. Even in modern science we are still struggling with the confusion between substance and attribute in the analysis of such concepts as matter and energy.

We do not mean to imply by this that mythology, as Max Müller states, is " a disease of language," that all mythological concepts originate from misinterpreted or reinterpreted linguistic forms, we rather mean that the formation of concepts is not the same in all languages and that in particular, the grouping of what is substance and what attribute, is not always made in the same way, and that many attributes are conceived as substance. It does not seem plausible that linguistic form should be subsequent to the conscious conceptualization of an attribute as a substance. The two must rather be considered as concomitant and interdependent phenomena. It is quite conceivable that where the tendency to objectivation of attributes prevails, later on the transformation of other attributes into objects may follow by analogy, but the primary basis cannot be considered in any way as due to a conscious classification,—just as little as the classification of the spectrum

into a limited number of fundamental colour terms can be due to conscious conceptualization of a number of selected colours.

On the basis of these considerations we interpret the fact that many manifestations of life take concrete forms as an effect of the tendency to conceive certain classes of attributes as substances. In modern languages terms like hunger, courage, love, sin, consciousness, death, are either owing to traditional usage or to poetic imagination, endowed with qualities, even with concrete forms.

The more distinctly a quality is conceived as a concrete substance, the less will its existence be bound up with the object possessing the quality in question. If success in hunting is conceived as a substance that may associate itself with a person, it will exist independently of the person who may acquire it or lose it and after his death it will continue to exist as it existed before its acquisition. When a sin is conceived as a substance, as is done by the Eskimo, it has an independent existence. It attaches itself to a person; it may be separated from the sinner, and continue to exist until attached to some other person. They are no longer qualities that die with the individual to whom they belong. Sickness is often conceived not as a condition of the body, but as an extraneous object that may enter the body of a person and may be extracted again, or that may be thrown into it. This foreign substance that acts upon the living being may be as permanent in its existence as the earth, the heavens and the waters.

In all these cases there is no integral association between the object and its objectivated quality. Each leads an independent existence. The quality of the expert hunter, or the faculty of the shaman may be con-

ceived as objects or as personalities that assist the man with whom they are associated. They are different from his own personality and we designate them as magical objects or as helping spirits.

There is, however, another group of qualities considered as substances which are most intimately connected with human life and without which a person is not a complete living being. Life, power of action, personality belong to this group. Wherever they occur in one form or another we designate them as "soul." The soul represents the objectivated qualities which constitute either the ideal human being or the individual personality. A study of the terms which are ordinarily translated as "soul" shows clearly that the equivalents in primitive tongues represent a variety of qualities of living man, and that their meaning varies accordingly.

Often the term "life" corresponds to what we call "soul." Thus the Chinook Indian of Northwest America says that when "life" leaves the body man must die, and that if it is returned to the body, he will recover. "Life" is an objectivation of all that differentiates the living person from the dead body. It leads a separate existence and, therefore, continues to exist after death.

"Life" itself is not always conceived as a unit. When a paralyzed arm or leg has lost its power of motion, its separate "life" has gone, but the person continues to live as long as the "great life" that belongs to the whole body stays with him. It is not by any means necessary that the "life" should be conceived in anthropomorphic form; it is sometimes considered as an object or as an animal such as a butterfly. As long as it stays in the body, its owner is alive; when it leaves, he dies; when it is hurt, he sickens.

In a wider sense the power to act, the will power, is classified not as a function of the living body, but as something substantial, of independent existence. We might call it the personality separated from the person. In a way it is another form under which life is conceptualized. On account of its closer association with the form of living man, it is very liable to appear in anthropomorphic form.

There is no sharp line that separates this concept from the products of imagery, in so far as these are not understood as functions of mental life, but as independent objects. Tylor and others have discussed fully and adequately the effects of the products of imagination, of dreams and of trance experiences in which man finds his body in one place while his mind visits distant persons and sees distant scenes, or when he finds conversely distant scenes and persons appearing before his mental eye. These are based on memory images which attain at times unusual intensity. Not by a logical process, but by the natural and involuntary process of classification of experience, man is led to the concept of the objective existence of the memory-image. Its formation is due to the experiences of visual and auditory imagery.

We may recognize the objectivation of life and of the memory-image as the principal sources from which the manifold forms of soul concepts spring. As the life-soul may vary in form, so the memory-image soul may take varying forms according to the particular aspect of the personality that predominates. These two concepts of the soul do not remain isolated, but the one always influences the other. A detailed study of their interrelation and of the variety of meanings that corresponds to our term "soul" would require a close study of the forms of thought that have grown up on

this general psychological background, partly through an inner development, partly owing to diffusion of ideas.

The most important results of these considerations for our problem is the recognition of the fact that those qualities, conditions, and functions which we combine under the term "soul" are looked upon as substances and that, for this reason, body and soul have separate existence and their lives are not encompassed in the same space of time.

In fact, there is probably not a single primitive people that holds rigidly to the belief that the existence of the soul coincides with the actual span of life of the individual. The soul may be considered as existing before the birth of its owner and it may continue to exist after his death. However, the idea of immortality, of a continued existence without beginning in the past and without end in the future is not necessarily implied in these beliefs.

Preëxistence is necessarily connected with the idea of rebirth. It is another expression of the primitive mythological thought which assumes that nothing has a beginning, that there is no creation of anything new, but that everything came into being by transformations. The animals, plants, striking features of the landscape are commonly accounted for as due to the transformation of human being into new forms. Thus also the birth of a child is accounted for as a result of the tranformation of a preëxisting being. If the Eskimo believe that children, like eggs, live in the snow and crawl into the mother's womb, if some Australian tribes believe that a totem or ancestral spirit enters the mother's body, if some Indian tribes of America believe that salmon may be reborn as children, or that a deceased person may come back to be borne

again by a woman of his own family, this is not necessarily due to a complete lack of knowledge of the physiological process of conception, but should rather be interpreted as a particular aspect of the concept of "life" or "soul," as independent of bodily existence. This appears very clearly in the case of the Eskimo who misinterpret sexual intercourse as intended to feed the child that has entered the mother's womb. These ideas are presumably analogous to the ideas surviving in our folk-lore in which children are presented as pre-existing. The belief in transmigration shows most clearly that we are dealing here with the soul which exists before the birth of the child.

The term "immortality" is, however, applied more specifically to life after death. We have pointed out before that the visualization of the form of a person due to imagery is one of the principal sources of the concept of "soul." This form survives after the death of the individual as his memory-image. For this very reason the image-soul cannot possibly die with the death of the person, but will survive at least as long as his friends survive. The importance of the recollection of a person for the future life of the soul is brought out in the beliefs of many Bantu tribes of Africa. Thus among the Vandau, the soul of a person who is remembered will be kindly disposed toward his friends. When the deceased is forgotten, his soul becomes a malignant being that is feared and must be driven away.

The memory-image is intangible, it arises suddenly and vanishes again when the calls of every-day life repress imaginative thought. It partakes of all the features of the departed and even his voice may dimly sound in the imagination of the surviving friend. In memory the departed will appear as he was known in

life, in his usual dress and engaged in his usual occupations so that with his image appear also his property that he used in his lifetime. The inanimate property partakes in a peculiar way in the continued existence of the memory-image even after the objects have been destroyed. It is hardly necessary to assume with Tylor, that the belief in this continued existence of proprietary objects is due to an animistic belief. In many cases it may be based merely on the continued existence of the memory-image.

The importance of the memory-image in the formation of the soul concept is nowhere clearer than in those cases in which the dead one is believed to continue to exist in the land of souls in the same condition in which he was at the time of death. When the aging Chukchee demands to be killed before he is infirm and unable to withstand the hardships of life, he acts under the assumption that his soul will continue in the same condition in which he finds himself at the time of death. Whether or not this is the historical source of the custom is irrelevant for its modern interpretation by the Chukchee. In the same way the belief of the Eskimo that a person who dies of old age or of a lingering illness will be unhappy in future life, while he who is suddenly taken away in full vigour, as a man who dies a violent death or a woman who dies in childbirth, will be strong and happy in future life is expressive of the memory-image that the deceased leaves in the minds of his survivors.

If the belief in continued existence is based on the persistence of the objectivated memory-image, it might be inferred that there should be a widespread belief of the death of the soul at the time when all those who knew the deceased are dead and gone. As a matter of fact, we find indications of a belief in a

second death that conform with this idea, but in the majority of cases the soul is believed to be immortal. There are a considerable number of cases in which the second death of a soul is described, but most of these are not of a character that may easily be reduced to the fact that the deceased is forgotten. They seem rather to be due to the imaginative elaboration of the continued life of the soul which is necessarily thought to be analogous to our own life and in which, therefore, death is a natural incident.

It does not seem difficult to understand why the objectivation of the memory-image should lead to the belief in immortality rather than in a limited existence after death. To the surviving friend the memory-image is a substance and he will talk of it as having permanent existence. It will, therefore, be assumed by his friends who may not have known the deceased, in the same way, and will continue to exist in their minds in the same way as all other qualities that are, according to the views held by their society, conceived as substances.

Knowledge of the presence and actual decomposition of the body and the long preservation of the skeleton is the source of a number of other concepts that are related to the idea of immortality. When we speak of ghosts, we are apt to think more of the disembodied souls which wait to be redeemed, than of the skeletal remains that are thought to be endowed with life. Nevertheless we find, every now and then, that the ghost is not described as the transparent or vaporous apparition of the memory-image, but as bearing the features of a skeleton, often with grotesque additions of luminous orbits and nasal aperture. In this form the ghost is, of course, not the memory-image of the living, but a concept representing the re-

mains of the dead body endowed with life. For this reason it happens often, that these "immortals" are not individualized, but are conceived as very impersonal beings who may wage war among themselves, or against man, who may waylay the unwary and who form a hostile tribe of foreigners, as though they were ordinary living beings, but endowed with unusual powers. The lack of individuality of this type of ghost appears very clearly among many American tribes, while the idea does not seem to prevail in Africa. We can hardly consider these ghosts as immortal souls, because they lack completely individuality.

Nevertheless there arises at times confusion between the two concepts. The ghosts have their village or villages and often, when the soul,—in the sense of life and memory-images,—of the departed leaves the body, it is said to go to the village of the ghosts where it meets previously departed friends and many persons whom it does not know,—those who died long ago. This contradiction is not surprising, because there are many associative bonds between the two groups of ideas, so that the one calls forth the other and a sharp line between the two concepts is, therefore, not established.

It is most important, for a clear understanding of the questions with which we are dealing and of similar problems, that we must not expect a consistent system of beliefs in primitive thought. We must remember that concepts originating from different principles of unconscious classification must overlap, and that for this reason, if for no other, the same concept may belong to conflicting categories. Only when conscious rationalization sets in and a standardization of beliefs develops may some of these conflicting or even contradictory views be harmonized.

It would seem, therefore, best not to include in the idea of immortality of the soul, the idea of separate existence which is attached to the acquaintance with the decomposing body and the relative permanence of the skeleton, just as little as we can consider the permanence and separate existence of objectivated spiritual powers, such as skill and success as immortal souls. They appear to us rather as helpful spiritual beings or objects.

The fundamental differences between the various forms of the soul concept and between the feelings and thoughts that lead to the assumption of a separate existence of the soul are the source also of many conflicting views regarding the abode of the soul before birth, during life and after death. Except in the cases of a well-developed belief in transmigration, there is no clear and well-developed idea of the places and conditions in which souls exist before birth. Even when they are believed to be returned ancestors, there does not seem to be a well-defined belief regarding the mode of life of a preëxisting soul. This may be due to the lack of congruity between the behaviour of the newborn infant and the memory-image which is ordinarily associated with the full-grown person. This makes it difficult to bridge the gap between the existence of the soul and the birth of the child.

During life, more particularly during healthy life, the seat of the soul is conceived to be in the body, or at least, closely associated with the body. Quite often the concepts of the relations between body and soul lack in clearness. The distinction between a spiritual helper or a protecting object and the "soul" shows, however, very clearly that the former is thought of as existing apart from the body, while the latter is closely associated with it. We pointed out before,

that we find in both groups conceptualized attributes, but that the former are less firmly connected with the fundamental phenomena of life. In many cases, the "life-soul" is believed to permeate the whole body, or the special part of the body to which it belongs. When the soul is considered as an object, it may be thought to be located in some vital part, as in the nape of the neck; or, still more commonly, it is identified with those functions of the body that cease with death, such as the breath, the flowing blood, or the moving eye. So far as these are visible and tangible objects of temporary existence, they are considered the seat of the "life-soul" during life, rather than as the "life-soul" itself. However, the latter always remains the objectivation of the functions of life.

The concept of the memory-image soul leads to different beliefs in regard to its localization. Its essential feature is that it is a fleeting image of the personality and that, for this reason, it is identical in form with the person. Shadows and reflections on water partake of these unsubstantial, fleeting characteristics of the image of the person. Probably for this reason they are often identified with the memory-image soul. There are, however, also mixed concepts, as that of a "life-soul" which, after leaving the body, appear in the form of its owner, but of diminutive size.

Much clearer than the idea of localization of the preëxisting soul and of the soul of the living are those relating to the conditions of the souls after death. In imaginative stories, the details of life after death are often elaborated. They are confirmed and further embellished by the reports of people who, in a trance, believe they have visited the country of the souls.

The presence of the bodily remains, the departure

of life, and the persistence of the memory-image lead to many conflicting views which have certainly helped in the development of the belief in multiple souls. While the idea of a life-soul combined with the belief in a continued existence of the personality, creates readily the formation of the concepts of a distant country of the dead, the memory-image based on the remembrance of the daily intercourse of the deceased with his survivors and the presence of his tangible grave lead rather to the belief in the continued presence of the soul. In the conflicting tendencies which are thus established, and in the elaboration of detail which is necessarily involved in tales regarding future life, historical diffusion plays a much more important part than in the formation of the mere concepts of soul and immortality, and it would be quite impossible to understand the multifarious forms of description of the land of the dead without taking into consideration the actual interrelations between tribes. An attempt at a purely psychological analysis would be quite misleading. We find, for instance, in Africa a widespread idea of sacred groves in which ancestral souls reside; this must be taken as a result of historical adaptation, not as the necessary development of psychological causes that lead to the same result anywhere,—in the same way, as the characteristic belief in the different behaviour of remembered and forgotten ancestral souls which is common to many South African tribes, must be due to historical assimilation. This is proved by the definite localization of these beliefs in well-circumscribed areas.

Nevertheless a number of features may be recognized which are of remarkably wide distribution and for which, therefore, a common psychological cause may be sought.

The belief in a temporary presence of the soul in or near the place of death is quite common and may be based on the condition of mind which prevails until the survivors have adapted themselves to the absence of the deceased. It may be interpreted as the objectivation of the haunting consciousness of his previous presence in all the little acts of every-day life, and in the feeling that he ought still to be present. As this feeling wears down, he departs to the land of the souls. In the same way the difficulty of separating the dead body from the remembrance of the body in action may be the cause of the belief that the soul hovers for some time around the grave, to leave only when the body begins to decompose.

The ideas relating to the permanent abode of the souls are not easily interpreted, largely on account of their complex mythological character which requires a detailed historical investigation. Nevertheless there are a few general features that are so widely distributed that they may be briefly touched upon. Generally the village of the dead is thought to be very far away, at the western confines of our world where the sun and moon disappear, below the ground or in the sky, and difficult to reach. Among the obstacles in the way, we find particularly a river that must be crossed by the soul, or dangerous passages over chasms. It is but natural that the souls should be conceived as living in the same way as human beings do. The experiences of primitive man give no other basis for his imagination to work on. Their occupations are the same, they hunt, eat and drink, play and dance. A living person who takes part in their daily life, particularly if he taste of their food, cannot return to the land of the living. The objects which the immortal souls use are also immortal, but they appear to the

living as old and useless, often in the form in which they are disposed of at the funeral ceremonies. Notwithstanding the identity of the social life of the dead and of the living, there is a consciousness that things cannot be the same there as here and this thought is given expression in the belief that everything there is the opposite of what it is here. When we have winter, it is summer there, when we sleep, the souls of the dead are awake.

We cannot enter into the great variety of beliefs regarding the land of the souls without overstepping the bounds of a socio-psychological discussion.

The belief in a number of different countries of the dead, however, requires brief mention. We are accustomed to think of these distinctions from an ethical point of view, of heaven for the souls of the good, of hell for the souls of the bad. It is doubtful whether in primitive life this concept ever exists. The difference in the locations of the countries of the dead and of their conditions is rather determined by the memory-image of the person at the time of his death. The strong and vigorous who live a happy life, are assembled in one place—the weak and sickly at another place. When other principles of separation prevail, they may be reduced to other classificatory concepts. In simple economic conditions the whole community is equally affected by favourable and unfavourable conditions. Among the Eskimo, when the weather is propitious, the whole village has enough food, and every healthy person is happy. When, on the other hand, no game can be obtained on account of continued tempests, the whole village is in distress. Therefore a conception of future life in which in the same village a considerable part of the people are unhappy, another considerable part happy, does not coincide with the

experience of Eskimo life and we may, perhaps, recognize in social conditions of this type a cause that leads to a differentiation of abodes of the dead.

In the preceding discussion, we have considered only the general socio-psychological basis on which the concepts of "soul" and "immortality" have arisen. It is necessary to repeat, that for a clear understanding of the great variety of forms which their beliefs take, the historical relations between groups of tribes must be considered, not only of those that are at present in close contact, but also of those which belong to larger cultural areas in which intertribal cultural influences may belong to early periods.

II

ANCIENT EGYPTIAN IDEAS OF THE LIFE HEREAFTER

JAMES HENRY BREASTED

AMONG no people, ancient or modern, has the idea of a life beyond the grave held so prominent a place as among the ancient Egyptians. This insistent belief in a hereafter may, perhaps, have been, and experience in the land of Egypt has led me to believe it was, greatly favoured and influenced by the fact that the conditions of soil and climate resulted in such a remarkable preservation of the human body as may be found under natural conditions, perhaps nowhere else in the world. In going up to the daily task on some neighbouring temple in Nubia, I was not infrequently obliged to pass through the corner of a cemetery, where the feet of a dead man, buried in a shallow grave, were now uncovered and extended directly across my path. They were precisely like the rough and calloused feet of the workmen in our excavations. How old the grave was I do not know, but any one familiar with the cemeteries of Egypt, ancient and modern, has found numerous bodies or portions of bodies indefinitely old which seemed so well preserved as to suggest those of the living. This must have been a frequent experience of the ancient Egyptian, and like Hamlet with the skull of Yorick in his hands, he must often have pondered

deeply as he contemplated these silent witnesses. The surprisingly perfect state of preservation in which he found his ancestors whenever the digging of a new grave disclosed them, must have greatly stimulated his belief in their continued existence, and often aroused his imagination to more detailed pictures of the realm and the life of the mysterious departed. The earliest and simplest of these beliefs began at an age so remote that they have left no trace in surviving remains. The cemeteries of the prehistoric communities along the Nile, discovered and excavated since 1894, disclose a belief in a future life which was already in an advanced stage. Thousands of graves, the oldest of which cannot be dated later than the end of the fifth millennium B. C., were dug by these primitive people in the desert gravels along the margin of the alluvium. In the bottom of the pit, which is but a few feet in depth, lies the body with the feet drawn up toward the chin and surrounded by a meagre equipment of pottery, flint implements, stone weapons, and utensils, and rude personal ornaments, all of which were, of course, intended to furnish the departed for his future life.

From the archaic beliefs represented in such burials as these it is a matter of fifteen hundred years to the appearance of the earliest written documents surviving to us—documents from which we may draw fuller knowledge of the more developed faith of a people rapidly rising toward a high material civilization and a unified governmental organization, the first great state of antiquity. When we take up the course of the development about 3000 B. C., we have before us the complicated results of a commingling of originally distinct beliefs which have long since interpenetrated each other and have for many centuries circulated thus,

—a tangled mass of threads which it is now very difficult or impossible to disentangle.

Certain fundamental distinctions can be made, however. The early belief that the dead lived in or at the tomb, which must therefore be equipped to furnish his necessities in the hereafter, was one from which the Egyptian has never escaped entirely, not even at the present day. As hostile creatures infesting the cemeteries, the dead were dreaded, and protection from their malice was necessary. Even the pyramid must be protected from the malignant dead prowling about the necropolis, and in later times a man might be afflicted even in his house by a deceased member of his family wandering in from the cemetery. His mortuary practices therefore constantly gave expression to his involuntary conviction that the departed continued to inhabit the tomb long after the appearance of highly developed views regarding a blessed hereafter elsewhere in some distant region. We who continue to place flowers on the graves of our dead, though we may at the same time cherish beliefs in some remote paradise of the departed, should certainly find nothing to wonder at in the conflicting beliefs and practices of the ancient Nile-dweller five thousand years ago. Side by side the two beliefs subsisted, that the dead continued to dwell in or near the tomb, and at the same time that he had departed elsewhere to a distant and blessed realm.

In taking up the first of these two beliefs, the sojourn in the tomb, it will be necessary to understand the Egyptian notion of a person, and of those elements of the human personality which might survive death. These views are, of course, not the studied product of a highly trained and long-developed self-consciousness. On the contrary, we have in them the involuntary and

unconscious impressions of an early people, in the study of which it is apparent that we are confronted by the earliest chapter in folk-psychology which has anywhere descended to us from the past.

On the walls of the temple of Luxor, where the birth of Amenhotep III was depicted in sculptured scenes late in the fifteenth century before Christ, we find the little prince brought in on the arm of the Nile-god, accompanied apparently by another child. This second figure, identical in external appearance with that of the prince, is a being called by the Egyptians the "ka"; it was born with the prince, being communicated to him by the god. This curious comrade of an individual was corporeal and the fortunes of the two were ever afterward closely associated; but the ka was not an element of the personality, as is so often stated. It seems to me from a study of the Pyramid Texts, that the nature of the ka has been fundamentally misunderstood. He was a kind of superior genius intended to guide the fortunes of the individual *in the hereafter,* or it was in the world of the hereafter that he chiefly if not exclusively had his abode, and there he awaited the coming of his earthly companion. He is roughly parallel with the later notion of the guardian angel as found among other peoples, and he is, of course, far the earliest known example of such a being.

The actual personality of the individual in life consisted, according to the Egyptian notion, in the visible body, and the invisible intelligence, the seat of the last being considered the "heart" or the "belly," which indeed furnished the chief designations for the intelligence. Then the vital principle which, as so frequently among other peoples, was identified with the breath which animated the body, was not clearly distinguished from the intelligence. The two together were pic-

tured in one symbol, a human-headed bird with human arms, which we find in the tomb and coffin scenes depicted hovering over the mummy and extending to its nostrils in one hand the figure of a swelling sail, the hieroglyph for wind or breath, and in the other the well known so-called *crux ansata,*[1] or symbol of life. This curious little bird-man was called by the Egyptians the "ba." The fact has been strangely overlooked that originally the ba came into existence really for the first time at the death of the individual. All sorts of devices and ceremonies were resorted to that the deceased might at death become a ba.

From these and other facts it is evident that the Egyptians had developed a rude psychology of the dead, in accordance with which they endeavoured to reconstitute the individual by processes *external to him,* under the control of the survivors, especially the mortuary priest who possessed the indispensable ceremonies for accomplishing this end. We may summarize it all in the statement that after the resuscitation of the body, there was a mental restoration or reconstitution of the faculties one by one, attained especially by the process of making the deceased a "soul" (ba), in which capacity he again existed as a *person,* possessing all the powers that would enable him to subsist and survive in the life hereafter.[2]

That life now involved an elaborate material equipment, a monumental tomb with its mortuary furniture. It was the duty of every son to arrange the material equipment of his father for the life beyond—a duty so naturally and universally felt that it involuntarily

[1] Really a sandal-string.

[2] It is therefore not wholly correct to attribute to the Egyptians a belief in the *immortality* of the soul strictly interpreted as imperishability, or to speak of his "ideas of immortality."

passed from the life of the people into the Osiris myth as the duty of Horus toward his father Osiris. The maintenance of the departed, in theory at least *through all time*, was, however, a responsibility which the Egyptian dared not entrust exclusively to his surviving family or eventually to a posterity whose solicitude on his behalf must continue to wane and finally disappear altogether. The noble, therefore, executed carefully drawn wills and testamentary endowments, the income from which was to be devoted exclusively to the maintenance of his tomb and the presentation of oblations of incense, ointment, food, drink, and clothing in liberal quantities and at frequent intervals. The source of this income might be the revenues from the noble's own lands or from his offices and the perquisites belonging to his rank, from all of which a portion might be permanently diverted for the support of his tomb and its ritual.

The Pharaoh himself might reasonably expect that his imposing tomb would long survive the destruction of the less enduring structures in which his nobles were laid, and that his endowments, too, might be made to outlast those of his less powerful contemporaries. The pyramid as a stable form in architecture has impressed itself upon all time. Beneath this vast mountain of stone, as a result of its mere mass and indestructibility alone, the Pharaoh looked forward to the permanent survival of his body, and of the personality with which it was so indissolubly involved. Each Pharaoh of the Third and Fourth Dynasties (early Third Millennium) spent a large share of his available resources in erecting this vast tomb, which was to receive his body and insure its preservation after death. It became the chief object of the state and its organization, thus to insure the king's survival

in the hereafter. Resting beneath the pyramid, the king's wants were elaborately met by a sumptuous and magnificent ritual performed on his behalf in the temple before his tomb. The increasing number of royal tombs, however, made it more and more difficult as a mere matter of management and administration to maintain them. Hence even the priests of Sahure's pyramid in the middle of the twenty-eighth century B. C., unable properly to protect the king's pyramid-temple, found it much cheaper and more convenient to wall up all of the side entrances and leave only the causeway as the entrance to the temple. Not long after 2500 B. C., indeed the whole sixty-mile line of Old Kingdom pyramids from Medûm on the south to Gizeh on the north had become a desert solitude.

The pyramids mark the culmination of the belief in *material equipment* as completely efficacious in securing felicity for the dead. The great pyramids of Gizeh represent the effort of Titanic energies absorbing all the resources of a great state as they converged upon one supreme endeavour to sheath eternally the body of a single man, the head of the state, in a husk of masonry so colossal that by these purely material means the royal body might defy all time and by sheer force of mechanical supremacy make conquest of immortality. The decline of such vast pyramids as those of the Fourth Dynasty of Gizeh, and the final insertion of the Pyramid Texts in the pyramids beginning with the last king of the Fifth Dynasty about 2625 B. C., puts the emphasis on well-being elsewhere, a belief in felicity in some distant place not so entirely dependent upon material means and recognizes in some degree the fact that piles of masonry cannot confer that immortality which a man must win in his own soul. The Pyramid Texts as a whole furnish us the

oldest chapter in human thinking preserved to us, the remotest reach in the intellectual history of man which we are now able to discern. Written in hieroglyphic they occupy the walls of the passages, galleries, and chambers in five of the pyramids of Sakkara. They represent a period of about one hundred and fifty years from the vicinity of 2625 to possibly 2475 B. C., that is *the whole of the twenty-sixth century and possibly a quarter of a century before and after it.* It is evident, however, that they contain inherited material much older than this. Within the period of a century and a half covered by our five copies, development is noticeable in the Pyramid Texts. Evidences of editing in the later copies, which, however, are not found in the earlier copies, are clearly discernible. The processes of thought and the development of custom and belief which brought them forth were going on until the last copy was produced in the early twenty-fifth century B. C. They represent a period of at least a thousand years, and a thousand years, it should not be forgotten, which was ended some four thousand five hundred years ago.

While their especial function may be broadly stated to be *to insure the king felicity in the hereafter,* the Pyramid Texts constantly reflect, as all literature does, the ebb and flow of the life around them, and they speak in terms of the experience of the men who produced them, terms current in the daily life of palace, street, and bazaar, or again terms which were born in the sacred solitude of the inner temple. But notwithstanding the fact that these archaic texts are saturated with the life out of which they have come, they form together almost a *terra incognita.* As one endeavours to penetrate it, his feeling is like that of entering a vast primeval forest, a twilight jungle filled with

strange forms and elusive shadows peopling a wilderness through which there is no path. An archaic orthography veils and obscures words with which the reader may be quite familiar in their later and habitual garb. They serve, too, in situations and with meanings as strange to the reader as their spelling. Besides these disguised friends, there is a host of utter strangers, a great company of archaic words which have lived a long and active life in a far-away world now completely lost and forgotten. Hoary with age, like exhausted runners, they totter into sight for a brief period, barely surviving in these ancient texts, then disappear forever, and hence are never met with again. They vaguely disclose to us a vanished world of thought and speech, the last of the unnumbered æons through which prehistoric man has passed till he finally comes within hailing distance of us as he enters the historic age. But these hoary strangers, survivors of a forgotten age, still serving on for a generation or two in the Pyramid Texts, often remain strangers until they disappear; we have no means of making their acquaintance or of forcing them to reveal to us their names or the message which they bear, and no art of lexicography can force them all to yield up their secrets. Combined with these words, too, there is a deal of difficult construction, much enhanced by the obscure, dark, and elusive nature of the content of these archaic documents; abounding in allusions to incidents in lost myths, to customs and usages long since ended, they are built up out of a fabric of life, thought, and experience largely unfamiliar or entirely unknown to us.

We have said that their function is essentially to insure the king's felicity in the hereafter. The chief and dominant note throughout is insistent, even passion-

ate, protest against death. They may be said to be the record of humanity's earliest supreme revolt against the great darkness and silence from which none returns. The word death never occurs in the Pyramid Texts except in the negative or applied to a foe. Over and over again we hear the indomitable assurance that the dead lives. "King Teti has not died the death, he has become a glorious one in the horizon"; "Ho, King Unis! Thou didst not depart dead, thou didst depart living"; "Thou hast departed that thou mightest live, thou hast not departed that thou mightest die"; "Thou diest not."

While the *content* of the Pyramid Texts may be thus indicated in a general way, a precise and full analysis is a far more difficult matter. The *form* of the literature contained is happily more easily disposed of. Among the oldest literary fragments in the collection are the religious hymns, and these exhibit an early poetic form, that of couplets displaying *parallelism in arrangement of words* and thought—the form which is familiar to all in the Hebrew psalms as "parallelism of members." It is carried back by its employment in the Pyramid Texts into the fourth millennium B. C.; by far earlier than its appearance anywhere else. It is indeed the oldest of all literary forms known to us. Its use is not confined to the hymns mentioned, but appears also in other portions of the Pyramid Texts, where it is, however, not usually so highly developed.

Besides this form, which strengthens the claim of these fragments to be regarded as literature in our sense of the term, there is here and there, though not frequently, some display of literary quality in thought and language. There is, for example, a fine touch of imagination in one of the many descriptions of the

resurrection of Osiris: "Loose thy bandages! They are not bandages, they are the locks of Nephthys," the weeping goddess hanging over the body of her dead brother. The ancient priest who wrote the line sees in the bandages that swathe the silent form the heavy locks of the goddess which fall and mingle with them. There is an elemental power, too, in the daring imagination which discerns the sympathetic emotion of the whole universe as the dread catastrophe of the king's death, and the uncanny power of his coming among the gods of the sky are realized by the elements. "The sky weeps for thee, the earth trembles for thee" say the ancient mourners for the king, or when they see him in imagination ascending the vault of the sky they say:

> "Clouds darken the sky,
> The stars rain down,
> The bows [a constellation] stagger,
> The bones of the Hell-hounds tremble,
> When they see King Unis,
> Dawning as a soul."

While the Pyramid Texts have not been able to shake off the old view of the sojourn at the tomb, they give it little thought, and deal almost entirely with a blessed life in a distant realm. Let it be stated clearly at the outset that this distant realm is the sky, and that the Pyramid Texts know practically nothing of the hereafter in the Nether World.

The men in whose hands the Pyramid Texts grew up took the greatest delight in elaborating and reiterating in ever new and different pictures the blessedness enjoyed by the king, thus protected, maintained, and honoured in the Sun-god's realm. Their imagination flits from figure to figure, and picture

to picture, and allowed to run like some wild tropical plant without control or guidance, weaves a complex fabric of a thousand hues which refuse to merge into one harmonious or coherent whole. At one moment the king is enthroned in Oriental splendour as he was on earth, at another he wanders in the Field of Rushes in search of food; here he appears in the bow of the Solar barque, yonder he is one of the Imperishable Stars acting as the servant of Re. There is no endeavour to harmonize these inconsistent representations, although in the mass we gain a broad impression of the eternal felicity of a godlike ruler, "who puts his annals (the record of his deeds) among his people, and his love among the gods."

Over and over again the story of the king's translation to the sky is brought before us with an indomitable conviction and insistence which it must be concluded were thought to make the words of inevitable power and effect. Condensed into a paragraph the whole sweep of the king's celestial career is brought before us in a few swift strokes, each like a ray of sunshine touching but for an instant the prominences of some far landscape across which we look. Long successions of such paragraphs crowd one behind another like the waves of the sea, as if to overwhelm and in their impetuous rush, to bear away as on a flood the insistent fact of death, and sweep it to utter annihilation. It is difficult to convey to the modern reader the impression made by these thousands of lines as they roll on in victorious disregard of the invincibility of death, especially in those epitomizations of the king's celestial career which are so frequent. In so far as they owe their impressiveness to their mere bulk, built up like a bulwark against death, we can gain the impression only by reading the whole collec-

tion through. The general character of such individual epitomizing paragraphs is perhaps suggested by such as the following: The voice addresses the king: "Thy seats among the gods abide; Re leans upon thee with his shoulder. Thy odour is as their odour, thy sweat is as the sweat of the Eighteen Gods. Thou dawnest, O King Teti, in the royal hood; thy hand seizes the sceptre, thy fist grasps the mace. Stand, O King Teti, in front of the two palaces of the South and the North. Judge the gods, (for) thou art of the elders who surround Re, who are before the Morning Star. Thou art born at thy new moons like the Moon. Re leans upon thee in the horizon, O King Teti. The Imperishable Stars follow thee, the companions of Re serve thee, O King Teti. Thou purifiest thyself, thou ascendest to Re; the sky is not empty of thee, O King Teti, forever."

Such in the main outlines were the beliefs held by the Egyptian of the Old Kingdom (2980–2475 B. C.) concerning the Solar hereafter. There can be no doubt that at some time they were a fairly well-defined group, separable as a group from those of the Osirian faith. To the Osirian faith, moreover, they were opposed, and evidences of their incompatibility, or even hostility, have survived. It is clear that in the Solar faith we have a state theology, with all the splendour and the prestige of its royal patrons behind it; while in that of Osiris we are confronted by a religion of the people, which made a strong appeal to the individual believer. In the mergence of these two faiths we discern for the first time in history the age-long struggle between the state form of religion and the popular faith of the masses. It must now be our purpose to disengage as far as may be the nucleus of the Osirian teaching of the after life, and to trace the still

undetermined course of its struggle with the imposing celestial theology whose epic of the royal dead we have been following.

Probably nothing in the life of the ancient Nile-dwellers commends them more appealingly to our sympathetic consideration than the fact that when the Osirian faith had once developed, it so quickly caught the popular imagination as to spread rapidly among all classes. It thus came into active competition with the Solar faith of the court and state priesthoods. This was especially true of its doctrines of the after life, in the progress of which we can discern the gradual Osirianization of Egyptian religion, and especially of the Solar teaching regarding the hereafter. There is nothing in the Osiris myth, nor in the character or later history of Osiris, to suggest a celestial hereafter. Indeed clear and unequivocal survivals from a period when Osiris was hostile to the celestial and Solar dead are still discoverable in the Pyramid Texts.

The supreme boon which the identity of the king with Osiris assured the dead Pharaoh was the good offices of Horus, the personification of filial piety. All the pious attentions which Osiris had once enjoyed at the hands of his son Horus now likewise become the king's portion. The litigation which the myth recounts at Heliopolis is successfully met by the aid of Horus, as well as Thoth, and, like Osiris, the dead king received the predicate " righteous of voice," or " justified," an epithet which was later construed as meaning " triumphant."

While the Heliopolitan priests thus solarized and celestialized the Osirian mortuary doctrines, although they were essentially terrestrial in origin and character, these Solar theologians were in their turn unable to resist the powerful influence which the popularity of

the Osirian faith brought to bear upon them. The Pyramid Texts were eventually Osirianized, and the steady progress of this process, exhibiting the course of the struggle between the Solar faith of the state temples and the popular beliefs of the Osirian religion thus discernible in the Pyramid Texts, is one of the most remarkable survivals from the early world, preserving as it does the earliest example of such a spiritual and intellectual conflict between state and popular religion. The dying Sun and the dying Osiris are here in competition. With the people the human Osiris makes the stronger appeal, and even the wealthy and subsidized priesthoods of the Solar religion could not withstand the power of this appeal. What we have opportunity to observe in the Pyramid Texts is specifically the gradual but irresistible intrusion of Osiris into the Solar doctrines of the hereafter and their resulting Osirianization.

Thus in the *royal* and *state temple* theology, Osiris *is lifted to the sky,* and while he is there Solarized, he also tinctures the Solar teaching of the celestial kingdom of the dead with Osirian doctrines. The result was thus inevitable confusion, as the two faiths interpenetrated. In both faiths we recall that the king is identified with the god, and hence we find him unhesitatingly called Osiris and Re in the same passage.

Nowhere in ancient times has the capacity of a race to control the material world been so fully expressed in surviving material remains as in the Nile valley. In the abounding fullness of their energies they built up a fabric of material civilization, the monuments of which it would seem time can never wholly sweep away. But the manifold substance of life, interfused of custom and tradition, of individual traits fashioned among social, economic, and governmental forces, ever

developing in the daily operations and functions of life—all that made the stage and setting amid which necessity for hourly moral decisions arises—all that creates the attitude of the individual and impels the inner man as he is called upon to make these decisions—all these constitute an elusive higher atmosphere of the ancient world which tomb masonry and pyramid orientation have not transmitted to us. Save in a few scanty references in the inscriptions of the Pyramid Age, it has vanished forever; for even the inscriptions, as we have seen, are concerned chiefly with the *material* welfare of the departed in the hereafter. What they disclose, however, is of unique interest, preserving as it does the earliest chapter in the moral development of man as known to us, a chapter marking perhaps the most important fundamental step in the evolution of civilization.

It is especially in the tomb that such claims of moral worthiness are made. This is not an accident; such claims are made in the tomb in this age with the logical purpose of securing in the hereafter any benefits accruing from such virtues. Thus on the base of a mortuary statue set up in a tomb, the deceased represented by the portrait statue says: "I had these statues made by the sculptor and he was satisfied with the pay which I gave him." The man very evidently wished it known that his mortuary equipment was honestly gotten.

Over and over these men of four thousand five hundred to five thousand years ago affirm their innocence of evil-doing. "Never did I do anything evil toward any person," says the chief physician of King Sahure in the middle of the twenty-eighth century before Christ; "I was a doer of that which pleased all men." It is evident from such addresses to the living as this

that one motive of these affirmations of estimable character was the hope of maintaining the good-will of one's surviving neighbours, that they might present mortuary offerings of food and drink at the tomb. It is equally clear also that such moral worthiness was deemed of value in the sight of the gods and might influence materially the happiness of the dead in the hereafter. An ethical ordeal awaited those who had passed into the shadow world. "I desired that it might be well with me in the Great God's presence," says a noble of the age.

It is of great importance to identify these ideas of a moral searching in the hereafter with one or the other of the two dominant theologies, that is with Re or Osiris. Unfortunately the god whose judgment is feared is not mentioned by name, but an epithet, "Great God," is employed instead. This is expanded in one tomb to "Great God, lord of the sky." It is hardly possible that any other than Re can be meant. There can be no doubt that in the Old Kingdom the sovereignty of Re had resulted in attributing to him the moral requirements laid upon the dead in the hereafter, and that in the surviving literature of that age he is chiefly the righteous god rather than Osiris. Contrary to the conclusion generally accepted at present, it was the Sun-god, therefore, who was the earliest champion of moral worthiness and the great judge in the hereafter. A thousand years later Osiris, as the victorious litigant at Heliopolis, as the champion of the dead who had legally triumphed over all his enemies, emerged as the great moral judge. In the usurpation of this rôle by Osiris we have another evidence of the irresistible process which Osirianized Egyptian religion. To these later conditions from which modern students have drawn their impressions, the current

conclusion regarding the early moral supremacy of Osiris is due. The greater age of the Solar faith in this as in other particulars is, however, perfectly clear.

As we have so often said, it is not easy to read the spiritual and intellectual progress of a race in monuments so largely material as contrasted with literary documents. It is easy to be misled and to misinterpret the meagre indications furnished by purely material monuments. Behind them lies a vast complex of human forces, and of human thinking which for the most part eludes us. Nevertheless it is impossible to contemplate the colossal tombs of the Fourth Dynasty, so well known as the Pyramids of Gizeh, and to contrast them with the comparatively diminutive tombs which follow in the next two dynasties, without, as we have before hinted, discerning more than exclusively political causes behind this sudden and startling change. The insertion of the Pyramid Texts themselves during the last century and a half of the Pyramid Age is an evident resort to less material forces enlisted on behalf of the departed Pharaoh as he confronted the shadow world. On the other hand, the Great Pyramids of Gizeh represent, as we have said before, the struggle of Titanic material forces in the endeavour by purely material means to immortalize the king's physical body, enveloping it in a vast and impenetrable husk of masonry, there to preserve forever all that linked the spirit of the king to material life. The Great Pyramids of Gizeh, while they are to-day the most imposing surviving witnesses to the earliest emergence of organized man and the triumph of concerted effort, are likewise the silent but eloquent expression of a supreme endeavour to achieve immortality by sheer physical force. For merely physical reasons such a colossal struggle with the forces of de-

cay could not go on indefinitely; with these reasons political tendencies, too, made common cause; but combined with all these we must not fail to see that the mere insertion of the Pyramid Texts in itself in the royal tombs of the last century and a half of the Pyramid Age was an abandonment of the Titanic struggle with material forces and an evident resort to less tangible agencies. The recognition of a judgment and the requirement of moral worthiness in the hereafter was a still more momentous step in the same direction. It marked a transition from a reliance on agencies *external* to the personality of the dead to dependence on *inner* values. Immortality began to make its appeal as a thing achieved in a man's own soul. It was the beginning of a shift of emphasis from objective advantages to subjective qualities. It meant the ultimate extension of the dominion of God beyond the limits of the material world, that he might reign in the invisible kingdom of the heart. It was thus also the first step in the long process by which the individual personality begins to emerge as contrasted with the mass of society, a process which we can discern likewise in the marvellous portrait sculpture of the Pyramid Age. The vision of the possibilities of individual character had dimly dawned upon the minds of these men of the early world; their own moral ideas were passing into the character of their greatest gods, and with this supreme achievement the development of the five hundred years which we call the Pyramid Age had reached its close.

When Egypt emerged from the darkness which followed the Pyramid Age, and after a century and a half of preparatory development reached the culmination of the Feudal Age (Twelfth Dynasty), about 2000 B. C., the men of this classic period looked back

upon a struggle of their ancestors with death—a struggle whose visible monuments were distributed along a period of fifteen hundred years. Of the thousand years which had elapsed since the Pyramid Age began, the first five hundred was impressively embodied before their eyes in that sixty-mile rampart of pyramids sweeping along the margin of the western desert. There they stretched like a line of silent outposts on the frontiers of death. It was a thousand years since the first of them had been built, and five hundred years had elapsed since the architects had rolled up their papyrus drawings of the latest, and the last group of workmen had gathered up their tools and departed. The priesthoods, too, left without support, had, as we have already seen, long forsaken the sumptuous temples and monumental approaches that rose on the valley side. The sixty-mile pyramid cemetery lay in silent desolation, deeply encumbered with sand half-hiding the ruins of massive architecture, of fallen architraves and prostrate colonnades, a solitary waste where only the slinking figure of the vanishing jackal suggested the futile protection of the old mortuary gods of the desert. Even at the present day no such imposing spectacle as the pyramid cemeteries of Egypt is to be found anywhere in the ancient world, and we easily recall something of the reverential awe with which they oppressed us when we first looked upon them. Do we ever realize that this impression was felt by their descendants only a few centuries after the builders had passed away? and that they were already ancient to the men of 2000 B. C.? On the minds of the men of the Feudal Age the Pyramid cemetery made a profound impression. If already in the Pyramid Age there had been some relaxation in the conviction that by sheer material force man might make

conquest of immortality, the spectacle of these colossal ruins now quickened such doubts into open scepticism, a scepticism which ere long found effective literary expression.

It was a momentous thousand years of intellectual progress, therefore, of which these sceptics of the Feudal Age represented the culmination. Their mental attitude finds expression in a song of mourning, doubtless often repeated in the cemetery, and as we follow the lines we might conclude that the author had certainly stood on some elevated point overlooking the pyramid cemetery of the Old Kingdom as he wrote them.

SONG OF THE HARPER

"How prosperous is this good prince!
It is a goodly destiny, that the bodies
diminish,
Passing away while others remain,
Since the time of the ancestors,
The gods who were aforetime,
Who rest in their pyramids,
Nobles and the glorious departed likewise,
Entombed in their pyramids,
Those who built their (tomb)-temples,
Their place is no more.
Behold what has become of them;
Behold the places thereof;
Their walls are dismantled,
Their places are no more,
As if they had never been.

"None cometh from thence
That he may tell (us) how they fare;
That he may tell (us) of their fortunes,
That he may content our heart,
Until we (too) depart
To the place whither they have gone.

"Encourage thy heart to forget it,
Making it pleasant for thee to follow thy
desire,
While thou livest.
Put myrrh upon thy head
And garments on thee of fine linen,
Imbued with marvellous luxuries,
The genuine things of the gods.

"Celebrate the glad day,
Be not weary therein,
Lo, no man taketh his goods with him.
Yea, none returneth again that is gone
thither."

Self-indulgence and hereafter a good name *on earth* may be said to summarize the teaching of these sceptics, who have cast away the teaching of the fathers. Nevertheless there were those who rejected even these admonitions as but a superficial solution of the dark problem of life. Suppose that the good name be innocently and unjustly forfeited, and the opportunities for self-indulgence cut off by disease and misfortune. It is exactly this situation which is presented to us in one of the most remarkable documents surviving from this remote age. We may term it "The Dialogue of a Misanthrope with His Own Soul," though no ancient title has survived. This unhappy sufferer finds no solution of his problem of life but to end it, and his dialogue concludes with a song in praise of death.

DEATH A GLAD RELEASE

"Death is before me to-day
(Like) the recovery of a sick man,
Like going forth into a garden after sickness.

"Death is before me to-day,
As a man longs to see his house
When he has spent years in captivity."

Thus longing for the glad release which death affords, the soul of the unhappy man at last yields, he enters the shadow and passes on to be with "those who are yonder." In spite of the evident crudity of the composition it is not without some feeling that we watch this unknown go, the earliest human soul into the chambers of which we are permitted a glimpse across a lapse of four thousand years.

In this document, then, we discern the emergence of a new realm, the realm of social forces; for while we have here the tragedy of the *individual* unjustly afflicted, his very affliction is due to the inexorable grip of social forces, calling for a crusade of social righteousness. The dawn of that social crusade and the regeneration which followed are still to be considered. For concern for social misfortune, the ability to contemplate and discern the unworthiness of men, the calamities that befall society, and the chronic misery which afflicts men as a body now appear as the subject of dark and pessimistic reflections in this remarkable age of growing self-consciousness and earliest disillusionment.

The appearance in this remote age of the necessary detachment and the capacity to contemplate society, things before unknown in the thought of man, is a significant phenomenon. Still more significant, however, is a vision of the possible redemption of society, and the agent of that redemption as a righteous king, who is to shield his own and to purge the earth of the wicked. And this justice which was to rule the world of the living was to pass over also into the world of the dead. A pamphleteer for social justice nearly four thousand years ago admonishes the nobles of his time: "Do justice for the sake of the lord of justice. . . . For justice (or 'righteousness, right, truth')

is for eternity. It descends with him that doeth it into the grave, when he is placed in the coffin and laid in the earth. His name is not effaced on earth; he is remembered because of good. Such is the exact summation of the divine word." " . . . this good word which came out of the mouth of Re himself: 'Speak the truth, do the truth. For it is great, it is mighty, it is enduring. The reward thereof shall find thee, and it shall follow (thee) unto blessedness hereafter.'" The moral obligation which men felt within them became a fiat of the god, their own abomination of injustice soon became that of the god, and their own moral ideals, thus becoming likewise those of the god, gained a new mandatory power.

It was now not only religious belief and social axiom, but also formally announced royal policy, that before the bar of justice the great and the powerful must expect the same treatment and the same verdict accorded to the poor and the friendless. Here then ended the special and peculiar claim of the great and powerful to consideration and to felicity in the hereafter, and the democratization of blessedness beyond the grave began. A friendless peasant pleading with a great lord for justice, says to him, "Beware! Eternity approaches." Ameni, a great lord of Benihasan, sets forth upon his tomb door the record of social justice in his treatment of all as the best passport he can devise for the long journey. Over and over again the men of the Feudal Age reiterate in their tombs their claims to righteousness of character. "Sesenebnef (the deceased) has done righteousness, his abomination was evil, he saw it not," says an official of the time on his sarcophagus. The mortuary texts which fill the cedar coffins of this age show clearly that the consciousness of moral responsibility in

the hereafter has greatly deepened since the Pyramid Age. The balances of justice to which the peasant just mentioned appealed so often and so dramatically were now really finding place in the drama of justification hereafter. "The doors of the sky are opened to thy beauty," says one to the deceased; "thou ascendest, thou seest Hathor. Thy evil is expelled, thy iniquity is wiped away, by those who weigh with the balances on the day of reckoning." The conviction was now universal that *every* soul must meet this ethical ordeal in the hereafter. It now became, or let us say that at the advent of the Middle Kingdom it had become, the custom to append to the name of every deceased person the epithet "justified."

The scepticism toward preparations for the hereafter involving a massive tomb and elaborate mortuary furniture, the pessimistic recognition of the futility of material equipment for the dead, pronounced as we have seen these tendencies to be in the Feudal Age, were, nevertheless, but an eddy in the broad current of Egyptian life. As the felicity of the departed was democratized, the common people took up and continued the old mortuary usages, and the development and elaboration of such customs went on without heeding the eloquent silence and desolation that reigned on the pyramid plateau and in the cemeteries of the fathers.

It is not until this Feudal Age that we gain any full impression of the picturesque customs connected with the dead, the observance of which was now so deeply rooted in the life of the people. The tombs still surviving in the baronies of Upper Egypt have preserved some memorials of the daily and customary, as well as of the ceremonial and festival, usages with which the people thought to brighten and render more at-

tractive the life of those who had passed on. We find the same precautions taken by the nobles which we observed in the Pyramid Age.

The marvel is that with their ancestors' ruined tombs before them they nevertheless still went on to build for themselves sepulchres which were inevitably to meet the same fate. The tomb of Khnumhotep, the greatest of those left us by the Benihasan lords of four thousand years ago, bears on its walls, among the beautiful paintings which adorn them, the scribblings of a hundred and twenty generations in Egyptian, Coptic, Greek, Arabic, French, Italian, English. The earliest of these scrawls is that of an Egyptian scribe who entered the tomb-chapel over three thousand years ago and wrote with reed pen and ink upon the wall these words: "The scribe Amenmose came to see the temple of Khufu and found it like the heavens when the sun rises therein." The chapel was some seven hundred years old when this scribe entered it, and its owner, although one of the greatest lords of his time, was so completely forgotten that the visitor, finding the name of Khufu in a casual geographical reference among the inscriptions on the wall, mistook the place for a chapel of Khufu, the builder of the Great Pyramid. All knowledge of the noble and of the endowments which were to support him in the hereafter had disappeared in spite of every precaution. How vain and futile now appear the imprecations on these time-stained walls!

But the Egyptian was not wholly without remedy even in the face of this dire contingency. He endeavoured to meet the difficulty by engraving on the front of his tomb, prayers believed to be efficacious in supplying all the needs of the dead in the hereafter. All passers-by were solemnly adjured to utter these

prayers on behalf of the dead. The belief in the effectiveness of the uttered word on behalf of the dead had developed enormously since the Old Kingdom. This is a development which accompanies the popularization of the mortuary customs of the upper classes. In the Pyramid Age, as we have seen, such utterances were confined to the later pyramids. These concern exclusively the destiny of the Pharaoh in the hereafter. They were now largely appropriated by the middle and the official class. At the same time there emerge similar utterances, identical in function but evidently more suited to the needs of common mortals. These represent, then, a body of similar mortuary literature among the *people* of the Feudal Age, some fragments of which are much older than this age. Later the Book of the Dead was made up of selections from the humbler and more popular mortuary literature. Copious extracts from both the Pyramid Texts and these forerunners of the Book of the Dead, about half from each of the two sources, were now written on the inner surfaces of the heavy cedar coffins, in which the better burials of this age are found. The number of such mortuary texts is still constantly increasing as additional coffins from this age are found. Every local coffin-maker was furnished by the priests of his town with copies of these utterances. Before the coffins were put together, the scribes in the maker's employ filled the inner surfaces with pen-and-ink copies of such texts as he had available. It was all done with great carelessness and inaccuracy, the effort being to fill up the planks as fast as possible. They often wrote the same chapter over twice or three times in the same coffin, and in one instance a chapter is found no less than five times in the same coffin.

While the destiny, everywhere so evidently royal in

the Pyramid Texts, has thus become the portion of any one, the simpler life of the humbler citizen which he longed to see continued in the hereafter is quite discernible, also in these Coffin Texts. As he lay in his coffin he could read a chapter which concerned "Building a house for a man in the Nether World, digging a pool and planting fruit-trees." Once supplied with a house, surrounded by a garden with its pool and its shade-trees, the dead man must be assured that he will be able to occupy it, and hence a "chapter of a man's being in his house." The lonely sojourn there without the companionship of family and friends was an intolerable thought, and hence a further chapter entitled "Sealing of a Decree concerning the Household, to give the Household [to a man] in the Nether World."

A tendency which later came fully to its own in the Book of the Dead is already the dominant tendency in these Coffin Texts. It regards the hereafter as a place of innumerable dangers and ordeals, most of them of a physical nature, although they sometimes concern also the intellectual equipment of the deceased. The weapon to be employed and the surest means of defense available to the deceased was some magical agency, usually a charm to be pronounced at the critical moment. This tendency then inclined to make the Coffin Texts, and ultimately the Book of the Dead which grew out of them, more and more a collection of charms, which were regarded as inevitably effective in protecting the dead or securing for him any of the blessings which were desired in the life beyond the grave. But the imagination of the priests, who could only gain by the issuance of ever new chapters, undoubtedly contributed much to heighten the popular dread of the dangers of the hereafter and spread the belief in the usefulness of such means for meeting

them. The belief in the efficacy of magic as an infallible agent in the hand of the dead man was thus steadily growing, and we shall see it ultimately dominating the whole body of mortuary belief as it emerges a few centuries later in the Book of the Dead.

Powerful as the Osiris faith had been in the Pyramid Age, its wide popularity now surpassed anything before known. The blessings which the Osirian destiny in the hereafter offered to all proved an attraction of universal power. Although they had once been an exclusively royal prerogative, as was the Solar destiny in the Pyramid Texts, even the royal Solar hereafter had now been appropriated by all. One of the ancient tombs of the Thinite kings at Abydos, a tomb now thirteen or fourteen hundred years old, had by this time come to be regarded as the tomb of Osiris. It rapidly became the Holy Sepulchre of Egypt, to which all classes pilgrimaged. There must eventually have been multitudes of these pilgrims, especially at that season when in the earliest known drama the incidents of the god's myth were dramatically reënacted in what may properly be called a "passion play." Thus while the supremacy of Re was a political triumph, that of Osiris, while unquestionably fostered by an able priesthood probably practising constant propaganda, was a triumph of popular faith among all classes of society, a triumph which not even the court and the nobles were able to resist.

In all this popular movement the magic of daily life was more and more brought to bear on the hereafter and placed at the service of the dead. As the Empire rose in the sixteenth century B. C., we find folk-charms drawn from the life of *this* world serving among the mortuary texts inserted in the tomb. A charm by which a mother, soothing her baby as darkness gath-

ered, prevented an evil demon from stealing away the child, appears as a *mortuary* charm entitled: "Chapter of Not Permitting a Man's Heart to be Taken Away from Him in the Nether World," a chapter already found in the Coffin Texts of the Middle Kingdom. These charms now greatly increased in number, and each was given a title indicating just what it was intended to accomplish for the deceased. Combined with some of the old hymns of praise to Re and Osiris, which might be recited at the funeral, and usually including also some account of the judgment, these mortuary texts were now written on a roll of papyrus and deposited with the dead in the tomb. It is these papyri which have now commonly come to be called the Book of the Dead. As a matter of fact, there was in the Empire no uniform selection of texts making up this book. Each roll contained a random collection of such mortuary texts as the scribal copyist happened to have at hand, or those which he found enabled him best to sell his rolls; that is, such as enjoyed the greatest popularity. There were sumptuous and splendid rolls, sixty to eighty feet long, containing from seventy-five to as many as a hundred and twenty-five or thirty chapters. On the other hand, the scribes also copied small and modest rolls but a few feet in length, bearing but a meagre selection of the more important chapters. Consequently no two rolls exhibit the same collection of charms and chapters throughout, and it was not until the Ptolemaic period, from the third century B. C. onward, that a more nearly canonical selection of chapters was gradually introduced. It will be seen, then, as we have said, that, properly speaking, there was in the Empire no *Book* of the Dead, but only various groups of mortuary papyri of the time. The entire body of chapters from which these rolls were

made up, were some two hundred in number, although even the largest rolls did not contain them all. Groups of chapters forming the most common nucleus of the Book of the Dead were frequently called "Chapters of Ascending by Day," a designation also in use in the Coffin Texts; but there was no current title for a roll of the Book of the Dead as a whole.

While the Book of the Dead is largely made up of magical charms, that which saves it from being exclusively a magical *Vade mecum* for use in the hereafter is its elaboration of the ancient idea of the moral judgment, and its evident appreciation of the burden of conscience. To this inner voice of the heart, which with surprising insight was even termed a man's god, the Egyptian was now more sensitive than ever before during the long course of the ethical evolution which we have been following. This sensitiveness finds very full expression in the account of the judgment, the most important if not the longest section of the Book of the Dead. Whereas the judgment hereafter is mentioned as far back as the Pyramid Age, we now find a very full account and description of it in the Book of the Dead. The judge Osiris is assisted by forty-two gods who sit with him in judgment on the dead. They are terrifying demons, each bearing a grotesque and horrible name, which the deceased claims that he knows. He therefore addresses them one after the other by name. They are such names as these: "Broad-Stride-that-Came-out-of-Heliopolis," "Flame-Hugger-that-Came-out-of-Troja," "Nosey-that-Came-out-of-Hermopolis," "Shadow-Eater-that-Came-out-of-the-Cave."

It is evident that the forty-two gods are an artificial creation. As was long ago noticed, they represent the forty or more nomes, or administrative districts, of

Egypt. The priests doubtless built up this court of forty-two judges in order to control the character of the dead from all quarters of the country. The deceased would find himself confronted by one judge at least who was acquainted with his local reputation, and who could not be deceived. To each one of these forty-two judges the deceased addressed a plea of "not guilty" of some particular sin. The editors had some difficulty in finding enough sins to make up a list of forty-two, and there are several verbal repetitions with slight changes in the wording. These forty-two pleas of not guilty may be divided into four groups. The crimes which may be called those of (I) *violence* are these: "I did not slay men (5), I did not rob (2), I did not steal (4), I did not rob one crying for his possessions (18), my fortune was not great but by my (own) property (41), I did not take away food (10), I did not stir up fear (21), I did not stir up strife (25)." (II) *Deceitfulness and other undesirable qualities of character* are also disavowed: "I did not speak lies (9), I did not make falsehood in the place of truth (40), I was not deaf to truthful words (24), I did not diminish the grain-measure (6), I was not avaricious (3), my heart devoured not (coveted not?) (28), my heart was not hasty (31), I did not multiply words in speaking (33), my voice was not over loud (37), my mouth did not wag (lit. go) (17), I did not wax hot (in temper) (23), I did not revile (29), I was not an eavesdropper (16), I was not puffed up (39)." The dead man is free from (III) *sexual immorality:* "I did not commit adultery, with a woman (19), I did not commit self-pollution (20, 27);" and (IV) *ceremonial transgressions* are also denied: "I did not revile the king (35), I did not blaspheme the god (38), I did not slay the

divine bull (13), I did not steal temple endowment (8), I did not diminish food in the temple (15), I did not do an abomination of the gods (42)." These, with several repetitions and some that are unintelligible, make up this declaration of innocence.

This section of the Book of the Dead is commonly called the "Confession." It would be difficult to devise a term more opposed to the real character of the dead man's statement, which as a declaration of innocence is, of course, the reverse of a confession. The ineptitude of the designation has become so evident that some editors have added the word "negative," and thus call it the "negative confession," which means nothing at all. The Egyptian does *not* confess at this judgment, and this is a fact of the utmost importance in his religious development. To mistake this section of the Book of the Dead for "confession" is totally to misunderstand the development which was now slowly carrying him toward that complete acknowledgment and humble disclosure of his sin which is nowhere found in the Book of the Dead.

Another record of the judgment was doubtless the version which made the deepest impression upon the Egyptian. Like the drama of Osiris at Abydos, it is graphic and depicts the judgment as effected by the balances. In the sumptuously illustrated papyrus of Ani we see Osiris sitting enthroned at one end of the judgment hall, with Isis and Nephthys standing behind him. Along one side of the hall are ranged the nine gods of the Heliopolitan Ennead, headed by the Sun-god. *They* afterward announce the verdict, showing the originally Solar origin of this scene of judgment, in which Osiris has now assumed the chief place. In the midst stand "the balances of Re wherewith he weighs truth," as we have seen them called in

the Feudal Age; but the judgment in which they figure has now become Osirianized.

At the critical moment Ani addresses his own heart: "O my heart that came from my mother! O my heart belonging to my being! Rise not up against me as a witness." Evidently the appeal has proven effective, for Thoth, "envoy of the Great Ennead, that is in the presence of Osiris," at once says: "Hear ye this word in truth. I have judged the heart of Osiris [Ani]. His soul stands as a witness concerning him, his character is just by the great balances. No sin of his has been found." The Nine Gods of the Ennead at once respond. "How good it is, this which comes forth from thy just mouth. Osiris Ani, the justified, witnesses. There is no sin of his, there is no evil of his with us. The Devouress shall not be given power over him. Let there be given to him the bread that cometh forth before Osiris, the domain that abideth in the field of offerings, like the Followers of Horus."

These accounts of the judgment, in spite of the grotesque appurtenances with which the priests of the times have embellished them, are not without impressiveness even to the modern beholder as he contemplates these rolls of three thousand five hundred years ago, and realizes that these scenes are the graphic expression of the same moral consciousness, of the same admonishing voice within, to which we still feel ourselves amenable. Ani importunes his heart not to betray him, and his cry finds an echo down all the ages in such words as those of Richard:

> "My conscience hath a thousand several tongues,
> And every tongue brings in a several tale,
> And every tale condemns me for a villain."

The Egyptian heard the same voice, feared it, and endeavoured to silence it. He strove to still the voice of the heart; he did not yet confess, but insistently maintained his innocence. The next step in his higher development was humbly to disclose the consciousness of guilt to his god. That step he later took. But another force intervened and greatly hampered the complete emancipation of his conscience. There can be no doubt that this Osirian judgment thus graphically portrayed and the universal reverence for Osiris in the Empire had much to do with spreading the belief in moral responsibility beyond the grave, and in giving general currency to those ideas of the supreme value of moral worthiness which we find among the moralists and social philosophers of the Pharaoh's court several centuries earlier, in the Feudal Age. The Osiris faith had thus become a great power for righteousness *among the people*. While the Osirian destiny was open to all, nevertheless all must prove themselves morally acceptable to him.

Had the priests left the matter thus, all would have been well. Unhappily, however, the development of the belief in the efficacy of magic in the next world continued. All material blessings, as we have seen, might infallibly be attained by the use of the proper charm. Even the less tangible mental equipment, the "heart," meaning the understanding, might also be restored by magical agencies. It was inevitable that the priests should now take the momentous step of permitting such agencies to enter also the world of moral values. Magic might become an agent for moral ends. The Book of the Dead is chiefly a book of magical charms, and the section pertaining to the judgment did not continue to remain an exception. The poignant words addressed by Ani to his heart as it was weighed

in the balances, "O my heart rise not up against me as a witness," were now written upon a stone image of the sacred beetle, the scarabeus, and placed over the heart as a mandate of magical potency preventing the heart from betraying the character of the deceased. The words of this charm became a chapter of the Book of the Dead, where they bore the title, "Chapter of Preventing that the Heart of a Man Oppose him in the Nether World." The scenes of the judgment and the text of the Declaration of Innocence were multiplied on rolls by the scribes and sold to all the people. In these copies the places for the name of the deceased were left vacant, and the purchaser filled in the blanks after he had secured the document. The words of the verdict, declaring the deceased had successfully met the judgment and acquitting him of evil, were not lacking in any of these rolls. Any citizen, whatever the character of his life, might thus secure from the scribes a certificate declaring that Blank was a righteous man before it was known who Blank would be. He might even obtain a formulary so mighty that the Sun-god, as the real power behind the judgment, would be cast down from heaven into the Nile if he did not bring forth the deceased fully justified before his court. Thus the earliest moral development which we can trace in the ancient East was suddenly arrested, or at least seriously checked, by the detestable devices of a corrupt priesthood eager for gain.

It is needless to point out the confusion of distinctions involved in this last application of magic. It is the old failure to perceive the difference between that which goeth in and that which cometh out of the man. A justification mechanically applied from without, and freeing the man from punishments coming from without, cannot, of course, heal the ravages that have

taken place within. The voice within, to which the Egyptian was more sensitive than any people of the earlier East, and to which the whole idea of the moral ordeal in the hereafter was due, could not be quieted by any such means. Nevertheless the general reliance upon such devices for escaping ultimate responsibility for an unworthy life must have seriously poisoned the life of the people. While the Book of the Dead discloses to us more fully than ever before in the history of Egypt the character of the moral judgment in the hereafter, and the reality with which the Egyptian clothed his conception of moral responsibility, it is likewise a revelation of ethical decadence. In so far as the Book of the Dead had become a magical agency for securing moral vindication in the hereafter, irrespective of character, it had become a positive force for evil.

In the days of the Greek kings, the Osirian faith finally submerged the venerable Sun-god, with whose name the greatest movements in the history of Egyptian religion were associated, and when the Roman emperor became an Oriental Sun-god, *sol invictus,* the process was in large measure due to the influence of Asiatic Solar religion rather than to the Solar Pharaoh, who, as we have seen in the Pyramid Texts, had been sovereign and Sun-god at the same time many centuries before such doctrines are discernible in Asia. Whether they are in Asia the result of Egyptian influence is a question still to be investigated. In any case, as Osiris-Apis or Serapis, Osiris gained the supreme place in the popular as well as the state religion, and through him the subterranean hereafter, rather than the Sun-god's glorious celestial kingdom of the dead, passed over into the Roman world. There is not space here to

discuss the influence of Egyptian ideas of the hereafter in the gradual spread of Christianity, but it is significant to note the recent discovery of a tomb in Upper Egypt containing a painting of the resurrection of Osiris, in which the god is depicted in the form of a fish, lying on the bier. It is evident that the fish as used in Christian symbolism suggested far more than five initial letters, and the discovery is obviously additional evidence of the influence of Osirian religion on Christian ideas of the resurrection.

III

IMMORTALITY IN INDIA

E. Washburn Hopkins

FIFTY years ago it was generally assumed that if several branches of the Aryan race possessed any one belief, that belief must have been prehistorical, reverting to the period when Hindu, Greek, and Irish made one happy family. Thus, because these three peoples spoke of an existence beyond the grave, belief in such an existence was said to be "primitive Aryan." Doubtless such was the case, but not on this account, for the argument failed to recognize that in this as in many similar cases different human groups may arrive independently at the same conclusion. In this particular instance, since few savages are so lacking in imagination as not to believe in ghosts, it is most probable that the primitive Aryans (if as a group they ever existed, which is matter of dubiety) did believe that there is a life beyond the grave.

A more serious error in the ratiocination of a half century ago was the assumption that belief in a life beyond the grave implied belief in immortality. But the two beliefs are by no means identical. Thousands of savages think that, though they will live hereafter, their after-life will be short; the surviving ghost will die again once for all, or will be devoured of the gods. Others opine that only a few favoured or highly-gifted individual souls will continue to live for a time,

while the mass of those who die will at once, or soon, cease to exist, evaporating forever. There are thus sundry varieties of belief in a future life that do not necessarily involve the notion of immortality. Even when that notion and the word for it are current, it does not follow that "immortality" is regarded as inevitably associated with the future of a human being.

The religious ideas of the people now called Hindus are contained in documents dating from various periods, the oldest document (not yet a writing) being the Hymns of the Rig Veda, which reflect the faith of the second millennium B. C. Later Vedas, such as the Atharva Veda, and their prose Brahmanas portray the beliefs of the first half of the first millennium, before Buddhism arose in the sixth century. The Upanishads, in the main contemporary with or slightly earlier than the first Buddhistic period, already reveal, though in a crude form, a fully developed belief in an All-Soul, whereof man's soul is a part and hence, like the All-Soul, is immortal. Thereafter, the doctrine of immortality was concerned with the relation existing between the soul of the individual and the All-Soul, or, since the monistic doctrine was not universal but was opposed by a dualistic conception, which admitted two immortal elements, the individual soul and matter, it was concerned with the relation existing between this soul and matter; but in both views the individual soul was immortal. At the same time, however, there was a strong tendency, reaching back into remote ages, to interpret the philosophic All-Soul in a religious rather than in a logically philosophical way, to deny that it was without attributes, to endow it with personality; in short to regard the All-Soul as God, the creator, and preserver, a Divine Being who had for man a fatherly regard and to whom man's soul after death

would return; whether to be absorbed into the Divine Being or to live with it as a distinct individual soul, was matter of theological debate.

The belief in immortality, of course, represents these various phases from the human point of view. The doctrine of immortality once established, as in some form or other it was established in the earliest period, persisted and has never ceased to be a potent element in Hindu religious life, fighting its way through the brief opposition of those radicals who maintained as early as the sixth century before Christ that "soul" was only a form of matter answering to fermentation, and successfully persisting through the period when the concept "soul" was reinterpreted by Buddha as a physical complex held together only by "desire," and immortality, as usually conceived, was regarded as a curse rather than a blessing.

For the first belief of the Hindus, or of those Aryans who later became Hindus, the Rig Veda is of course the paramount authority. This work, consisting of more than a thousand devotional songs, with some admixture of worldly poems, is a collection representing widely different views developed during centuries of growth. It is in the later parts of the work that allusions to human immortality are most common. Three-quarters of the actual instances of the use of the word itself as applied to man are found in the later hymns. As for the gods, they were from the beginning briefly characterized as "the immortals." The word "immortal" was synonymous with Deva (deus), as "mortal" was synonymous with man. "All the immortals" is a phrase used occasionally in the sense "all the gods." Between gods and men is recognized a class of active beings who were at first mortal but, owing to their good works,

apparently in regulating the seasons, they "attained to immortality," which is the same as saying "became gods."

These are the Ribhus, whom some scholars identify phonetically with our "elves." The language used in regard to their deification is, with the exception of one passage, virtually the same: "These, although mortal, got immortality (variant "attained godhead") through their work."[1] The exception comes in a presumably late hymn where, although the same statement is made as elsewhere, namely that the Ribhus got immortality through their work, it is prefixed by the apparently contradictory statement that Savitar, the inspiring god, inspired their immortality, or as it is sometimes rendered, "gave them immortality."[2] But Savitar as the abstract energizer or inspirer may be said to have given them energy, which resulted in their successful work being rewarded, without an actual contradiction of the received notion that their work was the cause of their immortality. The passage is not without importance because it shows an early tendency to attribute mortal happiness hereafter to a special act of a divine power as contrasted with the compelling power of a man's good works to attain the same result. The same phrase is used of Savitar as inspiring or energizing the gods themselves, so that they also are represented in one passage as owing immortality, "the highest gift," to the energizing power of Savitar, who also gives to men "recurrent lives."[3] This means only that to live long, either as immortals or in repeated generations, there must be a corresponding vital force or energy, the source of which is here said to be the

[1] Rig Veda, iii. 60, 2–3; iv. 33, 4; *ibid.* 35, 3, and 36, 4.
[2] Rig Veda, i. 110, 3 and 4, literally, "the inspirer inspired."
[3] Rig Veda, iv. 54, 2; "lives one after the other," probably refers to the passing generations, not to transmigration-births.

abstract divinity called the inspiring or energizing power or god.

It is quite possible that the notion of human immortality as consisting in successive lives of generations was current alongside of the notion of life in heaven. The Fathers (ancestral spirits) always become rather vague images to the remote descendants and it may have been felt that a man's truest immortality was in being reborn in his children. There is a prayer in the Rig Veda to Fire: "O Fire, I, the mortal, call upon thee, the immortal, may I obtain immortality through children," [4] which implies desire for that physical immortality of which Diotima speaks in Plato's Symposium (page 208). That this notion persisted till a late period is evident from the legal literature. In the aphorisms of Apastamba it is stated that the Sacred Tradition says "immortality is offspring," and then a verse is cited: "In thy offspring thou art born again; that, mortal, is thy immortality." [5] Again, even in this simple appeal to the Fire-god ("May I obtain," that is, from thee) there is a distinct recognition of the fact that to the Vedic people immortality is not inherent in man. The gift of immortality thus physically understood is in the power of Fire as giver of virility, just as Vishnu, "the protector of the seed" is invoked with the rain-gods (also seed-givers) [6] to "give the strength for progeny." Perhaps the prayer, "O Maruts, set us in immortality" may have the same

[4] Rig Veda, v. 4, 10. Compare *ibid.* ii. 33, 1, "may we be born again through children."

[5] Ap. Dh. Sutra, ii. 9, 24, 1 (TB. i. 5, 5, 6: *tad u te martya amritam*). The perverted use made of the quotation is to interpret it as meaning that the Manes are kept alive by the food offered by their descendants. But the original sense is shown by comparing Vas. xvii. 1f.: "The father obtains immortality on seeing his son" (approved by Manu, ix.137).

[6] Rig Veda, vii. 57, 6.

implication.[7] It is at any rate clear that man is not inevitably immortal. When once he has died he will, so to speak, naturally keep on living, barring the annihilation which will be his lot if he has deeply offended the gods. All the Vedic prayers for immortality imply the consent of the gods and that consent, as is clear from many passages, is not given in the case of unforgiven sinners. These, instead of living hereafter, sink into the "lap of destruction," otherwise called "black darkness," "the hole that has no hold," "the pit below," that is, a kind of Sheol, where life evaporates or ceases altogether. But in the earliest period there is no suggestion of corporal punishment in this pit or of torment other than this destruction. It is therefore a kind of negative punishment. Life and strength die and so dies utterly the man. Other men, not thus punished, go to heaven and that this is the expected event may be seen from the burial hymn which implies that the soul or "unborn part," after the physical body has reverted to its place of origin (eye to the sun, breath to the wind, etc.), is to go to "the pleasant place in the sky where the Fathers live with the gods in the third heaven." Nevertheless, though the natural event is the flight of the soul to the abode of bliss with the Fathers, it is still a favour of the gods when the soul thus arrived is permitted to stay there forever. Hence immortality is begged of the gods as casually as are water and other good gifts. "O Mitra and Varuna, we beg you for rain, for blessings, for immortality."[8] So the prayer: "May I be loosed from death as a gourd from its stem, not (loosed) from immortality."[9]

[7] *Ibid.* vii. 36, 9 and v. 55, 4. [8] Rig Veda, v. 63, 2.
[9] *Ibid.*, vii. 59, 12. The expression "having an immortal soul" is used of man first in the later Atharva Veda (*amritasu*, v. 1, 7),

The men who "get immortality" are thus those who please the gods. Now the way to please the gods is to sacrifice to them. Hence the Angirasas, semi-divine ancestors of the poets, are said to have attained to friendship with Indra by sacrifice and sacrificial gifts to the priests.[10] This leads to the next step, the priestly generalization that "those who give sacrificial gifts have a share in immortality."[11] Still more bluntly, with the use of the same phrase, is it said: "Those who give gold (to the priests) have a share in immortality."[12] These are the "good works" which, according to later belief, give immortality. Another passage even anticipates the philosophical dictum ("one attains to immortality by good works or by wisdom") in a Vedic form by saying that those who understand the metres of the Rig Veda "attain to immortality."[13] Such promises as these belong, however, to the latest stage of the Rig Veda and may be regarded as a perversion on the part of the priests in their own interest, of a general and not ignoble idea, to wit, that man must earn immortality through good works. Even of the gods it is said: "They have through their worth attained to immortality."[14]

The Yama myth is more or less concerned with the question of immortality. Yama is the first (mortal) that died, the ancestor of the human race, and he is represented as going to heaven, where he sits under a fair tree with the high gods in bliss; and to him go the souls of men upon the way which Yama discov-

in which is found the first mention of a hell, *naraka,* under its usual later designation.

[10] *Ibid.* x. 62, 1. [11] *Ibid.* i. 125, 6. [12] *Ibid.* x. 107, 2.

[13] *Ibid.* i. 164, 23. "Completeness and immortality" are also the reward of works of righteousness in Zoroastrianism (Yasna, 45, 5).

[14] Rig Veda, x. 63, 4. "They made for themselves the way to immortality," *ibid.* i. 72, 9 (cf. iii. 31, 9).

ered.[15] Hence men are said to "seek the immortality born of Yama."[16]

Such in general is the earliest view of immortality. It is only in the latest part of the Rig Veda that speculation discusses the origin of things and the time when "there was neither death nor immortality," as it speaks of the world-spirit as "lord of immortality" and says that "the Lord's shadow is immortality and death."[17] And at this period, though it is not stated, as it was later, that the gods were not immortal in the beginning, immortality even of the gods begins to be attributed to the divine power of Fire or of the intoxicating drink Soma. "O Fire, through thy powers the gods came to immortality," says one poet, who adds that Fire is "the guardian of the immortal." Using the same phrase another poet says that the early singers, to whom Soma gave strength, "came to immortality."[18] Thus Fire itself says to the gods: "I will by sacrifice effect for you immortality and heroic power," and the gods are represented as guarding Fire as (their) immortality.[19] The explanation is that Fire is the fire-priest not only of men but of gods, and as men gain immortality by sacrifice, so must the gods. So Soma, the divine intoxicant, "calls the divine race to immortality," or, as is said elsewhere, the gods became immortal through drinking Soma, the immortal drink (ambrosia).[20]

[15] *Ibid.* x. 14, 2. He is thought of as the first man, who, first to die, became the god of death; later, he is conceived as god of hell and punishment.

[16] *Ibid.* i. 83, 5.

[17] Rig Veda, x. 129, 2; 90, 2; 121, 2.

[18] *Ibid.* vi. 7, 4, 7; ix. 94, 4.

[19] *Ibid.* x. 52, 5; i. 96, 6.

[20] Rig Veda, ix. 108, 3; compare *ibid.* 106, 8: "The gods drank thee, O Soma, for immortality." In Rig Veda, iv. 58, 1, "through the (Soma) stalk one gets to immortality" may be implied the belief in man's obtaining immortality through drinking the same ambrosia. In Rig Veda, i. 31, 7, it is said that Fire "daily sets

Scattered indications of variant ideas as to life after death are found in the Rig Vedic belief that stars are the spirits of the dead and that some of the departed Fathers may be living on earth or in the air, probably as birds, for a legal aphorism states that it is current belief that the Manes fly about as birds. One passage makes a seer say, "I who am now the seer and priest was once Father Manu and once the sun," as if transmigration was natural, as indeed bird-forms of the Fathers would imply.[21] There is, however, a difference between being born again in a human form and in being reincarnated as an animal. Even when metempsychosis was the current Hindu belief it was not universally believed that a man was likely to be reborn as an animal; only in some human form of low or high degree. One was liable to be reborn as an animal, just as one might instantaneously be converted into a beast, by virtue of a curse; but the probability was remote and animal-births were stories to amuse and instruct, not actualities producing religious concern, despite all the moral threats of the law-books, which assumed a certain natural logic in some instances and then developed a crude system of future punishments by analogical transmigration.[22]

One cannot fail to be struck with the similarity be-

a mortal in immortality for glory," a phrase perhaps merely poetic for "gives immortal glory," but apparently rather implying that daily sacrifice is one of the good works that yield immortality. So the daily drinking of Soma is indubitably felt to be a means to the same end. Thus, *ibid.* viii. 48, 3: "We have drunk Soma and become immortal, we have come to the light and found the gods."

[21] Rig Veda, iv. 26, 1 (the seer as formerly Manu); *ibid.* x. 15, 2 (the Manes living on earth); Baudh. Sutra, ii. 8, 14, 10, "A Vedic passage says that the Manes move about as birds."

[22] Sanskrit *mush* (English mouse) is from the root *mush*, steal; hence a thief will be reborn as a mouse (literally "stealer"); but one who steals water becomes a water-bird, etc.

tween the rough transmigration belief synchronous with a belief in immortal heavenly bliss as found in early India and the like association in Egypt, where also metempsychosis was not a necessary condition and was not moral but was, so to speak, a side issue, an optional way, open to the good who, if they would, might live in the Elysian Fields, but, if they preferred to this, which was practically a continuation of earthly existence under ideal conditions, the more novel life of bird or beast, they might as a special privilege become bird or beast. Just so the Vedic poet believed that his normal destination was the "Abode of Yama in the sky," a heaven of sensuous enjoyment, but that he might become a bird or a star according to his desire and his glory. Probably he had no very definite ideas on the subject; he had a general belief that men who were not so wicked that their very souls died naturally, lived with their Fathers, and sacred tradition had already located their home in the sky. But whether they would live forever in that blissful abode was a question apparently dependent on the consent of the gods, over whose will the dead man at burial seeks (by the aid of a priestly formula) to get control. In such matters the most weighty evidence is given by the ordinary standards. These standards are established by burial-hymns and hymns to the Manes. They show (as they are in universal use) that the ordinary man expected to rejoin his Fathers and Yama, and that the Fathers came regularly to their meals (offered by human descendants), but that they might be resident either in the sky or on earth. All popular tradition, reflected in the subsequent literature, points to the same conclusion.

Later Vedic belief, voiced in the speculation which eventually by imperceptible degrees passes into the for-

mal theological and philosophical speculation of the Upanishads, plays with and elaborates the idea of immortality. The Father-god is said to be "half death and half immortality," that is, both mortality and immortality are phases of the supreme divinity. The gods as a class of spiritual beings were (as now considered) not naturally immortal. They became possessed of certain symbolic facts in the sacrificial mystery, and through this wisdom attained to immortality. Death became alarmed, thinking that men also might gain knowledge which would exempt them from death and thereby rob him, Death, of his prey, which would entail the loss of offerings hitherto made to him. The gods, however, reassured Death, telling him that no man should be "immortal with his body," but that any man, "after parting with his body," might become immortal "through knowledge or through works." But even this passage admits that a man who dies without gaining immortality through his knowledge or his works becomes again the prey of death: "Those men who have neither knowledge or works come to life after death, but they become the food of Death again and again." [23]

In this second Vedic period, that of the prose Brahmanas subsequent to the Vedic Hymns, immortality

[23] Sat. Brahmana, i. 3, 2, 4f.; ii. 2, 2, 6; x. 4, 3, 9–10. Here, as in the earlier conception, the dead man leaves his body behind, the eye going to the sun, the breath to the wind, etc., and assumes a "body of light" or "glory-body." Thus the stars are the glory-bodies, *prakritayas*, of ancient seers. The departed Fathers not only lived on in bliss but they fought on in power for their families and were regarded (like mediæval saints) as helpful spirits and powerful allies in the spiritual world. Yet the Hindu Fathers were always dependent on their descendants for the food supplied them at their daily (in human terms, monthly) meal. "A human month is a night and day of the Fathers. The dark half of the month is their day and the bright half is their night, the former for activity, the latter for sleep" (Manu's Law-book).

has become universal, not a special reward of virtue. All men are now believed to be born again and then they are recompensed according to their deeds, good being rewarded and wickedness punished. The good that man does is put into one side of a balance and the wickedness into the other side and the man's soul follows the weightier. Hence the man still living is adjured to "weight himself in this world with good deeds." The ritualistic form of religion of the period made it inevitable that sacrifice should be the chief "good deed" and in fact the etherial character of the body after death was in proportion to good deeds (performed in life) interpreted in this sense. The more sacrifices one makes the more etherial will his body be hereafter, so that a man who performs the greatest of sacrifices will need in the next life to eat only once a year. But as a counterpart to this ideal of etherial bliss it is not uncommon to find a prayer or promise that a man after death shall be born with his whole body in the next life.[24] One is liable to go to heaven incomplete, leaving his bones on earth, an undesirable state. Instead of living with Yama and the gods, however, it is expressly said that a man becomes "whatever god he will." That is, as the voice at death goes to Fire, and the eye to the Sun, the mind to the Moon, the ear to the directions (regions of air), and the breath to Wind, and each recipient is a god, so the man himself becomes a god, a view which reflects the old belief that the pious become rays of the sun, saints become stars, etc. As late as the epic it is taught that "the stars which seem small because of their distance" are huge flaming bodies, incorporate forms of glorious saints. Good works or knowledge

[24] Sat. Brah. xi. 2, 7, 33. Compare Weber in the *Journal of the German Oriental Society*, volume nine.

gives man the power thus to become "of the same nature" with the sun, fire, or with Brahman. Only incidentally and as if a rare event may one without dying go directly to heaven. Thus one sage is said by his knowledge to have gone to heaven and become united with the Sun-god without previously dying. But he first (on earth) became a golden swan and thus flew to heaven. Heaven itself is now no longer the common abode of gods and Fathers. The door of the gods' heaven lies in the northeast and the door of the heaven of the Manes lies in the southeast.

Retribution after death may be implied in the tale of a seer called Bhrigu, the son of the god Varuna, who saw a vision of men cut up and eaten in the next life as a punishment for the cruelties they had inflicted in a previous existence upon those who were now their torturers. But neither reward nor punishment is, to speak strictly, everlasting. The duration of both is entirely indefinite. As the gods are also of indefinite duration, man is, however, assured of a reasonably long if not immortal existence either in heaven with the gods or as part of a god. The idea of this heavenly existence is no longer sensuous. Absorption into Brahma excludes such an idea, and later Brahmanism expressly states what earlier Brahmanism implies, namely that "no slaves of passion are found in the sphere of Brahman." As between work and knowledge, again, the philosophic thought of the later period sets steadily toward the final solution of the problem, to wit, that works are vain and that knowledge is the only sure means of eventual and final bliss. By works, it is said, one is bound, by knowledge one is liberated. The truly pious do no good works (of sacrifice, etc.,) but acquire wisdom; only those who have divine wis-

dom become immortal. It is nowhere said that retribution is unending. This idea comes with the notion of eternal transmigration ethically considered, which is comparatively late. First in the Upanishads (c. 700-600 B. C.) occurs the statement which foreshadows the causal nexus utilized by Buddha in explaining the doctrine of an endless round of existence caused by unsuppressed "desire." In one of the earliest of these Upanishads[25] is found this dictum: "as is man's desire, so is his will; as is the will, so is the act; as is the act, so will he reap; but he who desires only the World-Soul, he goes to Brahma; his immortal breath (soul, *prāna*) is Brahma, is light (glory) only." Another Upanishad divides the way of the soul according to two paths. Some, even saints, desire offspring; at death they go to the moon and are reborn on earth and have children. But sages, who are ascetic, full of faith and knowledge, who have given up the desire of this earthly immortality and seek only union with the highest, follow the northern course, going to the sun, where they become immortal and return to earth no more.[26] This is a favourite theme with later writers. It culminates in that immaterial view of heaven which sets it against an immaterial hell, and declares that "heaven is what delights the soul, hell is what pains the soul, hence heaven is virtue and vice is hell," or, "heaven is light eternal, hell is the darkness of ignorance." Yet these are apophthegms of the philosophical and spiritual saint rather than the beliefs of the practical man and of the mass. To discover what the latter were is, of course, not altogether easy in a literature essentially didactic and reflecting always the creed inculcated by priests rather than naïvely held by the

[25] Brihad-aranyaka Up. iv. 4, 5f.
[26] Prasna Up. i. 9.

people. Yet it may probably be assumed with some degree of verisimilitude that what is universally taught to the people is the current belief. Such teaching may be found in the law-manuals, where religion is secondary to ethics and law. In these manuals, soul, a Supreme Being, and an immortal life of some sort are assumed as a matter of course and occasionally become the subject of a few didactic remarks. Although ostentatiously orthodox, that is, based on belief in the divine authority of the Vedas, the law-books actually inculcate a modified Vedism, partly through their expansion of Vedic ideas and partly through their tendency to uphold the Vedic ritual at the expense of Vedic freedom of thought. In general, however, on the particular subject now under consideration, they teach that man obtains immortality if he will, but if he prefers he may enjoy the reward of heaven for his good works and then be born again; or, for evil works, suffer in hell and then be born again. The question whether heaven would be an "endless reward" is not answered in Vedic nor in philosophical manner but is met with the dogmatic assertion that "the Vedas declare there is a reward without end called heavenly bliss." But where the law differs from philosophy, and it must be remembered that law and not philosophy is what is taught to the common people, is in the distinct denial that knowledge alone is sufficient to insure immortality. To admit this would have been to cut out the whole series of "good works" (sacrificial ritual) as otiose. So Apastamba, who makes the declaration just cited, says emphatically: "Some say that knowledge of the All-Soul is sufficient to insure peace (immortal happiness); but this is incorrect. The dictum *buddhe kshemaprāpanam* ("attainment of immortal happiness rests on knowledge") is opposed to

the treatises of law."[27] The most authoritative of these law-treatises, that of Manu, gives as its final word on the subject that one who has followed the law and learned all that philosophy can teach in regard to the All-Soul, "after death obtains whatever course he will," that is, he may become united with the World-Soul or become a god or pass into any form of existence. But Manu and most of his fellow-legislators condemn the rejection of "good works." In other words, immortality is possible, but not on the basis of mere knowledge; one must have led a religious life in form and ceremony to ensure salvation. The difference between the religious man who fulfills the law, no unimportant item of which is that he should lead a family-life and have children, and the ascetic philosopher, who discards all human ties and wishes by meditation and "knowledge" to attain to Brahma, is illustrated by Apastamba in his discussion of the "two paths" discussed in the Upanishads.

"There were eight and eighty thousand sages who, desiring offspring, followed the sun on its southern course and so obtained the reward of heaven, and there were eight and eighty who desired no offspring but followed the northern course of the sun and obtained immortality." Some six hundred years later a writer who mingles philosophy with law discusses this question of the two ways, introducing the subject with a dissertation on the impossibility of discerning truth when the soul is clouded with passion: "As a soiled mirror cannot reflect an image, so the soiled soul cannot reflect truth. But the clean soul sees that there is one spirit and one world, which is a combination of five elements, space, air, fire, water, and earth. Now

[27] Apastamba, ii. 21, 14. This law-manual dates from about 300 B. C.

the Soul of the World emits from itself the world, as a silkworm out of itself [literally, out of its own spittle] makes a cocoon, shaping it with the elements, as a potter with clay, stick, and wheel shapes a jar, as a carpenter with clay, wood, and straw, shapes a house, as a goldsmith out of mere gold makes a thing of beauty. Thus using elements and organs the World-Soul shapes itself in different births. To reach immortality one must recognize the Soul in the world, but only by serenity and freedom from passion can one know the Soul and only he who is without desire can attain the highest desire. When one has thus attained the peace of the pure he will know the Soul and may thus immortalize himself."[28] But tradition tells of the "two ways" (the writer continues) and these must be explained: "The path of the Fathers who desire offspring is one; that of those who desire none is different. Those who perform good works and have all the eight virtues go to heaven and abide in bliss till they descend to earth again as the seed of the righteous. These are the eight and eighty thousand whereof Scripture speaks. But it speaks also of other eight and eighty thousand and they are the sages who do not desire heaven and their way is not thither but it goes near the Seven Seers (the constellation of the Great Bear, higher than the heaven of the other seers) and carries them to fire, to the day, to the light half of the moon, to the sun on its northern course, to glory everlasting in the abode of Brahma, whence there is no return to earth (no subsequent birth and death). These then are immortal. But the pious and venerable ones who desire offspring, who have devoted themselves to asceticism, to sacrifice, to all good works

[28] Yajñavalkya, iii. 159, coins here the word *amriti-bhavet,* as if in Latin *immortali-fiat.*

whose goal is heaven, their path is to smoke, to night, to the moon [29] in its dark half, to the southern course of the sun, and on that course they reach the moon, the abode of the Fathers in heaven, and there they remain till, as rain and wind, they fall to earth and become reborn. For as rain they enter earth and develop into food for living beings and so become living beings, new creatures born again."

Traces of this crude form of transmigration are found in the Upanishads.[30] Rough as is the combination of folk-lore and philosophy, it is clear that the teaching implies the possibility of immortality in the strict sense only in the case of those who have given up all desires. Other souls return to the course of transmigration, which implies unending births and deaths and hence is not "freedom from death" (immortality) but only endlessness. The legislator, who is more philosophical than most of his kind, seems to approve of the eight and eighty thousand (a common periphrasis for a multitude) who renounce desire, especially of offspring; but he is careful to confine the application of his teaching to sages. The ordinary man cannot be a sage of the sort that becomes immortal. He has to raise a family, and to sacrifice to the gods is one of his duties. His latter end is thus a temporary abode of bliss with descent to earth and rebirth followed by re-death.

This teaching, however, does not contradict that of the old philosophers, who distinguish what is to be taught exoterically and esoterically. The Upanishads recognize the partial truth of a conditioned Brahma as they recognize that the ordinary man must believe in

[29] This is a refinement on the old notion that all the dead go to the moon (Kaushitaki Upanishad, i, 2).

[30] Brihad-aranyaka, vi. 2, and Kaushitaki, i. 2.

gods and heavenly rewards. It is thus only for the philosopher that the truth is stated in these terms: "There are two forms of Brahma, immortal and mortal, immaterial and material; so man is both mortal and immortal, material and immaterial," and again: "When all desires cease, the mortal becomes immortal and obtains Brahma. He who knows the Soul of the World becomes immortal through that knowledge, becomes himself the Soul of the World, which is seen nowhere but is felt in man's heart," or, as elsewhere stated, "those who in heart and mind know Him, the World-Soul, become immortal." [31]

The popular teaching tended, however, even when it rejected the sacrificial works of the law, to emphasize faith rather than knowledge. Thus the Bhagavad Gita, a sort of sectarian Upanishad in popular form, insists on freedom from desire and from hope of reward (in heaven). But one must through faith in Krishna rather than through knowledge, "free oneself from birth and death, from misery and old age" and by giving up all desires, save the desire to be with the Lord Krishna, "become immortal."

Where the older religion then is divided between the two methods of obtaining salvation, which implies immortality, namely the way of knowledge and the way of ceremonial observance, the newer sectarian religion is inclined to trust almost wholly to faith in the personal Lord. In a sense, this is closer to the second of the two older ways, for the way of ceremonial is essentially the way of faith in the gods and sacrifices to the gods handed down from Vedic times, and the new way of faith merely changes the object of devotion. At the same time this older faith had become stereotyped in expression, it was a faith in the Vedas

[31] Katha Upanishad, ii. 6, 14, 9; Svet. Up. iv. 20.

rather than a living faith in the gods to whom sacrifice was made, and the sacrifice itself had long become a magical ritual rather than an expression of heartfelt devotion. The new religion, that introduced by the Gita, which has not inaptly been called the "New Testament of Hinduism," inculcates a living faith in Krishna as the saviour of man, through whom alone man attains to everlasting felicity.

The formal philosophies represented by the system called the Vedanta of Sankara and that of Ramanuja, four centuries later than Sankara (*circa* 1200 A. D.), really advance along these same lines. That is to say, the monistic Vedanta is based on the statements of the old Upanishads, such as that of the Chandogya Upanishad when it says, "Delusion is death; knowledge is freedom from death; he who knows this does not see death," and that of the Svetasvatara Upanishad, "By knowing Him only one passes over death," but it makes the living Him of the latter Upanishad an impersonal substratum of existence and the immortality of man an absorption into that substratum in which all personality is lost. Ramanuja, on the other hand, denies that the Soul of the World is without attributes and in his system the soul of man is immortally individual and personal, so that this system closely approaches the Christian belief in God and immortal happiness of souls living in the presence of God. With these systems there was no question as to immortality, only as to the form thereof. The two systems are analogous to the beliefs of the Buddhists who about the same era, after divesting themselves of the primitive notion that annihilation was the *summum bonum*, adopted the belief that Nirvana is not extinction but immortal being or peace, sometimes interpreted as everlasting existence in the Western Paradise. In

both Brahmanism and Buddhism, the belief in a personal immortality was more general and more enduring; that in an immortality conceived as impersonal oneness with the Absolute was confined chiefly to philosophers. Thus in Buddhism as it is found in the Far East, the popular teaching to-day admits the hope of personal immortality; while in Brahmanism, the many systems deriving from that of Ramanuja or his followers inculcate a belief in one Supreme Being and in the immortal happiness of the believer. Also the followers of Krishna in their various modern forms all believe in a similar immortality of bliss for those who regard him as identical with the Supreme Being. It is to-day only the philosophers who look upon themselves as illustrating the ancient simile of "rivers mingling with the ocean and losing individuality." That even from the seventh century B. C. the general expectation of the devotee was that he should live forever in bliss with his Lord, is quite certain. It was combined in the following manner with the doctrine of metempsychosis. A man lives on earth subject to passion and other vitiating traits. If he is thereby led to commit sin, he will after death be punished in hell for his sin and then, after an uncertain period of time, be reborn in a state appropriate to his sin. On the other hand, by living a holy life he will be reborn in bliss, the duration of which in heaven will depend on his virtue in the last existence; but when his merit is exhausted he also will fall to earth, "like a shooting star," and enter a womb in accordance with his merit. Age after age this process is repeated till in the course of time he will, by giving up all desires and living nobly in each successive stage, overcome all demerit and will be born on earth no more. The change in this view induced by the Krishna-cult and similar modifications is merely

that through faith he may, on dying, at once obtain release and go to immediate immortal bliss.

The resemblance between this non-sectarian belief and that of the Greek philosophers who taught metempsychosis is obvious. In Plotinus the soul is one with the Absolute, as it is in the Vedanta, and in both systems it is estranged from the Absolute by ignorance. When illusion is cast out and the soul recognizes its true being by intuition it becomes, or rather that instant is, identical with the Absolute. So earlier, in Plato, punishment in hell and reward in heaven are combined with metempsychosis. But in the view of the Greeks the round of transmigration was not endless. According to Pindar, souls that are punished beneath earth return in nine years, or the soul wanders thrice ten thousand seasons born in all forms of mortal beings. Souls are first punished in hell and then, as in India, are reborn in a certain round of existences. But the difference between the systems of India and Greece is marked. In Greece the soul forgets that it is divine and the philosopher seeks to awaken it to its true origin by ascetic observances, as did the Pythagoreans and Orphic philosophers. Thus the soul owes its state in its earthly body to a mythical fall, either a transgression of divine law or inability to control passion. No such idea as that of the fall of an originally pure soul is found in the Hindu doctrine. Moreover, according to Plato, souls that have suffered cast lots with those that have been blessed, after a thousand years, and then choose what life they will lead thereafter. A soul's rebirth in animal form is voluntary. Only after three thousand years does a soul "recover its wings" and mount to the heavenly world from which it came. It is not probable that either early system was received from the other, though some think

that the philosophy of Plotinus may have been influenced by eastern ideas.[32]

In one particular the doctrine of immortality in India is unique. The belief in the transference of merit was universal. So Buddha, from his own store of unrivalled merit, could bestow merit upon another, thus mitigating for that other the pangs induced by demerit. This doctrine was applied even to immortality and as late as our own times it is illustrated by the tale of Bharthari, as believed by the modern Sikhs. He was king of Ujjain and one of his priests had through austerity won immortality. As he loved the king, he made him a present of it. As the king loved his queen, he in turn presented her with this gift of immortality. As the queen was in love with the minister of police, she gave it to him; but, as he was devoted to the king, he presented it to Bharthari again, who, however, was so disgusted at finding his gift returning in this way that he renounced immortality altogether.[33]

It should be said in conclusion that although the dualistic view and the view that the soul is different ("similar but not the same") from the All-Soul, as the All-Soul or Supreme Being is different from Nature, prevails in general among the modern religious sects, yet in Siva-sects there have been and still are many who insist on the old Vedanta oneness of soul and Soul (of the World) and whose longing is for union with God in the non-dualistic sense. But these sects have not held their own with those that have prayed rather to "come to God" than to become God, and it is not improbable that their failure has been due

[32] Compare on this point, George F. Moore, *Metempsychosis* (Cambridge, Mass., 1914).
[33] Macauliffe, *The Sikh Religion,* Oxford, 1909, Vol. I, p. 169.

to just this insistence. It is, too, a question in how far the hope of immortality thus regarded as eternal oneness with God is a reflection of book-learning and in how far it actually expresses the belief of the modern devotee. Many of the phrases used in these sects are mere translations or imitations of the old Gita gospel, in which "union" is spoken of but in effect this union is living with God, who by His grace saves the mortal that has faith and love for Him. But the Gita itself is not always consistent and it sometimes harks back to the power of "knowledge" as the means of salvation. This salvation consists, as in the religion that centres about Amita Buddha, in "coming to the Lord" and living forever with Him, or, as it is said in the *Awakening of Faith* of the Mahayana School of Buddhism, the devotee "passes to where he immortally sees Buddha." So, although Krishna speaks in the Gita of man as becoming united with Brahma, yet his final word is, "Be devoted to me, revere me, and thou shalt come to me, to me as thy refuge, for thou art dear to me, and I will release thee from all thy sins," and it is Krishna who declares that his worshipper through devotion is "fitted for Brahma and Brahma's support is Krishna," while in the language of the same speaker "my devotees through faith come to immortality." No doubt there is also a strain of mysticism here which makes uncertain any too exact definition, for again it is Krishna who says: "I am immortality and death, I am that which is and that which is not," but the essential meaning of "come to me" may perhaps best be seen in the words succeeding those just cited: "Those who worship the gods go to the gods, those who make vows to the Manes go to the Manes, those who worship devils go to the devils, and those who worship me go to me," apparently to

enjoy endless bliss, for it is added: "Those who worship me abide in me and I in them—he who is my devotee obtains everlasting peace," or, as elsewhere expressed, "he comes to the highest place," "he will come to the Supreme divine being." In any event, immortality is the reward of loving devotion; and as in the Gita, so in the subsequent developments of Krishnaism, as in Ramaism, the faithful soul becomes immortal in or with the Supreme Soul. In the great modern religious poem of Tulsi Das, a poem which expresses the feeling and belief of generations of Rama-devotees, "after piety and asceticism comes knowledge; knowledge is good, but higher than all knowledge is faith, the incomparable source of happiness." Faith here, as in the Gita, is "the easy way by which one comes to God" and "finds immortal bliss." This attitude has even had the effect of combining the irreconcilable religious elements of theism and metempsychosis in that, as a modern pietist says, "even the infinite round of transmigration loses its terror if one has faith, for then one forever in ever new births may be the devotee of God and associate with Him in loving worship." [84]

[84] This religion of loving faith, *bhakti*, openly mocks at that of knowledge, as in the sarcastic statement: "I ask him why he is not singing the glory of God and worshipping Him with loving devotion and he replies, 'I have no time; I am too busy with the discussion of the doctrine of the identity of God and the world.'" For the writers of this later period, compare Macnicol, *Indian Theism*, Oxford, 1915.

IV

IMMORTALITY AMONG THE BABYLONIANS AND ASSYRIANS

Morris Jastrow, Jr.

I

IN any discussion of the beliefs about immortality among Babylonians and Assyrians, our point of departure must be the view which, as the survival of the animistic stage in primitive religion, is common to antiquity, to wit, that life as such does not come to an end. Longfellow's utterance,

> "There is no death,
> What seems so is transition,"

voices the attitude of man before the age of sophisticated reflection set in to raise a doubt whether death was not the end of what we call consciousness. The belief that life in some form continues is the natural phase, the normal state of mind among all peoples up to a certain and in most cases up to a relatively high stage of culture. The doubt comes when more serious speculation sets in as to the meaning of human existence, the mystery of life and the relationship of that mystery to the phenomena about us.

In Greece we find a genuine scepticism arising through the influence of philosophical thought, leading to such a remarkable production as Plato's *Phaedo* to

prove by elaborate arguments a belief which primitive religion took for granted, while in India we find speculation likewise starting from the popular view that life is a perpetual process of transition but reaching the conclusion that extinction of consciousness is the desirable goal of life. The goal, however, can only be reached after one has passed through a series of existences marked by the suppression of desires and culminating in the effacement of the last of all desires, the desire for life itself, which is at once the source of all misery and the cause of evil and injustice and which makes life a struggle and a burden.

The doubt thus unfolds itself in two directions according as life is viewed as a blessing or as a curse. It leads, on the one hand, as in the great monotheistic faiths essentially optimistic in their ultimate outlook, to a distinction between consciousness attached to a material body and the spiritualized conception of an immortality vouchsafed to the soul, and, on the other hand, to a doctrine of salvation through entering into the blissful state of complete unconsciousness. The heavenly Paradise of Jewish, Christian and Islamic theology finds its counter expression in the Nirvana of Buddhism. But both heaven and Nirvana are the outcome of doubt as to the sufficiency of primitive beliefs.

If I may linger on the threshold of my subject a little longer, may I call attention to a confusion that one often encounters in discussions on Animism between Animism as a basic conception and Animism as a stage of belief through which man in the course of the evolutionary processes of his thought necessarily passes. It is, I believe, an error to think of Animism as a specific form of religion; it is merely a substratum to religion in both its earliest and most advanced manifestations—a substratum representing a groove in which

of necessity man's fancy runs when he contemplates the universe about him. Conscious of life within himself, man is inevitably impelled to predicate life of everything that manifests activity or power, whether in the bird soaring through the air or in the rustling of the leaves, whether in the flow of the streams or in the flowers that spring up out of the ground. He sees life in the wind that sweeps across the land, as in the fire that comes from above; he sees it in the heat of the sun, as in the pale light of the moon sailing along the heavenly expanse. The constant renewal of life in nature and in the trees that after a period of barrenness put on fresh leaves, or in the apparently lifeless seed that put into the ground awakens to fresh life, impresses him. But this process of renewal of life is not needed as an analogy to prompt him to the view that all life, including his own, is an endless chain; nor does he even need the analogy between sleep and awakening to suggest that when he lies down to a sleep from which there is no apparent awakening, his life nevertheless goes on in some form. It is sufficient for him that he is *unable* to conceive of himself as without consciousness.

> "A little child that feels its life in every limb,
> What can it know of death?"

What indeed, except its mysterious aspect? But to primitive man as to the child everything is mysterious —life quite as much as death. The belief in the continuation of life, or as we may also put it, the impossibility of conceiving of life as coming to an absolute terminus is instinctive with man.

Nor does man when he becomes conscious of something within him that is at the core of the manifestations of life differentiate, or at all events he does not

differentiate sharply, between the life within him and the life that he predicates in what he sees about him, showing itself in activity and in power. He knows of no distinction between what we call animate and inanimate being. All is animate and life everywhere is of the same kind. Hence it is again almost instinctive with him to assume that the vital spark or essence may pass from one form to the other, or, as primitive man would put it, the spirit of life may choose its abode with an unlimited choice. This spirit of life, to be sure, is regarded as something material, though also invisible. Animism moves in the groove of the material and so the "something" within him which he associates with life may manifest itself in a tree or in a plant; it may have its seat in an animal or in a stream. This corollary which ample evidence justifies us in assuming as an outcome of Animism comes to reinforce the instinct which leads man to the conclusion that his own life—or, as we would say, his consciousness—is part of the endless process of the varied manifestations and perpetual renewal of life; it forms the substratum to man's earliest religious beliefs, and just here we encounter the link that connects Animism with more advanced speculation.

No matter how far maturer thought may lead us away from primitive beliefs, we cannot escape from the groove of Animistic conceptions in which the mind of man—apparently by a law of his being—necessarily runs. The advanced religions of antiquity, Egypt, Babylonia, Assyria, India, Greece, Rome, China, Japan, are all inseparably bound up with Animistic conceptions. The gods are personified powers of nature; and when we encounter an apparently abstract conception, as we do in Babylonia and Assyria, as well as in India, of a god of heaven, this dissociation from a per-

sonified nature power is only apparent. The god of heaven turns out to be the sun-god who because of his wide control is enlarged to a general overseer of all the phenomena that appear in the vault above us, including rain and storms as well as the moon and stars.

The hint has already been thrown out that what in the hands of the speculative Greek philosopher becomes a carefully worked out theory of the transmigration of souls is actually inherent in Animism, which assumes, as we have seen, the possibility of the transfer of life from one form to the other. When, therefore, we find on the one hand the Jataka, or Birth Fables, of India setting forth the previous existences of Buddha in the guise of various animals, and on the other Ovid's elaborate poem on Metamorphoses, furnishing the illustrations from Greek and Roman mythology of the same idea of the exchange between human and animal form, we are led back to Animism as the source of a belief capable of being adapted to advanced thought. Similarly, such a widespread conception as the incarnation of a god in a human being, playing an important rôle in Islamic as well as in Christian theology, is only a further extension of the Animistic point of view which in another form leads to the deification of earthly rulers in whom the spirit of the god has taken up his abode, just as the political doctrine of the divine right of kings, accepted even by so extreme a sceptic as Hobbes as at least possessing academic value, is merely a final outcome of primitive Animism. Nor would it be difficult to trace the doctrine of conception without carnal intercourse which leads in Christian theology to the twofold descent of Jesus, in the spirit and in the flesh, to Animistic views of life. Sir James G. Frazer brings illustrations in plenty of the various ways in which primitive peoples supposed

it possible for the life spirit to enter the body—through the ear or the mouth or the leg or by inhaling the savoury smell of roast fish,[1] trees, animals or plants may cause conception.

When we pass to the ritual of advanced religions of antiquity we encounter on all sides practices that have their rise in primitive Animistic conceptions. The widespread view of the liver as the seat of the soul[2] leads to elaborate systems of divination through the inspection of the liver and animal sacrifices to the gods. Incantation resting on the vital power inherent in words finds its final expression in the subtle doctrine of the Logos. Astrology, based on the identification of the gods with stars which is again an extension of the Animistic conception regarding the sun and moon, leads to peopling the heaven with the spirits of the dead, who after separation from the body mount to the abode of the gods. Even when we reach the monotheistic faiths we do not escape from the meshes of Animistic points of view for the supreme power is in the popular mind invested with a personality not dissimilar from that associated by him with human life, though raised to the nth power of superiority. And if following the thought of a central power in another direction we reach a pantheistic conception of the divine, what is this but the diffusion of the vital essence throughout the visible and invisible universe?

II

Now with such a conception of life expressing itself in such various forms, we will be prepared to find in

[1] *Attis, Osiris and Adonis,* Volume I, page 102.

[2] See the author's essay on "The Liver as the Seat of the Soul," in *Studies in the History of Religions in honor of C. H. Toy,* (New York, 1912, pp. 143–168).

the case of the Babylonians and Assyrians a striking continuity between earlier and later views of life after death. The modification that earlier conceptions undergo, so far as we are able to trace them in literature and in certain practices, never leave the main highway of Animistic beliefs.

So far as the evidence goes, burial of the dead was the earliest and remained the sole method of disposing of the dead; and this applies to Sumerians as well as to Akkadians[3]—the two ethnic elements that compose the population of the Euphrates Valley and through the commingling of which a high order of civilization, gradually spreading northwards, is evolved. It was a natural outcome wherever burial was the prevailing custom to picture all the dead as gathered in a great hollow somewhere below the surface of the earth. The place was known as *Arali* among the Sumerians and passed over to the Akkadians under the form of *Arallū*. The etymology of the word is unknown, but ideographic designations like E-Kur Bad, "Mountain House of the Dead" leave no doubt as to the nature of the conception. E-Kur ("mountain house") becomes in Sumerian the generic term for temple—presumably because the Sumerians, as a people, originally dwelling in a mountainous district[4] before coming to the Euphrates Valley, worshiped their gods on mountain tops. Temples being places of assembly, the E-Kur Bad was, therefore, the assembly place of the dead. Another designation Uru-Gal "great city"—perhaps a word play on Arali—is a more fanciful one, though likewise suggesting a single gathering place. Other synonyms

[3] The Sumerian is the name for the non-Semitic element of the population; Akkadian for the Semitic element.

[4] Perhaps from central Asia Minor which we now know was at a very early period a great gathering place of many peoples.

in Akkadian are *bīt mūti* " house of the dead," *naḳbaru* " burial place " and *irṣitu, i. e.,* " land " *par excellence,* and which is qualified in a remarkable description of *Arali* on which I will dwell further on as " the land of no return." From these and other designations we are justified in concluding that the Sumerians and Akkadians alike conceived of the dead as forever separated from the living—imprisoned, as it were, in a great mountain or subterranean hollow. The descriptions that have come down to us of *Arali* show that this existence after death was marked by gloom and inactivity. The dead in *Arali* were deprived of joy. Dense darkness enveloped the dead, and it is added that " dust is their nourishment and clay their food."

Unable by virtue of the Animistic compulsion to conceive of vitality without giving the dead some material shape, poetic fancy pictured the dead as " clothed with wings like birds." The single positive attribute of the dead was consciousness, but this consciousness is not viewed with any degree of satisfaction. The Sumerians and Akkadians loved life, because it spelled activity. There is, therefore, a prevailing note of sadness whenever in myths, legends, hymns and prayers death is referred to. Those in distress pray that life may be granted in order that when released from misery and suffering they may praise the gods.

" Lengthen my days! Grant me life!"

is a cry which like a refrain resounds through a special class of penitential hymns [5] which picture a sufferer as beseeching the divine throne. The kings, reflecting the popular view, pray for long life as a sign of divine

[5] See, for examples, Jastrow, *Religion of Babylonia and Assyria,* chap. xviii.

favour to their dynasty. We fail to encounter any trace of a feeling of resignation at the approach of death. On the contrary, the attitude is one bordering on despair, for fear that an offended deity apparently deaf to one's appeal is about to permit the demon of disease to carry his victim down to *Arali*. Perhaps the most significant testimony to the general horror which the thought of death aroused is to be found in a tale attached to the Gilgamesh Epic—a composite production[6] in which various myths have been combined with historical traditions grouped around two heroic figures of the past—Enkidu and Gilgamesh. The two heroes after a hostile encounter become fast friends and engage in a number of adventures. Enkidu is smitten with disease for offending the goddess Ishtar and after lingering for twelve days succumbs. Gilgamesh weeps bitterly and dreads that the same fate may overtake him.

> "I myself will die and will I not then be like Enkidu?
> Woe has entered my heart.
> I fear death—therefore, I wander across the fields."

Gilgamesh begins a long series of wanderings in the hope of finding some way to escape from death. To all whom he meets, he recounts the story of Enkidu's death and his fear of meeting the same fate:

> "My friend Enkidu whom I loved has become dust.
> Will I not be like him—lying down,
> Never to rise up again—never more?"

Unable to throw off this fear, he has recourse to invoking the shade of Enkidu. He wishes to find out

[6] See Jastrow, *ibid.*, Chap. xxiii. and for a more recent discussion of the origin and growth of the Epic, Jastrow and Clay, *An Old Babylonian Version of the Gilgamesh Epic*, Yale University Press, 1921, pp. 32–52.

for himself how the dead fare in *Arali.* The god Ea, always depicted as the friend and helper of mankind, grants Gilgamesh's request for a sight of his friend. Nergal, the guardian of the realm of the dead, opens a hole and the *utukku* of Enkidu rises up "like a wind out of the earth," as the text reads. Gilgamesh, almost reconciled to his fate of becoming a prisoner like all mortals in *Arali,* wishes at least to ascertain the conditions under which the dead continue their shadowy existence:

"Tell me, my friend, tell me, my friend!
The law of the earth which thou hast experienced,
tell me!"

Mournfully the answer comes:

"I cannot tell thee, my friend, I cannot tell thee.
If I were to tell thee the law of the earth which
I have experienced,
[With me (?)] [1] thou wouldst sit down to weep;
[With thee(?)] I would sit down and weep."

The text at this point becomes defective, but so much is clear, that Enkidu goes on to contrast the joy which he had with his friends while his heart was still beating with the sorrow at the thought of their bodies being turned to dust.

"Worms eat him whose touch once brought thee joy."

There is only one thing that one can do to lighten the sorrow of those who have passed through the portals of death—to provide a proper burial, which includes keeping the memory of the dead alive by libations and by food offerings. Those who are thus cared for rest on a couch and drink pure water:

[1] Restored words are placed in brackets.

"But he whose corpse is thrown into the open,
His *etimmu* ("*shade*") does not rest in the earth,
He whose *etimmu* has no caretaker
Is forced to eat the offal that is thrown into the street."

Such descriptions obviously must not be taken too literally. Their significance lies in the general picture that they convey of the depressing thoughts aroused by the thought of the dismal fate of the dead and of the attempt to soften this thought by inculcating a proper regard for the care of the dead, so that they may not at least suffer the pangs of hunger and thirst.

Offerings to the dead, as a matter of fact, play a prominent part in the Babylonian-Assyrian ritual. The nearest relative becomes the *nēḳ mē* "the libation pourer" on whom the obligation rested to satisfy the simple needs of the dead. In accordance with this belief of the misery endured by those who did not receive proper burial, we find in historical inscriptions references to the punishment meted out to enemies by permitting their bones to rot on the field of battle. In one instance, the Assyrian king, Ashurbanapal, in order to set an example of Assyrian "*Schrecklichkeit*" for future ages, tells[8] how he exhumed the remains of Elamitic kings, exposed them to the sun, and brought the skeletons to his capital as a trophy of war. The *ẹtimme* were thus deprived of rest and of the comfort of being provided with food (*kispu*) and libations (*nēḳ mē*). The severest curse, therefore, that could be pronounced on any one was that "his corpse may be cast before his enemies, his bones be carried away and his body be without burial."[9] Similarly in the Assyrian Code of laws, recently published and dating

[8] V. Rawlinson, Pl. 6, Col. 6, 70.
[9] See V. Rawlinson, Pl. 61, Col. 6, 54–55.

from c. 1500 B. C., we find the punishment meted out to a woman who, by submitting to malpractice, brings about an abortion, that she be impaled and "be without burial." [10]

III

Poetic fancy playing around primitive conception leads to further speculations regarding the world of the dead. So, for example, in a famous tale of the descent of the goddess Ishtar to *Arali*, she is represented as passing through seven gates, each guarded by a keeper before she reaches the palace in *Arali* inhabited by Eresh-Kigal, "the lady of the great land" whose Akkadian name Allatu finds a strange counterpart in an old Arabic goddess el-Lat, the female consort of Allah.

The story, in the form in which we have it, reverts to a Sumerian original [11] and is clearly a nature myth, symbolizing the change from the summer season with its glory and splendour to bare winter where nature is stripped as it were of its raiments. Ishtar, the goddess of earth, who presides over the fields that yield their products out of the seeds laid in the womb of the earth, is the symbol of vegetation and fertility in the tale, but even Ishtar must submit to the inexorable law. She loses her vigour with the waning of the summer season until she appears to be held in the light embrace of death. The journey to the realm of the dead—which for mortals is the "land of no return"—symbolizes the steady approach of winter. The seven

[10] See the translation by the writer in the *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, Vol. 41, No. 1, p. 47.

[11] A fragment of the Sumerian prototype has been found and published by Dr. Arno Poebel in his *Historical and Grammatical Texts* (Philadelphia, 1914), No. 23.

gates are so many stages in the journey. At each gate the gatekeeper removes some ornament from the goddess or a part of her clothing, first the great crown on her head, then in turn her earrings, her necklace, the ornaments on her breast, the girdle of her loins set with precious stones, the spangles on her hands and feet and finally the loin cloth, so that when Ishtar arrives at the palace of her "sister," Eresh-Kigal, she stands naked before her. The symbolical character of the tale is further illustrated by the answer that the gatekeeper at each gate gives to Ishtar's question as to the reason for thus stripping her of her ornaments and clothing:

"Such are the decrees of Eresh-Kigal."

IV

The laws of nature demand that the earth after showing herself in all the glory of summer must shed her lustre. She must enter upon a period of apparent decay. Ishtar is smitten with wasting disease—sickness of the eyes, of the loins, of the feet, heart and head, aye, throughout her body. The symbolism of the loss of vigour with the approach of the wintry season is extended to animate nature. Men and animals cease to be productive. Another interesting touch in the poem—reflecting the attitude of Sumerians and Babylonians toward death—is the portrayal of the hostility between the two sisters, between Ishtar, the goddess of the living, and Eresh-Kigal, the mistress of *Arali.* They fly at each other's throats. Eresh-Kigal is enraged at Ishtar's invasion of her domain. She fears instinctively that Ishtar may rob her of her supreme position in the nether world, that the goddess of the living may carry off the dead from *Arali.*

Eresh-Kigal, therefore, gives orders to smash the palace, to shatter its portals and to force Ishtar out of *Arali* by sprinkling her with the waters of life. And so Ishtar retraces her steps, passes through the seven gates, at each of which she receives back the garments and ornaments which on entering she was obliged to leave behind, and emerges once more to the earth in all her splendour.

The closing lines of the poem which set forth its purpose are unfortunately so mutilated as to baffle attempts at a translation.[12] Only so much is clear that the poem seems to have been composed for recitation at a festival of Tammuz in honour of the dead. Could the story have suggested, as some scholars believe, the possibility that as Ishtar emerges from the world of the dead, so human beings who have passed through the portals of death may hope for a release? Hardly —for there is nothing in the entire realm of Babylonian or Assyrian Literature to suggest the belief in such a resurrection of the dead. Rather the point of view is that of which Job complains (14: 7–12):

> " For there is hope for a tree if cut down,
> That its tendril will not cease,
> Though its root wax old in the earth,
> And its stock die in the ground;
> Through the scent of water it will bud,
> And put forth branches like a shoot.
> But man dies and passes away,
> He expires and how is it with him?
> Man when he lies down will not rise,
> Till the heavens be no more, they shall not awake."

Nature revives—after apparent death. Ishtar is re-

[12] A recently published Assyrian duplicate of the text Ebeling, *Keilschrifttexte aus Assur, religiösen Inhalts,* Part I, No. 1; see also Part 4, p. 321 (corrections and additions) is likewise mutilated at the close.

leased from *Arali,* but not man. All that one can do for those who have departed this life is to recall their memories on the festival of Tammuz—to sing laments and to offer the sacrifice for the dead.

There are other tales in Babylonian Literature that illustrate the continuance of the primitive point of view—that death is the fate decreed for mankind from the beginning of time and that the laws of nature are unchangeable and inexorable. In the Gilgamesh Epic there is a significant passage bearing on this point. Gilgamesh, in his quest for escape from the fate which has overtaken his companion Enkidu, comes after a long wandering through a dark forest, filled with all kinds of dangers, to the seashore. There he encounters a maiden who thus addresses him:

"Why dost thou wander from place to place?
The life which thou seekest thou shalt not find.
When the gods created man, they decreed death
for him,
Life they kept in their own hands."

And then follows the advice to enjoy life while it lasts. Much as in the Biblical Book of Ecclesiastes (9: 7–9), Gilgamesh is told,

"Let thy garments be white,
Let oil not be lacking for thy head,
Daily fill thy belly,
Daily enjoy á feast.
Live joyfully with the wife of thy bosom,
With the child at thy side." [13]

A strange materialistic point of view, though also betraying a sane doctrine that life is made for enjoyment, and that the thought of death should not deprive one of the joy of living.

[13] See Jastrow-Clay, *An Old Babylonian Version of the Gilgamesh Epic,* New Haven, 1920, p. 12.

V

And yet there are some indications—though faint—that the primitive view did not altogether satisfy a more advanced age which, impressed by man's exceptional place in nature, felt that at least an explanation was needed how man came to be subject to death. Sir James G. Frazer in his remarkable work, *Belief in Immortality*,[14] has gathered from many sources the evidence for the belief that man was at one time destined for immortality, but forfeited it by an error, or by a failure to pursue a certain course, or through some mishap. There is a whole series of stories according to which death came into the world because men rejected a certain kind of food which, if they had eaten it, would have made them immortal. Instead they selected a food externally more attractive, but which brought death in its wake. So among the natives of Piso, a district of Central Celebes, it is related that at a time when the sky was near the earth, the creator used to let down his gifts to men at the end of a rope. One day he lowered a stone, but the first ancestors of the human race declined it and asked for something else. So the creator let down a banana, which was more to the liking of the human pair. Then a voice called out: "Because you chose the banana your life shall be as its life. When the banana tree has offspring, the parent stem dies. So shall you die and your children step into your place. Had you chosen the stone, your life would have been like the life of the stone—changeless and immortal." Elsewhere, among the natives of Nias, an island off Sumatra, death was believed to have come to man because the original ancestor ate bananas instead of river crabs to satisfy

[14] I., pp. 72 *seq.*

their hunger. Had he selected the latter, human beings would have cast their skins like crabs and never died. Another type of stories rests on a change in a command given by the Creator. In Annam, the natives relate that Ngochoang, who dwelt in heaven, sent a messenger to announce to man that when he grows old he will cast his skin and renew his vitality, but when serpents become old, they shall die and be laid in coffins. The messenger did as he was told, but a brood of serpents heard this and fell into a fury. They said to the messenger: "Repeat this order, but in contrary fashion, or we will bite you." That frightened the messenger, who accordingly changed the message. Hence it happens that when man grows old he dies and is laid in a coffin, whereas the serpent casts off his skin and constantly enjoys a new life. A third type of stories involves the sending out of two messengers, one with a message that man should live forever, the other with the message that they would die; and the latter messenger invariably arrives first. Among the Zulus, the two messengers are the chameleon and the lizard. The chief deity Unkulunkulu ("the old old one") decided to let man live forever and sent the chameleon to make this announcement, but afterwards Unkulunkulu thought better of it and sent the lizard to announce that men will die. The chameleon loitered by the way to eat berries or, according to another version, he filled his belly with flies and fell asleep. The lizard ran posthaste and arrived first with its fateful message. As a consequence the Zulus hate both the lizard and the chameleon, the one for being so fast and the other for being so slow.

Among the Babylonians we have a tale that evidently belongs to the same category of stories told to account for the presence of death.

Omitting minor features of this tale [15] concerning a certain Adapa, a fisherman who breaks the wings of the south wind that threatened to drive him into the sea, we find the chief scene to take place before Anu, the god of heaven, who summons Adapa to answer for his crime. Ea, the god of the waters, who is the protector of Adapa, instructs Adapa how to conduct himself in the presence of Anu. At the gate of heaven he will find two gods, Tammuz and Gishzida. In order to secure their sympathy Adapa is to clothe himself in mourning garb and when asked for the reason should say:

> "Two gods have disappeared from earth,
> Therefore do I appear thus."

These two gods are, of course, Tammuz and Gishzida—vegetation deities who, like Ishtar, disappear after the summer season has passed. Ea furthermore instructs his favourite not to accept food that will be offered him when he comes to Anu, for it will be the food of death, nor to accept drink, for it will be the water of death:

> "They will offer thee a garment, put it on.
> They will offer thee oil, anoint thyself."

Had Ea's plan succeeded, mankind would have escaped death, but alas! Ea proposes, but some other god disposes. Tammuz and Gishzida, out of sympathy for Adapa, interceded on his behalf with Anu, whose anger is appeased. As a sign of grace it is decided to offer Adapa food of life and water of life, but Adapa, not aware of the change and recalling the instructions given to him, refuses both in the belief that

[15] See Jastrow, *Religion of Babylonia and Assyria,* Boston, 1898, pp. 544–555.

the food and drink will bring on death. He puts on the garment that is brought to him and anoints himself with the oil offered, but alas! he has refused the chance of immortality and is thus condemned to encounter death. So man by an act of obedience on his part, but by a deception on the part of the gods, forfeits the possibility of being like the gods—immortal.

We are reminded, of course, of the Biblical tale in the third chapter of Genesis, likewise, in the original form, told to account for the presence of death in the world, but which, in the final shape that it assumed, became the medium of inculcating the lesson of obedience to the divine will and, in further development, became the basis of St. Paul's doctrine of sin and salvation. No doubt both tales revert to a primitive stage of culture—as do the many similar ones collected by Frazer—but the point of interest for us is that old tales, entwined with myth and symbolism, become the medium of illustrating doctrines that arose in a later age of reflection and speculation on the mystery of life and death. The tale of Adapa is intended to illustrate the prevailing belief, as expressed in the speech of the maiden to Gilgamesh:

> "When the gods created man, death they decreed for him.
> Life they kept in their own hands."

Even when a protector of humanity, like Ea, plans to avert the will of the gods he is foiled in his endeavour. Even the heroes—the leaders of the race—cannot escape the common fate and no one can ascertain anything about death, except that decent burial and care of the dead insures to them as much comfort as their imprisonment forever in *Arali* will permit them to enjoy.

VI

But is there, then, no hope of a release from the misery of being condemned to consciousness but without activity in a gloomy subterranean hollow? Yes, a glimmer of hope is held out that those singled out for special favour by the gods may be transferred to a more cheerful place—to a distant isle situated at the confluence of the streams. It is again the Gilgamesh Epic that opens up this faint ray of light in the encompassing darkness. This Epic, comprising in its complete form twelve tablets, or some 3,000 lines, is the literary plum-pudding of ancient Babylonia and Assyria in which some of the choicest tales of the remote and less remote past have been welded together into a semblance of literary unity.[16] A critical analysis reveals the composite character of the production and shows that episodes, having originally nothing to do with Gilgamesh, are connected with the exploits of the hero by artificial links. In this way, incidental to the wanderings of the hero in search of an escape from death, the story is introduced of a destructive flood which wipes out all mankind with the exception of a favourite of the god Ea to whom the coming of the disaster is revealed by a mysterious message which Ziugiddu, "the one of long life," as the survivor is called in the Sumerian prototype of the tale,[17] understands. Ziugiddu, who in the later Semitic or Akkadian form becomes Utnapishtim, builds a house-boat on which he and his family with all their belongings

[16] See the references in note 6.

[17] Discovered and published by Dr. Arno Poebel *Historical and Grammatical Texts* (University of Pennsylvania, Museum Publications, Vol. V., 1914) No. 1, Col. 4. In this text the Deluge story is connected with a Creation myth as in the Book of Genesis, showing that its incorporation into the Gilgamesh Epic is of later date.

take refuge and thus escape the common destruction. At the close of a terrific storm which lasts seven days, in which all mankind perished, Enlil, the god of storms, who brought on the catastrophe, is enraged upon discovering that some one has escaped, but his anger is calmed by Ea, who urges him in future to send whatsoever misfortunes he will—lions, pestilence, famine—but not a deluge:

> "On the sinner impose his sin,
> On the evil-doer his evil,"

but mankind as a whole should not be wiped out.

The close of the episode bears directly on our subject. Utnapishtim, who tells the story of his escape and exceptional fate to Gilgamesh, says:

> "Ea [18] entered the boat;
> Took hold of my hand and lifted me up.[19]
> He lifted up my wife and made her kneel at my side,
> Touched our foreheads and stepped between us and blessed us:
> Hitherto Utnapishtim was human,
> Now Utnapishtim shall be as the gods.
> And Utnapishtim shall dwell in the distance at the confluence of the streams.
> Then they took me and placed me in the distance at the confluence of the streams."

Evidently this single illustration of one who had escaped the common fate was intended to hold out the faint hope that, under exceptional circumstances, one may avoid imprisonment in *Arali*. There is, however, little consolation to be found in an exception that

[18] It is quite certain that Ea is intended by the deity designated in the text as *bêlu* or "lord."

[19] Perhaps in the sense of lifting him on to the land.

proves the rule. It would be hazardous, therefore, to conclude from the story of Utnapishtim that the Babylonians or Assyrians had taken more than the first step leading to a more hopeful view of life after death. The mass of incantation texts which date from the early period to the latest show the persistence of the dread inspired by the approach of death, due to the successful attack of a demon or of a group of demons, acting as messengers of gods who preside over *Arali*. A separate pantheon of the lower world was developed in contrast to the upper realms, which divided into three zones distributed among a triad: Anu, who as sun god became the controller of the heavens; Enlil, who from a storm-god expands into a deity, in control of the earth and the region immediately above it; and Ea, who presides over the waters that surround the earth, pictured as floating like a rubber ball in a great sea. The upper gods are on the whole favourably inclined toward mankind. Evil, sickness, plagues, and death come through the gods of the lower world. Nergal and his consort Eresh-Kigal are surrounded by a court of deities of the second rank and by myriads of demons ready to do the bidding of the divine pair, who are portrayed in myths as gloomy, prone to anger and hostile to mankind.

VII

We have an interesting tale,[20] showing that originally a goddess—the same Eresh-Kigal whom we encountered in the tale of Ishtar's descent to the nether world,—was the head of the pantheon of *Arali*. She is portrayed as ferocious and ever ready to inflict injury, precisely as in the tale of Ishtar. She offends

[20] See Jastrow, *Religion of Babylonia and Assyria*, Boston, 1898, pp. 584–586.

Nergal, the god of pestilence and of death, who in revenge proposes to drag her from the throne. He forces his way into the domain of Eresh-Kigal, stationing a watchman at each of the fourteen gates through which he passes in order to avert the escape of the goddess. When he bursts into her presence he seizes her by the hair until she prays for mercy:

> "Be my husband and I will be your wife,
> The tables of wisdom I will lay in your hands,
> You shall be master and I shall be mistress."

Nergal accepts the offer, kisses Eresh-Kigal and wipes away her tears. The tale is of interest as showing the existence of two conceptions of the pantheon of *Arali* that have been here combined, one in which Nergal was ruler and the other—probably the older one—in which this distinction was accorded to a goddess. But the point of chief interest lies in the description of the divine pair whose traits appear again in the large army of demons that pass through the world at the command of the rulers of *Arali,* bringing suffering and eventually death to mankind. The belief in these demons pervades the entire literature of Babylonia and Assyria and furnishes sufficient proof for the persistency of the popular views regarding the gloomy fate of the dead.

The deification of kings, a belief which we encounter already in the Sumerian period and which crops up sporadically in later times, might be adduced as evidence that there existed a tendency at least to pass beyond primitive conceptions of the life after death, but it is the special position accorded to rulers as standing *nearer* to the gods than the rest of mankind that forms the chief factor in giving to kings occasionally the epithet of a god and in erecting statues to

some of them, as was done to the gods and occasionally even in offering sacrifices to them. The kings are in a special sense the offspring of the gods and this relationship is frequently stressed in official annals even when actual deification did not take place. The assumption of Divine descent was the manner in which the Akkadians expressed their belief that the kings acted as *mediators* between their subjects and the gods,[21] while actual deification appears to be rather an instance of the Sumerian point of view. And yet even among the Sumerians, the belief never went so far as to assume that kings enjoyed immortality in the sense in which the gods were immortal. Deification partook more of an academic character; it was formal rather than real and at all events exercised no influence on popular beliefs regarding the general fate of mankind after death had extinguished all activity. As already pointed out, there is a striking uniformity in the attitude toward death in all periods of Babylonian-Assyrian history—from the earliest to the latest. So strong appears to have been the hold of primitive beliefs that even the development of an elaborate astrological literature,[22] which rested upon an identification of the great gods with the planets and of the minor ones with stars did not lead to the belief in an upper realm as the abode of the dead, as happened when the Babylonian-Assyrian method of divining the future through the observation of the movements of the heavens passed westward.[23] There is no intimation throughout the realm of Babylonian-Assyrian liter-

[21] A widespread view which underlies kingship in its earlier manifestations wherever we encounter it.

[22] See Jastrow, *Aspects of Religious Belief and Practice in Babylonia and Assyria,* New York, 1911, Lecture IV.

[23] See Cumont, *Astrology and Religion Among the Greeks and Romans,* New York, 1912, Lectures III and V.

ature of a heavenly home for departed spirits who had merited a better fate than imprisonment in the nether world; and this is all the more amazing when we consider the comparatively early period at which the step was taken of identifying the goddess Ishtar with the planet Venus, Marduk with Jupiter, Nebo with Mercury, Nergal with Mars and Ninib with Saturn. One might have supposed that such a purely abstract conception of deities that in the Animistic stage were associated with manifestations of nature having nothing to do with the heavens as in the case of Ishtar, who is a distinct earth goddess, or of Nebo who was in his origin either an agricultural or a water deity, would have led to further speculations, suggesting at least that the favourites of the gods would be transferred to the heavens after they had closed their earthly careers. Astrology led in the later period to the rise of a genuine science of astronomy, largely stimulated by contact with Greek culture after the middle of the fourth century B. C., but not to eschatological speculations such as we find among the Jews in the second century and later among Greeks and Romans and in early Christianity.[24] The reason for this rather remarkable stability of primitive views of life after death, despite steady intellectual advance and despite accompanying changes in social standards, is to be sought, as it seems to me, in the absence of any pronounced ethical factor in the view held of the gods, or perhaps we had better say in the weakness of ethical conceptions unfolded—despite cultural advance —in the relationship of the gods to mankind. Not only do the gods of the lower world remain forbidding in their aspect and cruel in their nature, but those

[24] See C. H. H. Charles, *A Critical History of the Doctrine of a Future Life*, London, 1899, Chapters V-VIII and XI.

of the upper world, while susceptible to appeals for help and often addressed as merciful, yet continue to be arbitrary. One could never be sure of the gods. They were always prone to anger; and often they showed themselves unfriendly without apparent cause. Strength, exercised at will, continued to be their chief trait and as long as this was the case, a genuine ethical development of the god idea was checked or at most was capable of a limited development only. The one aim of life was to try to keep the gods in good humour by offering them the homage that they craved. Man was created, according to the main version of the Babylonian-Assyrian creation story, to do the service of the gods. A recent publication, completing to a large degree the account of the creation of man, brings this out even more clearly than we had reason to believe.[25] After the rebellion of the lower order of divine beings—headed by Kingu and Tiamat—against the superior gods, the latter decided upon the advice of Ea to create mankind to take the place of the lower order of divine beings and to build temples in which the higher gods might be worshiped. The gods *need* homage and since Kingu and Tiamat and their followers had proven false, a new order was to be established with mankind to take the place of the rebel host.

VIII

With such as the chief motive for man's exceptional place in nature, it is not surprising that a doctrine of rewards and punishments in a future existence to compensate man for the failure of justice in

[25] Ebeling, *Keilschrifttexte aus Assur* (Part 4) Text No. 164. See the translation in the third edition of Barton, *Archaeology of the Bible,* Philadelphia, 1920.

this one should never have been evolved by the Babylonian and Assyrian schoolmen. The favour of the gods was shown by happiness, prosperity, good health and long life in this world. As long as one enjoyed the favour of the gods, things went well, but when misfortune came on in any form the conclusion was drawn that some deity had been offended, whether for a good cause or without apparent reason. Under such conditions a consciousness of guilt was developed but, as the hymns and prayers show, a ritualistic misstep was placed on a par with an ethical transgression; and often the penitent appealing for divine mercy states that he does not know what wrong he has done nor what particular deity he had offended.[26] The Babylonian-Assyrian religion may then be characterized as an instance of an arrested ethical development in the unfolding of religious beliefs, which likewise brought it about that the jurisdiction even of the most merciful and loving gods was limited to this world. When one passed beyond the portals of life into the shadowy realm where Nergal and Eresh-Kigal held sway, even Ea whose rôle in the pantheon is that of the protector of mankind *par excellence* is powerless to be of further service. One cannot even praise the gods of the upper world when one reaches *Arali,* as little as, according to earlier psalms, one cannot sing the praises of Yahweh when in Sheol (Ps. 6, 6). The Hebrews passed beyond this primitive view by virtue of the complete infusion of the ethical idea into the conception of Divine government of the universe, though even among them centuries had elapsed after the appearance of the great Hebrew prophets, who first em-

[26] See examples in Jastrow, *Religion of Babylonia and Assyria,* Boston, 1898, pp. 320 *seq.;* and in the German (enlarged) edition, I. pp. 99–106.

phasized that Yahweh rules his people by self-imposed laws of justice and righteousness, before the corollary was drawn extending this rule beyond the grave. The high-water mark of the Babylonian conception of the relationship existing between the gods and man was reached in a remarkable composition that has come down to us in which a pious sufferer voices his despair at not being able to please the gods at all times. The composition, though reverting to a considerable antiquity, illustrates the views that continued to sway the popular mind to the latest period; and since the tale also shows that the last word of the religion was one of faith in ultimately overcoming the anger of the gods, it is worth while in conclusion to give some extracts from the composition, which is in many respects the most remarkable that has come down to us from ancient Babylonia.[27]

Like Job, in the poetic symposium which forms the first stratum of the book of Job,[28] the Babylonian sufferer, whose name is given as Ṭabi-utul-Enlil and who represents himself as a king, complains of the bitter fate allotted to him without apparent cause:

"As though I had not always set aside the portion for my god,
And had not invoked the goddess at the meal,
As though I had not bowed my face and brought my tribute.
* * * * * * * *
Prayer was my practice, sacrifice my law.
The day of worship of the god was the joy of my heart,
The day of devotion to a goddess more than riches."

[27] For a full account see the author's article *A Babylonian Parallel to the Story of Job,* in the "Journal of Biblical Literature," Vol. 25, pp. 135–191.

[28] See the author's *Book of Job,* Philadelphia, 1920, p. 67 *seq.*

He indulges in reflection on the difficulty of pleasing the gods:

"What, however, seems good to oneself, to a god is displeasing,
What is spurned by oneself finds favour with a god;
Who is there that can grasp the will of the gods in heaven?
The plan of a god full of mystery(?)—who can understand it?
How can mortals learn the way of a god?
He who is still alive at evening is dead the next morning;
In an instant he is cast into grief, of a sudden he is crushed;
For a moment he sings and plays,
In a twinkling he wails like a mourner.
Like opening and closing, their [sc. mankind's] spirit changes;
If they are hungry, they are like a corpse,
Have they had enough, they consider themselves second to their god;
If things go well, they prate of mounting to heaven,
If they are in distress, they speak of descending into Irkalla."[29]

His appeals to the various classes of priests are of no avail—none was able to furnish relief. He stands on the brink of the grave:

"The grave was open, my burial prepared,
Though not yet dead, lamentation was made,
The people of my land said 'Alas' over me."

For all that, like Job in the folk-tale, Ṭabi-utul-Enlil retains his faith and is finally rewarded by complete restoration to health. The lesson is drawn not to lose faith in Marduk.

[29]Another name for the nether world, reverting to the Sumerian Uru-gal "great city." See above.

"In the jaw of the lion about to conquer him Marduk places a bit.

Marduk seized the one ready to overwhelm him
and completely encircled him."

Psychologically, then, it is interesting to note that the gloomy views of life after death did not lead to absolute despair when faced with misfortune, nor to sullen views of life itself. Both Sumerians and Akkadians were keenly alive to the joy of existence. Long life was a mark of favour from the gods, and grateful hearts sang praises to the superior beings who thus permit man to enjoy the sunlight. The Babylonians would echo the sentiment of Koheleth, himself without a hopeful outlook upon death:

"Life is sweet,
And it is pleasant for the eyes to see the sun."
—*Eccl.* 11, 7.

How are we to account for this? It seems to me that the answer is to be found in the nature of man which is normally optimistic. Pessimism is an abnormal state, at least so far as the large masses are concerned. We encounter the pessimist in the blasé individual who is surfeited with pleasure, in the closet philosopher whose thought is concentrated on the misery that he sees about him, in the disappointed and embittered soul—often starting out in life as an idealist; but the very need of husbanding one's strength for the struggle of life prevents the average man from indulging in the luxury of a pessimistic outlook either on life or on death. Such an outlook would lame his efforts, check his growth effectively, and block the endeavour to overcome obstacles. The hope that springs eternal in the human breast is the heritage of

the average man. Lincoln is reported to have said that "God loves the common people—for He made so many of them." The Sumerians and Akkadians were made up, as we are to-day, of common people.

We may, therefore, well believe that despite the persistence of gloomy views of *Arali* the average person gave little thought to death and concentrated his efforts on the work and need that lay immediately at hand. He looked up gratefully to his gods when sunshine played around his existence, and he prayed to them when sickness and suffering came,—in a dejected frame of mind, to be sure, but also in the hope that the anger of his god or goddess—even though he was often forced to face the inability of knowing which one had smitten him—would pass away. He was content when the end drew nigh and after he had enjoyed life to the full:

> "To fold his cloak about him,
> And lie down to pleasant dreams."

V

THE ANCIENT PERSIAN DOCTRINE OF A FUTURE LIFE[1]

A. V. Williams Jackson

AMONG all the nations of mankind that have cherished the spark of religious faith, that ember has kindled into a beacon flame, pointing onward to a world beyond the present, and to a life, whatever its character, existing beyond the grave. The rude savage bears witness to this truth, as well as those great spirits of classical antiquity, Socrates, Plato, Cato, Cicero; the ancient Egyptians and Hindus, the early Celts, Germans, and other races of antiquity, bear kindred testimony, as well as those who have received the blessed light of revelation. But among the nations of the distant past, outside the light of Biblical revelation, this feeling seems to have stirred in the hearts of none more strongly than it stirred in the hearts of the ancient Persians, those natives of old Iran, the worshippers of Ormazd and followers of Zoroaster, the prophet who spoke at least six centuries before the Saviour came preaching the truth. The confident belief that the good will be rewarded after

[1] Cordial acknowledgment is made to the editorial board of the University of Chicago for the privilege of reproducing, with additions and changes, the material of an address made at the opening of the Haskell Oriental Museum of the University in 1896; see *The Biblical World,* 8, 149–163, Chicago, 1896. Since then has appeared the volume by N. Söderblom, *La Vie future d'après le Mazdéisme,* Paris, 1901.

this life and the wicked will be punished; that right will triumph and evil will be destroyed; that the dead shall arise and live again; that the world shall be restored and joy and happiness shall reign supreme—this is a strain that runs through all the writings of Zoroastrianism for hundreds of years, or from a time before the Jews were carried up into captivity at Babylon until after the Koran of Mohammed and the sword of the Arabs had changed the whole religious history of Iran.

It is with reference to this doctrine of a future life for the immortal soul, and in respect to the views relating to eschatology, that there is a most striking likeness between the religion of ancient Iran, as modified by Zoroaster, and the teachings of Christianity. The firm belief in a life hereafter, the optimistic hope of a regeneration of the present world and of a general resurrection of the dead, are characteristic articles in the faith of Persia in antiquity. The pious expectation of a new order of things is the chord upon which Zoroaster rings constant changes in the Gāthās, or Psalms. A mighty crisis is impending; every man ought to choose the right and seek for the ideal state; mankind shall then become perfect and the world renovated (*frashem ahūm, frashōtema, frashōkereti,* etc.).[2] This will be the establishment of the power and dominion of good over evil, the beginning of the true rule and sovereignty, "the good kingdom, the wished-for kingdom" (*vohu khshathra, khshathra vairya*). It is then that the resurrection of the dead will take place. This will be followed by a general judgment, accompanied by a flood of molten metal in

[2] Avesta, Yasna, 30, 9; 34, 15; 55, 6; Yasht, 19, 10, 11, 89; Ys. 46, 19; 50, 11; Yt. 13, 58; Vend. 18, 51; Ys. 62, 3. The transliteration of Avestan and other technical words in this article is more popular than strictly scientific.

which the wicked shall be punished, the righteous cleansed, and evil banished from the earth. So much by way of introduction.

Before turning to the sacred books of Iran itself, it may be well to cite the testimony of early Greek writers in regard to the Persian faith in their own time. The contemporaneous statements of these writers prove the existence of the Iranian belief in a resurrection of the body, a restoration of the world, and a life everlasting. It was this doctrine of a bodily resurrection, quite foreign to Greek idea, however strong might be the belief in immortality, that forms a cardinal tenet in the Magian faith. Let us listen for a moment to what Theopompus (end of the fourth century B. C.), as quoted by Diogenes Laertes (*Proem.*, p. 2), can tell us: "In the eighth book of the Philippics, Theopompus says that, according to the Magi, men shall come to life again and will become immortal, and all things will continue to exist in consequence of their invocations." And Diogenes adds that Eudemus of Rhodes gives the same testimony. The authority of Theopompus is cited again by Æneas of Gaza (*Dial. de animi immort.*, p. 77) to show that Zoroaster had already preached the resurrection doctrine. "Zoroaster," he says, "preaches that a time shall come when there will be a resurrection (ἀνάστασις) of all the dead." The great biographer, Plutarch, also mentions Theopompus upon this article of the Magian creed. In his Isis and Osiris (ch. 47) he describes a coming millennium and restoration of the world, when the devil, Ahriman, shall be destroyed, and evil will utterly perish from the world, the rough ways be made smooth, and the earth will become a plain; there will be one life and one community of the blessed, and one universal language of all mankind. This is nothing else than a description

of the new dispensation (*vīdāiti,* division) which Zoroaster teaches in the Gathas. The whole passage is exactly in the spirit of the Avesta, and is precisely parallel with the tone of the famous chapter in the Bundahishn, which is quoted below. This corroborative evidence deduced from Theopompus takes us back four centuries before the Christian era. In a passage in Herodotus, moreover, we can perhaps go back to the fifth century for an allusion to the Persian doctrine of the resurrection of the dead (*cf.* Hdt., 3, 62).

Such are the important Greek statements that may be quoted on the subject. Turning from these indirect sources to direct Iranian authority we have the testimony of the Avesta and of the traditional literature of the Parsis as witness. These go hand in hand with the classics and testify to the antiquity of the belief. The Avesta, or sacred book of the Parsis, holds the same position in Zoroastrianism as the Holy Scriptures in Christianity; it is supplemented by the Pahlavi Books, or religious writings of Sasanian Persia, which answer in part to the writings of the Church Fathers. From the ancient Persian inscriptions of the Achæmenian kings we naturally could not expect to receive any specific knowledge on this subject, as the formal and official character of these edicts would preclude it. The Avesta is therefore both our oldest and our most immediate source of information on the topic. Three of its books or divisions are of special import in the present connection: They are, first, the *Yasna,* or book of the ritual; second, the *Yashts,* or heroic hymns of religious praise; third, the *Vendīdād,* an Iranian Pentateuch. Among the Pahlavi writings, most important are the *Būndahishn,* a sort of Iranian Genesis and Revelation, based upon the ancient " Dāmdāt Nask " of Zoroaster; second, the theological treatises, *Dātistān-ī*

Dēnīg, "religious opinions;" *Dēnkart,* "acts of the religion;" *Dīnā-ī Maīnōg-ī Khirat,* "opinions of the spirit of wisdom;" and, finally, the *Artā-Vīrāf Nāmak,* a Persian apocalypse or Dantesque vision of heaven and of hell, seen by the saint Arta Viraf.

As to dates, different periods of composition must be recognized. Some portions of the sacred canon of the Avesta are older than others. The *Gāthās,* or Psalms of Zoroaster, inserted in the midst of the book of the Yasna, are the oldest portion. They are the sayings, metrical sermons or Psalms, of the Prophet himself, and in point of time they undoubtedly represent a period that is not later than the seventh or the sixth century before Christ.[3] Other parts of the Avesta, like certain young pieces in the Vendidad or formulaic repetitions in the Yasna which are easily recognized as more recent, may be as late as the Christian era. But the great body of the Avesta is pre-Christian in material and in composition, if not in point of redaction. Metrical passages as a rule are antique. The time of the Pahlavi literature covers a period between the fourth and the ninth centuries of our era; this does not preclude the antiquity of some of the matter, much of which is based upon texts that antedate the first Christian years by several centuries. An example in point is the relation of the Bundahishn to the Damdat Nask and of other portions of the literature founded upon lost original Nasks.

The views with respect to a future life are not complete in the Gathas themselves, owing to the limited extent of this psalter portion of the Avesta. The

[3] I must here observe that I do not regard the views of the lamented scholar, Darmesteter, as expressed in *Le Zend-Avesta,* Vol. III, Introduction, respecting the late origin of the Gathas, as tenable; nor have they met with general approval or acceptance among Iranists.

compass of these versified utterances, dogmas and preachings of the Reformer, is less in extent than the direct words of Christ, but their spirit pervades the other parts of the Avesta and extends to the Pahlavi writings, as our Lord's teachings inspire all portions of the New Testament and are reflected in the patristic literature.

In the detailed discussion of the present subject references will accordingly be generally given in the following order: (1) Gatha Avesta, (2) Younger Avesta, (3) Pahlavi and other sources. But in the first half of the article the references are reduced to a minimum, as a fuller number may easily be collected by any attentive reader of Zoroastrian literature. In the treatment of the topic, two divisions may logically be made, the (1) first dealing with the fate of the individual soul from death to judgment, the (2) second dealing with the general judgment, eschatology and the end of the world.

As the fate of the soul from death to judgment is a favourite theme to dwell upon, dozens of references are found in the Avesta and Pahlavi books alluding to the journey of the spirit from earth to the world beyond this life. A perfect picture of the general belief can be obtained only by giving many quotations and citations from the texts, but there is not space here. We must content ourselves with the merest outline based upon an exhaustive collection of passages and must emphasize only the most important. Several explicit descriptions, full of vivid imaginings, have been preserved as to how the spirit of the righteous or of the wicked, as the case may be, is believed to linger about the body, in joy or in pangs, for three days and three nights after death. At the dawn of the

fourth day the soul awakens to consciousness of the new life amid a breath of balmy wind fragrant with scents and perfumes, or in the face of a foul, chill blast heavy with sickening stench. According to a graphic image, the Conscience, or Religion personified, then appears before the dead, either in the form of a beautiful maiden or in the shape of a hideous hag, being the reflection of his own soul, and this image advances with him to the destined end. In some instances two dogs, guarding the soul from demons, accompany the figure of the maid. This latter seems to be a refracimento of an old Aryan belief. The soul now stands at the individual judgment in the presence of three angels, Mithra, Sraosha and Rashnu, the assessors before whom the life account is rendered, and the good and bad deeds are weighed in the balance. According to the turn of these scales, which are counterpoised with perfect justice, the final decision is made.[4]

Next comes the crossing of the Chinvat Bridge of judgment, which (apparently conceived of as being somewhere in Media) stretches over Hell between the divine Mount Alborz and the Peak of Judgment.[5]

[4] Among a number of illustrative passages that may be cited are: (Soul after death) Avesta, Yt. 22, 1–42 (=Hatokht Nask 2); Yt. 24, 53–67; Vd. 19, 26–34; Pahlavi, Dat. i Den. 20, 1–4; Mkh. 2, 114–194; AV. 17, 1-27.—(Accounting, and the store of works), Avesta, Ys. 31, 14; 32, 7; Yt. 1, 8; Vd. 19, 27; Ys. 55, 8; Afr. 1, 7; Yt. 10, 32; 19, 33; Vsp. 15, 1; Pahlavi, Mkh. 2, 96–97; Dat. i Den. 31, 1–25; 32, 1–16.—(Weighing before judges) cf. Avesta, Ys. 33, 1; especially Ys. 57, 2; Vd. 7, 52; Vd. 19, 28; compare also Av. *héñkeretā*, "reckoning, balance," in Ys. 31, 14; Pahlavi, Mkh. 2, 115; Art. Vf. 5, 5; Dat. i Den. 24, 6; and (among other passages) Iran. Bund. ch. 34, 1–3 (cf. J. J. Modi, *Bombay Roy. As. Soc.*, Aug. 1901, pp. 1–17).

[5] For example: (Chinvat Bridge) Avesta, Ys. 46, 10–11; 51, 13; Ys. 19, 6; Yt. 24, 42; Sir. 2, 30; Vd. 13, 3; 18, 6; 19, 27; Pahlavi, Bd. 12, 7 (and references in numerous other Phl. works).

This bridge plays an important rôle throughout all ages of Zoroastrianism. Across it the righteous and the wicked alike must pass; the one to felicity, the other to damnation; the former with the assistance of ministering angels, or guided by the conscience-maiden as some accounts describe; the latter amid the howls of demons and tormenting fiends, or led by the horrid hag. The difficulties of the passage over this terrible bridge of death are often enough alluded to and dilated upon, from the Gathas down to the latest Persian religious writings.[6] The orthodox doctrine teaches that this bridge becomes broad or narrow according to the nature of the soul upon it; and in some late accounts[7] the bridge is described under the guise of a beam that turns various sides according to the doom of the spirit which crosses it, presenting now to the righteous a pathway "nine javelins" or a "league" in breadth, or again presenting to the wicked an edge like "the thinness of the edge of a razor," so that the lost soul falls off when half-way across, into the depths of Hell.

As the spirit-journey is further pursued, the mansions of the paradise of Good Thoughts, Good Words, Good Deeds, in the regions respectively of the stars, the moon, and the sun, are described.[8] The description is only less brilliant in its colouring than the entry into the place of "Eternal Light," the blissful Garonmāna or "house of song," "the abode of Good Thought" (the archangel), that "good dwelling of Good Thought, Ahura, and Righteousness," "the Best

[6] For example: (Passage over Chinvat Bridge) Avesta, Ys. 46, 10; 19, 6; 51, 12; Vd. 13, 3; Ys. 31, 20; Vd. 19, 30; 19, 27; 13, 8–9; Pahlavi, Dat. i Den. 1, 1–7; and elsewhere in Phl. literature.

[7] Cf. Dat. i Den. 21, 2–8; Mkh. 2, 123, Art. Vf. 5, 1.

[8] Avesta, Yt. 22, 15–18; Pahlavi, Mkh. 7, 1–12; Art. Vf. ch. 7–11.

World," the heaven "where Ormazd dwells in joy."[9] But offsetting this, is the painful descent through the grades of Evil Thought, Evil Words, Evil Deeds, to the hell of darkness that can be seized by the hand, a place so foul, so gloomy and so lonesome that although the suffering souls be as many and as close together "as the hairs on the mane of a horse," still each one thinks he is alone (AV. 54, 5–8; Bd. 18, 47); this scene of frightful torment is "the house of Falsehood," "the home of Worst Thought," "the Worst Life."[10]

With perfect logic, moreover, the religion taught the existence of a third place suited to the special cases in which the good and the bad deeds exactly counterbalanced. This is the *Hamīstakān,* "the commingled, or equilibrium," an intermediate place between earth and the star-region, somewhat resembling a purgatory in which the soul is destined to suffer no other torment than the changes of heat and cold of the seasons, and must there abide awaiting the general resurrection and final judgment day. This doctrine is as old as Zoroaster in the Gathas and it continues throughout the history of the religion.[11]

All these ideas, so cursorily touched upon here, are clearly to be recognized in the Zoroastrian books and they each have their prototypes in the Gathas. But passing over these with this sketch so hasty that full

[9] Avesta, Ys. 28, 6–7; 43, 5; and especially Ys. 46, 15–17; 45, 8; 50, 4; 51, 15; 30, 10; and Ys. 16, 7; Pahlavi, Mkh. 7, 13; 2, 157; Dat. i Den. 26, 2–4.

[10] See particularly Avesta, Ys. 31, 20; 49, 11; Yt. 22, 33–36; cf. Vd. 4, 50–54; and Pahlavi, Mkh. 7, 19–30.

[11] See Ys. 33, 1, and compare the Pahlavi version of Vd. 7, 52; likewise Avestan *misvāna gātu,* Sir. 1, 30; 2, 30; Vd. 19, 36; and Phl. version of Yt. 1, 1; furthermore, Pahlavi, Art. Vf. 6, 1–12; Mkh. 7, 18; and often elsewhere in later Zoroastrian literature. Observe, in connection with the whole subject, Herodotus 1, 137.

references cannot be presented, attention may be given with more detail to the second half of the subject, the ancient Persian doctrine of eschatology, a millennium, a resurrection, the coming of a Saoshyant or Saviour, the punishment of the wicked in a flood of molten metal, and the establishment of a kingdom or sovereignty of good which is to be the regeneration of the world.

Notice has already been taken of the oft-recurring expression of pious hope in the Gathas of Zoroaster for the coming of a new order of things at the great crisis or final change of the world.[12] This final change, when there will be a decisive division and separation of the evil and the good forever,[13] is to be the beginning of the wished-for kingdom or good sovereignty,[14] and of a regeneration of the world.[15] This is the *frashō-kereti,* as it is elsewhere called in the Avesta,[16] the *frashakart,* as it repeatedly appears in Pahlavi, in other words "the renovation, perfection, preparation for eternity," accompanied by the purifying ordeal of molten metal.[17]

This Gatha doctrine of a renovation, *frashém ahūm* the renewed world, as found likewise in the Avestan *frashōkereti* and Pahlavi *frashakart,* is a distinctly millennial doctrine and is closely associated with the general belief in the appearance of a Saviour and the resurrection of the dead. The doctrine of the thousand years—a belief parallel in a measure with ideas

[12] Cf. Ys. 30, 2 *mazé yāoṅhō,* Ys. 51, 6, *apemē aŋhéush urvaēsē* Ys. 43, 5, *dāmōish urvaēsē apémē.*
[13] Cf. Ys. 31, 19; 47, 6; and Ys. 46, 12.
[14] Cf. Av. *khshathra* "kingdom," *passim.*
[15] Cf. Ys. 30, 9, *ferashém kerenāun ahūm;* Ys. 46, 19; 50, 11, *frashōtema,* and Yt. 19, 11, 89–96.
[16] See Ys. 62, 3; Vd. 18, 31; Yt. 13, 58.
[17] Cf. Ys. 51, 9; Vp. 20, 1; Yt. 17, 20; Bd. 30, 20, *et al.*

found in the Book of Revelation—is unquestionably an old article in the Zoroastrian creed, although it first appears elaborated in the Pahlavi writings.[18] It is fully recognized as Magian as early as the fourth century before Christ, by Theopompus,[19] and his statements are in exact agreement with the traditional literature of the Parsis. According to this literature, a period of 12,000 years is the length of the world's duration, and in the last 3000 years of this æon occur the millenniums of Aushetar and Aushetar-mah.[20] These names are found in the Avesta (Yt. 13, 128) as Ukhshyat-ereta; Ukhshyat-nemah, sons miraculously born, at the end of time, of the seed of Zoroaster, the heralds and forerunners of the *Saoshyant* Saviour.

The development of the Persian idea of a Saviour is an interesting one to trace. The term Av. *saoshyañt*, Phl. *sōshāns* occurs throughout the entire literature, Gathas, Younger Avesta, Pahlavi, but it seems to have different shadings of meaning according to the circumstances under which it is employed, and it shows perhaps a growth. In form the word is a future active participle from the root *sū* "to swell, increase, benefit, save"—a word connoting the highest degree of sanctity. The term *saoshyañt* is employed to denote (1) priest, apostle, saint of the faith,[21] and is so used both in Gatha and in Younger Avestan, being found oftenest in the plural; second (2) it marks especially

[18] See in Pahlavi, Bd. 30, 2 (in which connection it is to be recalled that the Bundahishn is based upon the original Damdat Nask), and consult Bd. 34, 1 *seq.*; Zsp. 1, 10; Byt. 1, 5; 2, 22; 3, 9; Dt. Den. 37, 11, 33; 64, 4; 66, 10; 90, 7; Dk. 6, etc., 8, 14, 10–14.

[19] Quoted by Plutarch, *Is. and Os.* 47.

[20] Pahlavi Bd. 30, 2, 3; 32, 8; 34, 2, etc.; Dk. 8, 14, 10–15; 9, 41, 4–8.

[21] Cf. Ys. 48, 9; Yt. 11, 17, 22; Vp. 11, 13, 20; Vp. 5, 1; Ys. 14, 1; 70, 4, and consult Darmesteter *Le Zend-Avesta*, i, p. 85.

those holy men who have lived or who will be born, who are to appear in a goodly company at the millennium and lend their aid in renovating the world; third (3) it designates in particular the Saoshyant supreme, their leader, the last of the three miraculously born posthumous sons of Zoroaster, the great apostle who will preside at the general resurrection.

A question may arise as to whether the Saviour-idea in Mazdaism was a tenet that was taught by Zoroaster himself, or whether it may not possibly be due to some influence of the Messianic idea in Judaism. The answer is not at once to be given. The Apocryphal New Testament of the Bible, Infancy iii., 1–10, expressly states that the Magi who came to worship before the new-born Saviour, came in accordance with a prophecy uttered long before by Zoroaster. A similar assertion is made in a Syriac MS. commentary on Matt. 2: 1, by 'Ishōdad of Hadatha in the ninth century of our era. An old metrical fragment of the Avesta (Frag. 4, 1–4), an extract from Yasht 13, 89 *seq.*, and the well-known passage in the Bundahishn believed to be founded on the Dāmdāt Nask (Bd. 30, 1 *seq.*), all lend their weight in ascribing this particular teaching to Zoroaster himself. The whole system of the faith appears to be built upon this tenet. To cite from the Gathas, it certainly seems in one passage, Ys. 46, 3, as if the use of *saoshyañtām,* in the special connection in which it is used by Zoroaster, did imply the existence and recognition of the belief in the Saoshyant and his company of apostles.[22] See also Ys. 9, 1–2. In Ys. 48, 9 *saoshyãs* may possibly be employed by Zoroaster with a feeling that he himself was the grand apostle of Ahura Mazda. The distinction between the use of the word in the

[22]And that too, in spite of such passages as Ys. 14, 1; Yt. 11, 17, 22.

singular and in the plural should in any case be marked. At all events, there can be no doubt on one point, the Saoshyant doctrine in Zoroastrianism is pre-Christian as is shown by its occurrence in metrical compositions.[23]

The great Saoshyant (Saviour) who is to appear at the end of time is the son of the maid Eredat-fedhri Vispa-taurvairi "the all-conquering."[24] It is believed that he will be conceived in a supernatural manner by a virgin bathing in the waters of Lake Kansavaya.[25] In an Avestan prose passage (Yt. 13, 129) his name is called the Victorious (*verethrajan*), Righteousness Incarnate (*astvat-ereta*), and the Benefactor or Saviour (*saoshyañt*). The Avestan text itself etymologizes the titles and shows the connection with the resurrection (Yt. 13, 128–129 in prose):

"We worship the guardian spirit (*fravashi*) of the righteous Astvat-ereta who shall be the Victorious Saoshyant (Benefactor, Saviour) by name, Astvat-ereta (Incarnate Righteousness) by name. He shall be called 'Benefactor, Saviour' (*sao-sh-yañt*) because he will 'benefit, save' (*sāv-a-yat*) all the incarnate world. He shall be called 'Incarnate Righteousness' (*astvat-ereta*) because being 'incarnate,' endowed with vital power, he will acquire incarnate incorruptibility for withstanding the Fiend (Druj) with her two-footed brood, and for withstanding the malice done by the righteous."

In the old metrical stanzas of the Zāmyat Yasht (Yt. 19, 89 *seq.*) the idea is even more elaborately developed in verse. A rendering of the passage is here attempted so as to convey a more exact impression than a mere description can do.

[23] Cf. Yt. 19, 92; Frag. 4, 1–4; Ys. 9, 1–2.
[24] Yt. 13, 142; 19, 92; Cf. Dk. 7, *et al.*
[25] Yt. 13, 62; 19, 66, 92; Vd. 19, 5, *et al.*

"We worship the mighty Kingly Glory which shall attend upon

89. "The Victorious One of the Saoshyants,
And attend his other comrades,
When He makes the world perfected
Ever ageless and undying,
Undecaying, ne'er corrupting,
Ever living, e'er increasing, ruling at will,
When the dead again shall rise up,
When immortality comes alive,
And, as wished, the world made perfect.

90. "Then the beings become undying,
Who uphold the laws of Righteousness;
And away shall the Druj (Fiend) vanish
Thither whence she came destroying
The righteous man, both seed and life.
She the Deadly Fiend shall perish
And the Deadly Lord (Ahriman) shall vanish.

92. "When arise shall Astvat-ereta
From the waters of Kansavya,
Envoy of Ahura Mazda,
Offspring of Vispa-taurvairi,
Flourishing a brand triumphant. . . .

94. "He shall look with eye of Wisdom,
Beaming look upon all creatures,
Those of evil brood excepted.
He on all the world incarnate
Beaming looks with eye of Plenty,
And his glance shall make immortal
Each incarnate living creature.

95. "Then, behold, advance the comrades
Of Victorious Astvat-ereta,
Thinking good and but good speaking,
Doing good, of good Religion,
Nor, indeed, have tongues like theirs
Ever uttered word of falsehood.

"From them flees the Demon Aeshma,
Bloody-speared and of foul Glory.
Righteousness smites evil Falsehood,[26]
Fiend of sinful race and darkness;

96. "Evil Thought verily smiteth,
But Good Thought in turn shall smite this;
Though the Word False-Spoken smiteth,
Yet the Word of Truth shall smite it.
Saving-Health and Life Immortal
Hunger and Thirst shall smite completely;
Saving-Health and Life Immortal
Smite down sinful Thirst and Hunger.
Forth shall flee that evil-worker,
Anra Mainyu, reft of power."

To these unequivocal resurrection passages in the Avesta, there is to be added a remarkable fragment, Fr. 4, 1–3 (Westergard) which has been preserved from the missing Varshtmansar Nask (*cf.* Denkart, 9, 46, 1). The piece is in praise of the Airyama Ishya Prayer (Ys., 54, 1), is rhythmical, and is undoubtedly old. The words of the Airyama Prayer shall be intoned by the Saoshyant and his glorious attendants, at the great day of judgment, as a sort of last trump whose notes shall raise the dead again to life; shall banish the devil, Ahriman, from the earth, and shall restore the world. This is in harmony with the preceding extract and recalls the words of Theopompus, found in Plutarch and his phrase quoted by Diogenes Laertes regarding the continuance of the new order of things.[27] The verses run thus in the words of Ormazd to Zoroaster (Fr. 4, 1–3):

[26] Battle of the Archangels and Arch-Fiends. See also Bundahishn 30, 29 below. Observe the personifications throughout, as elsewhere in sacred literature.

[27] Diog. Laert. *Proem.*, 6, *καὶ τὰ ὄντα ταῖς αὐτῶν ἐπικλήσεσι διαμένειν.*

1 The Airyama Ishya Prayer, I tell thee,
Truly, holy Zoroaster,
Is the greatest of all prayers.
Verily among all prayers
It is this one that I gifted
With revivifying power.

2 This prayer shall the Saoshyants, Saviours,
Chant; and by the chanting of it
I shall rule over my creatures,
I who am Ahura Mazda;
Nor shall Ahriman have power,
Anra Mainyu o'er my creatures,
He (the fiend) of foul religion.

3 In the earth shall Ahriman hide,
In the earth, the demons hide.
Up the dead again shall rise,
And within their lifeless bodies
Incorporate life shall be restored.

This plainly speaks of a bodily resurrection even though the bodies be such as Theopompus (Plutarch) says "cast no shadow."

It might be asserted that in the Gathas themselves there is no direct allusion to Zoroaster's personally having taught a belief in the resurrection of the body. That he did teach the doctrine, however, there is little doubt, as may be affirmed also on the Greek authority of Theopompus in the fourth century B. C. The metrical fragment just translated from the Avesta attributes the tenet to him;[28] and all the passages in the Pahlavi books which are based on Avestan authority, bear substantial testimony to the same.[29] Every-

[28] Ys. 30, 7, *kehrpém* seems to contain a covert allusion by Zoroaster to the resurrection.

[29] Cf. Bd. 30, 4, SLS. 17, 11–14. So also in the original Varshtmansar and Damdat Nasks of the Avesta, as stated in Dk. 9, 33.1 and in the Persian Rivayats 2, 5, translated by West. *S. B. E.* xxxvii, 14 n. 1, 421.

where in the Gathas the principal theme is the end of the world, the life hereafter, the great crisis and catastrophe, and the ordeal of the molten metal, when the power of evil shall finally be destroyed.[30] These awful events are the ones which are regularly associated with the resurrection in the later literature; they are doubtless so in the Gathas. The occurrence of the mighty catastrophe *mazé yāoṅhō* in the Gathas is explained in the Pahlavi gloss to the passage as taking place "at the resurrection" (*tanū-ī pasīn*). This expression *tanū-ī pasīn*, "the future body," and also *rīst-ākhēzh*, "raising of the dead," is common enough in Pahlavi comments on ancient Avestan passages and in other works.[31]

Fortunately there survives in the Bundahishn, drawn doubtless from the Damdat Nask of the original Avesta,[32] a most interesting description of the last days of the world, the millennium, the coming of the Saoshyant, the resurrection and general judgment, and the annihilation of evil and the reign of good. No more complete account could be given, embracing the whole Zoroastrian view on the subject, than is found in this chapter (Bd. 30, 1–33). It is in harmony likewise with the Pahlavi Bahman Yasht (Byt. 3, 43–63) and with the seventh book of the Denkart.[33] The Bundahishn chapter is here given in outline, renderings from West's translation being sometimes adopted verbatim.[34]

At the close of the last millennium of the world, men will live simply upon vegetable food, milk, and water,

[30] Ys. 30, 8, cf. Ys. 36, 2; 35, 5; see Ys. 51, 9; 32, 7; 30, 9–10; Yt. 17, 20; Vp. 20, 1.

[31] Cf. Mkh. 2, 95, 193; 27, 36, 53, *et al.*

[32] Cf. West *Pahlavi Texts* in S. B. E. xxxvii, p. 14 n, 421.

[33] Cf. West in *S. B. E.* v. 120–130, 230–235, and in Geiger and Kuhn's *Grundriss*, ii, 96, 97.

[34] Cf. West, *Pahlavi Texts* (Bundahishn) in S. B. E. v, 120–130.

and ten years before the Soshans (Saviour) comes, they will desist altogether from eating. At his appearance the dead will arise, each from the spot where life departed.[35] "First the bones of Gayomart (man primeval) are roused up, then those of Mashya and Mashyoi (the Iranian Adam and Eve), then the rest of mankind."[36] They all assume their own bodies and forms and each will recognize his family, his relatives, and his friends. The preparation of the dead by Soshans and his company of attendants, fifteen men and fifteen damsels, will take fifty-seven years to accomplish.[37] The resurrection finished, a great assembly of the risen dead now takes place. "In that assembly every one sees his own good deeds and his own evil deeds; and then, in that assembly, a wicked man becomes as conspicuous as a white sheep among those which are black."[38] Then follows the separation of the unrighteous from the just; the wicked are cast back into hell for three days of awful torment, while the righteous taste of the joys of heaven.[39]

A star now falls from heaven; the metal in the mountains and hills melts with fervent heat, and flows upon the earth like a river. "Then all men will pass into that melted metal and will become pure. When one is righteous, it seems to him just as though he walks continually in warm milk; but when wicked, then it seems to him in such manner as though in the world, he walks continually in melted metal."[40] Cleansed and purified by this fiery ordeal, all meet once more together and receive the reward of heaven. An ambrosial draft of the white *hōm* juice, prepared by Soshans, makes "all men immortal for ever and everlasting;" those

[35] See SLS. 17, 12, Bd. 30, 7. [36] Bd. 30, 7.
[37] Bd. 30, 7, 17; Dk. 7th book (West).
[38] Bd. 30, 10, transl. West. [39] Bd. 30, 12–13. [40] Bd. 30, 20.

who died as adults are restored at the age of forty years, those who were taken when children, will be restored as if fifteen years old; husband and wife together attain heaven, but there shall be no more begetting of children."[41]

The powers of evil, however, shall gather once more their forces for a final conflict with the kingdom of good. A mighty battle of the spirits ensues.[42] Each archangel seizes upon the arch-fiend that is his special adversary. The battle described in the metrical Avestan fragment translated above should be compared. Evil is finally routed. The devil Ahriman and the demon Az discomfited flee away to darkness and gloom. The serpent is burned in the molten metal, hell is purified, Ormazd "brings the land of hell back for the enlargement of the world; the renovation arises in the world by his will, and the world is immortal for ever and everlasting."[43] The heavenly work completed, "all men become of one voice and administer praise to Auharmazd and the archangels"[44]—to him, "the merciful Lord, who makes the final retribution, and who will at the end deliver the wicked from hell and restore the whole creation in purity."[45] The lines of Marlow's Faustus involuntarily rise to one's lips:

> "When all the world dissolves,
> And every creature shall be purified
> All places shall be hell that are not heaven."

Such is the ancient Persian doctrine of a future life, so far as this brief sketch can depict a notion of it. As we review it we must indeed look with eye of admiration at the flashes of truth that shed rays of light into

[41] Bd. 30, 25–27. [42] Bd. 30, 29. [43] Bd. 30, 32.
[44] Bd. 30, 23. [45] Denkart, 2, 81.6, Casartelli.

the souls of those faithful worshipers of old. And knowing, as we do, "that our Redeemer liveth, and that he shall stand at the latter day upon this earth," we ought with all reverence feel that God in His divine goodness has left no time and no race without the kindness of His illumining grace in some way or other; and perhaps properly we may count Zoroaster, the sage sprung of Persian stock and religious teacher of ancient Iran, as one among those "prophets which have been since the world began."

VI

IMMORTALITY IN THE HEBREW RELIGION

Lewis Bayles Paton

I. The Primitive Period

1. *Continued existence of the soul after death.*— The conceptions of the soul held by the early Hebrews were identical with those of the Semites and of other ancient races throughout the world. They distinguished between the *basar,* "flesh," and the *nephesh,* "breath," or *rûăḥ,* "wind, spirit"; and they believed that the spirit persisted after death. Disembodied spirits retained the intellectual, emotional, and volitional powers that they had possessed in life.[1] They also gained new and superhuman powers. They could occupy stones or images, thus creating fetishes or talismans;[2] they could obsess men, causing disease or insanity;[3] they could possess men, inducing second-sight, mind-reading, and prevision of the future;[4] they could appear as ghosts, announcing impending disaster.[5] On the other hand, they lost their physical

[1] Gen. 4:10; 1 Sam. 28:16–19; Isa. 14:9f.; Jer. 31:15; Ezek. 32:31; Job 24:12. For fuller discussion of this subject see L. B. Paton, *Spiritism and the Cult of the Dead in Antiquity,* New York, The Macmillan Co., 1921, Chaps. viii–xiii.

[2] Josh. 7:26; 2 Sam. 18:17f.; Gen. 35:20; 31:30; 35:2, 4; 1 Sam. 15:23; 19:13.

[3] 1 Sam. 16:14; 21:12–15; 24:7; Judg. 9:23; 2 Kings 19:7.

[4] 1 Sam. 28:3, 9; Isa. 8:19; 19:3; 2 Kings 21:6; 23:24; Deut. 18:11; Lev. 19:31.

[5] 1 Sam. 28:11–19; Job 4:15; 2 Mac. 15:12–16; Josephus, *Ant.* xvii. 13:4; *War,* ii. 7:4.

powers in parting from the body, and were commonly known as *rĕphāîm*, "feeble ones." [6]

2. *The abode of the dead.*—In the earliest times spirits of the dead were thought to maintain a close connection with their corpses.[7] A horror was felt of remaining unburied, and burial in the family tomb was earnestly desired in order that one might be "gathered unto one's fathers." [8] Subsequently, under Babylonian influence, the Hebrews came to think of the dead as dwelling in an Underworld called *Shĕôl*. The two conceptions, that the dead live in the grave, and that they live in *Shĕôl*, were never harmonized, but existed side by side down to the end of Old Testament history.

3. *Worship of the dead.*—Because of their superhuman powers, spirits of the dead were known as *ĕlôhîm*, "gods," (1 Sam. 28: 13), and were honoured like other gods. The mourning and funeral rites of the Hebrews were similar to those of the other Semites, and were originally acts of worship. Garments were "rent off" [9] and a "sackcloth," or kilt, was girded on,[10] the head was covered,[11] cuttings were made in the flesh,[12] the hair was shorn,[13] mourners wallowed in dust,[14] and fasted at least until the evening of the day

[6] Job 26: 5; Psa. 88: 11 (10); Prov. 2: 18; Isa. 14: 9f.; 26: 19; 59: 10.
[7] Job 14: 21f.; 1 Sam. 17: 51ff.; 18: 25, 27; 2 Sam. 4: 12; 20: 22.
[8] Gen. 47: 30; 50: 25; 2 Sam. 17: 23; 19: 37; 21: 14.
[9] Mic. 1: 8, 11; Isa. 20: 2.
[10] Gen. 37: 34; 2 Sam. 3: 31; 1 Kings 21: 27; 2 Kings 6: 30; 19: 1.
[11] 2 Sam. 13: 19; 15: 30; 19: 4; Mic. 3: 7; Ezek. 24: 17, 22; Est. 6: 12.
[12] Jer. 16: 6; 41: 5; 47: 5; 48: 37; Lev. 19: 28; 21: 5; Deut. 14: 1.
[13] Mic. 1: 16; Isa. 15: 2; 22: 12; Jer. 16: 6; 47: 5; 48: 37; Deut. 21: 12; Lev. 21: 5.
[14] Mic. 1: 10; Jer. 6: 26; Ezek. 27: 30; Est. 4: 3; Josh. 7: 6; 1 Sam. 4: 12, *etc.*

of death.[15] The body was buried with the utmost honour; and with it were deposited food and drink, pottery, lamps, implements, weapons, ornaments, amulets, and images of various sorts. The graves of the patriarchs, judges, kings, and ancestors were seats of worship down even into Christian times.[16] At these graves sacrifices were offered [17] and funeral feasts were celebrated.[18] Prayer to the dead, particularly in the form of laments, was usual;[19] and they were called up by necromancers to answer questions in regard to the future.[20]

II. The Pre-Prophetic Period

1. *The primitive conception of spirits was unaffected by Yahwism.*—The animistic ideas held by the early Hebrews were incorporated bodily into the religion of Moses, and remained unchanged down to the times of the prophets.

2. *The worship of spirits was forbidden by Yahweh.*—The ancient commandment "Thou shalt have no other gods besides me," excluded worship of the dead as much as worship of other divinities. From 1 Samuel 28: 9 it appears that Saul made an effort to exterminate those who had familiar spirits and the necromancers; and was so successful that, when, toward the close of his reign, he wished to consult a medium, he had difficulty in finding one. The prot-

[15] 2 Sam. 1: 12; 3: 35; 12: 21; 1 Sam. 31: 13.
[16] *E. g.*, Gen. 23: 19; 25: 9; 2 Sam. 5: 3; 15: 7, 12; Judg. 10: 1f.; Ezek. 43: 7–9; Isa. 65: 3.
[17] Deut. 26: 14; Jer. 34: 5; 2 Chr. 16: 14; 21: 19; Psa. 106: 28; Tob. 4: 17.
[18] Jer. 16: 7; Ezek. 24: 17; Hos. 9: 4; Deut. 26: 14.
[19] Gen. 23: 2; Deut. 21: 13; 2 Sam. 19: 4; 1 Kings 13: 30; Isa. 63: 16.
[20] 1 Sam. 28: 7–9; Isa. 8: 19; 2 Kings 21: 6; 23: 24; Deut. 18: 11; Lev. 19: 31; 20: 6.

estation of the bringer of the tithe in Deuteronomy 26: 14, "I have not given thereof for the dead," is probably a fragment of a liturgy far older than Deuteronomy.[21]

3. *Yahweh appropriated the functions of the dead.* —Oracular indication now became his work in the lots of Urim and Thummim. Disease and insanity were ascribed to his activity. Genius, inspiration, and prophecy were caused by the operation of his spirit.

4. *Yahweh appropriated the cult of the dead.*— Their tombs and standing stones became his sanctuaries. The blood of their sacrifices became his most sacred offering. Everything that clearly belonged to their worship was already in the pre-prophetic period claimed as his due.

5. *Rites of the dead that were not clearly acts of worship were tolerated, but they rendered one unclean.* —Burial and the rites of mourning mentioned above had already lost their religious significance as early as the pre-prophetic period; consequently these were tolerated by Yahweh. At the same time it was felt that these ceremonies were connected with "other gods," and therefore rendered one "unclean."[22]

6. *Shĕôl stood outside of the authority of Yahweh.* —It was a foreign land, presided over by its own gods, the spirits of the dead; and over its border Yahweh never passed to exert his authority. In the creation narrative of J it is not mentioned with "earth and heaven" as created by Yahweh. Even in the late Priestly account it is omitted from the works of Elohim. Never once in pre-prophetic literature is Yahweh said to descend into *Shĕôl,* or to show his power there.

[21] *Cf.* Deut. 18: 11; Lev. 19: 31; 20: 6, 27; Isa. 8: 19.
[22] Amos 6: 10; Hos. 9: 4; Deut. 26: 14.

7. *Retribution was limited to the present life.*—To those who kept his commandments Yahweh promised that their days should be long upon the land which he, their god, gave them, that their bread and their water should be blessed, that sickness should be kept away from them, that none should cast their young or be barren, that all their enemies should be defeated. Those who broke his commandments were punished with sudden death, with loss of children or property, with sickness, misfortune and invasion by enemies. Nowhere in pre-exilic literature is any reward of virtue or any punishment of sin anticipated in *Shĕôl*.[23]

8. *Collective retribution.*—In lack of a belief in future rewards and punishments the justice of Yahweh was vindicated by means of the theory of collective retribution. The penalty of a sinner, which he escaped by dying, was visited upon his relatives or his descendants. This was an outgrowth of the primitive Semitic sense of tribal solidarity. The clan was held responsible for the misdeeds of its individual members. Children were put to death for the sins of their fathers, and fathers for the sins of their children. It seemed natural, therefore, that Yahweh should deal with the group rather than with the individual. No difficulty was felt with this theory of retribution so long as the consciousness of tribal unity remained strong.[24]

III. The Prophetic Period

The literary prophets from Amos onward differed from their predecessors chiefly in the emphasis that

[23] Ex. 20:12; 23:25–31; Gen. 38:7; 44:16; Judg. 9:56; 2 Sam. 16:8.

[24] Ex. 20:5; 17:16; 1 Sam. 15:2f.; Num. 16:27ff.; Josh. 7:24; 1 Sam. 2:31; 2 Sam. 3:29; 12:10, 14f.; 1 Kings 11:11.

they laid upon the moral character of Yahweh. They perceived that righteousness was his central attribute. The other gods, being unethical, were no gods at all. This new conception of Yahweh's character could not fail to modify the conception of the future life.

1. *The vitality of the dead was denied.*—Like the "other gods" they were degraded from *ĕlôhîm,* "mighty ones," to *ĕlîlîm,* "non-entities." The prophetic and later literature denied consciousness and volition to them. They were not annihilated, but their existence was emptied of content; it was "eternal sleep." [25]

2. *Rites of ancestor-worship were eliminated from the worship of Yahweh.*—Graves and the stones that stood upon them, that had been appropriated by Yahweh in the older religion, were now condemned along with other "high places." [26] The prohibition was intensified by the doctrine that graves were "unclean." [27] Bloody sacrifices which had been transferred to Yahweh from the cult of the dead were declared by the prophets to be hateful in his sight.

3. *Rites of mourning for the dead were restricted.*—This process was gradual, and was never carried through completely. Jeremiah and Ezekiel still regard shaving the head and making cuttings in the flesh as permissible;[28] but Deuteronomy and the Holiness Code prohibit both of these customs.[29]

4. *Yahweh's power extended to Shĕôl.*—With the recognition that Yahweh was the only God, because he

[25] Isa. 38:11; 63:16; Ezek. 26:21; Job 7:9–11; 14:21; 17:15f.; 26:6; Psa. 88:11f.; 94:17; 115:17; Prov. 15:11; 27:20; Eccles. 9:5, 6, 10; Ecclus. 30:18f.; 38:20–23; Bar. 2:17.
[26] Deut. 12:1–14, *etc.;* 16:22.
[27] Ezek. 43:7f.; Num. 19:11.
[28] Jer. 16:6; Ezek. 7:18.
[29] Deut. 14:1; Lev. 19:27; 21:1f., 5, 10f.; Num. 6:6f.

alone was righteous, went the belief that his power was not limited to the land of Israel, but that the whole world stood under his rule. For this reason *Shĕôl* was now thought to be included in his realm.[30] When Yahweh's power was thus extended, it would seem as if a higher doctrine of immortality might have been developed; but this extension came too late. In the struggle against ancestor-worship the shades had been stripped so completely of their faculties that, although Yahweh was now present among them, they could not know him, and could not rejoice in his loving-kindness.

5. *Retribution was limited to the present life.*—Like the pre-prophetic literature, the Prophets and the Law never promise rewards or punishments in another world. This is not because Yahweh is unable to bestow them, but because the dead are unable to receive them. Thus the paradox is explained that the prophetic religion, which was preëminently a religion of hope, had no hope of immortality. Over the gate of *Shĕôl,* as the prophets conceived it, might have been written the words that Dante saw written over the entrance to Hell, "Lasciate ogni speranza voi ch'entrate."

6. *Collective retribution.*—The prophets held the same conception as the earlier religion, that a man's rewards and punishments were often allotted to his relatives and descendants. The penalty due the ruling classes fell upon the nation, and the sins of parents were visited upon their children.[31] In like manner the rewards of virtues accrued to the family of the righteous.

[30] Amos 9:2; Hos. 13:14; Isa. 7:11; Deut. 32:22; Job 11:8; 26:5f.; 38:16f.; Psa. 139:8; Prov. 15:11.
[31] Amos 7:17; 8:8; Hos. 8:4; Isa. 5:25–30; Mic. 3:12.

IV. The Post-Exilic Period

(*a*) *The rise of individualism in Israel.*—As early as the period of the monarchy, through trade and life in cities, the ancient tribal organization of Israel began to break up, and a new importance was attached to the individual. This shows itself in the social legislation of Deuteronomy and the Holiness Code, both promulgated shortly before the Exile, in contrast to the Book of the Covenant and early Hebrew custom.[32] Individualism was fostered also by the religion of the prophets. In their inaugural visions they were conscious of a personal union with Yahweh that did not depend upon their membership in the commonwealth of Israel. The nation was against them, yet they were certain that they stood in the council of the Most High. This experience was exemplified most perfectly in Jeremiah, whose faith in God's individual care triumphed amid the downfall of the nation,[33] and led him to assert that in the coming age Yahweh would write his instruction in the heart of each individual, so that all should know him from the least unto the greatest.[34] This doctrine was taken up by Ezekiel, and found magnificent expression in the words, "Behold, all souls are mine; as the soul of the father, so also the soul of the son is mine."[35] The fall of Jerusalem and the breaking of the ancient national and tribal bonds through the Exile fostered this religious individualism, so that in post-exilic times it became a characteristic feature of Judaism that found frequent expression in the Psalter.

(*b*) *Doubt in regard to collective retribution.*—The new conception of the worth of the individual could not

[32] Deut. 24:1f.; 15:12; 23:15f.; 20:5–8; 24:5; 12:31; 18:10; 24:16; Lev. 25:42.
[33] Jer. 1:17–19; 17:5–18; 20:7–11.
[34] Jer. 31:31–34.
[35] Ezek. 18:4.

fail to suggest difficulties in the ancient theory of collective retribution. If, as the prophets were never weary of asserting, Yahweh was supremely righteous, why did he not punish the sinners themselves, instead of visiting their penalty upon their children, their clan, or their nation? In the time of Jeremiah popular discontent with the old doctrine found expression in the proverb, "The fathers have eaten sour grapes, and the children's teeth are blunted," [36] a saying which implies that the divine government is unjust, and that therefore moral effort is useless. Ezekiel found the same proverb current among the exiles in Babylonia,[37] who claimed that, although they were innocent, they were suffering the penalty of the sins of their forefathers. The same difficulty is voiced by Job: "Ye say, God layeth up his penalty for his children. Let him recompense it unto himself, that he may know it. Let his own eyes see his destruction, and let him drink of the wrath of the Almighty. For what pleasure hath he in his house after him, when the number of his months is cut off in the midst?" [38] The cardinal doctrine of prophetism, the righteousness of Yahweh, was thus at stake, and it became necessary for Hebrew thinkers to formulate new theories of retribution.

(*c*) *New theories of retribution.*—1. *The theory of individual retribution in the present life.*—Ezekiel met the problem of his age by a bold repudiation of the ancient postulate of solidarity in guilt. Instead of the doctrine that the penalty of the fathers is visited upon the children, he taught, "The soul that sinneth it shall die," [39] and amplified this proposition at great length to show that each man received separately the reward

[36] Jer. 31 : 29.
[37] Ezek. 18 : 2.
[38] Job 21 : 19ff.
[39] Ezek. 18 : 4.

of his own deeds.[40] This recompense was, of course, in the present life, since Ezekiel, like the other prophets, held that there was no conscious existence in *Shĕôl*.

This theory found favour with Ezekiel's successors, and was defended by most of the Psalms and Proverbs. Thus Psalm 88: 10 asks: "Wilt thou for the dead work a wonder? Will shades arise to render thee thanks? Do they tell in the grave of thy goodness? Of thy faithfulness in the world down below? Can thy wonders be made known in the darkness? and thy righteousness in the land of oblivion?"[41] This was also the theory of the three friends who argued against Job.[42]

Ecclesiastes (about 200 B. C.) knows that theories of immortality are current, but rejects them as unproved: "Who knows the spirit of the sons of men, whether it ascends upward, and the spirit of beasts, whether it descends downward to the earth?"[43] "The dead know not anything, neither have they any more a reward. . . . There is no work, nor device, nor knowledge, nor wisdom in *Shĕôl* whither thou goest."[44] *Shĕôl* is the "eternal house."[45] There are no rewards nor punishments in the future life. "One event happeneth to them all. Then said I in my heart, as it happeneth to the fool so it will happen even unto me";[46] "I saw the wicked buried, and they came to the grave; and they that had done right went away from the holy place, and were forgotten in the city";[47] "All things come alike to all: there is one event to the righteous and to the wicked, to the good and to the evil, to

[40] Ezek. 18: 5–32; 9: 3–6; 14: 12–20.
[41] Psa. 34: 19ff.; 37: 25, 28; 145: 20; Prov. 3: 33; 11: 31.
[42] Job 4: 8; 8: 20; 11: 20.
[43] Eccles. 3: 21.
[44] Eccles. 9: 5f., 10.
[45] Eccles. 12: 5.
[46] Eccles. 2: 14.
[47] Eccles. 8: 10.

the clean and to the unclean, to him that sacrificeth and to him that sacrificeth not; as is the good, so is the sinner." [48]

Ecclesiasticus also believes neither in resurrection nor in immortality. Activity ceases in *Shĕôl*.[49] It is eternal rest.[50] Rewards and punishments are distributed in the present life.[51] Tobit and 1 Maccabees occupy the same position. Enoch [52] denounces those who say: "Blessed are the sinners, they have seen good all their life long. Now they have died in prosperity and riches; they have seen no trouble and no shedding of blood in their life. They have died in glory, and judgment was not executed upon them in their lifetime." This was the doctrine of the priestly party of the Sadducees over against the Pharisees.[53] The preexilic doctrine of *Shĕôl* and Ezekiel's doctrine of individual retribution in the present life they preserved in a petrified form, regardless of the fact that great movements of thought had occurred that rendered these doctrines no longer tenable.

In spite of its popularity, Ezekiel's theory was open to formidable objections. In the first place, experience taught that there was truth in the old theory of collective guilt. The children of the drunken and the sensual bore the consequences of their fathers' excesses, while the children of the godly entered into an inheritance of health and prosperity. Ezekiel's message of individual responsibility and individual retribution was only a half-truth; and, in the extreme form in which he stated it, could not be made to square with the facts of life. It is no wonder, therefore, that the old doctrine that the sins of the fathers were visited

[48] Eccles. 9:2. [49] Ecclus. 17:27. [50] Ecclus. 30:17.
[51] Ecclus. 11:26f. [52] Enoch 103:5f.
[53] Mark 12:18–27; Acts 23:8.

upon the children maintained itself in Jewish thought even down into New Testament times.[54]

In the second place, it was contrary to experience that each man received in the present life the just recompense of his deeds. It was frequently observed that the sinners prospered, and the righteous suffered. Manasseh, the wickedest of all the kings of Judah, reigned in peace for fifty-five years; while Josiah, the reformer, was slain in the battle of Megiddo. Prophets like Jeremiah suffered everything at the hands of their contemporaries, and pious worshipers of Yahweh at the time of the captivity fared worse than apostate Israelites. Such facts as these cast doubts upon the doctrine of individual retribution: "Righteous art thou, O Yahweh, when I plead with thee; yet would I reason the cause with thee: Wherefore doth the way of the wicked prosper? Wherefore are all they at ease that deal very treacherously? Thou hast planted them, yea, they have taken root; they grow, yea, they bring forth fruit." [55]

Defenders of Ezekiel's theory tried to answer this objection by asserting that the happiness of the wicked and the misery of the righteous are only temporary. In order to test the fidelity of His servants God permits injustice to exist for a while, but before the death of every man He will apportion a just recompense.[56] Encouraged by this thought, Job's friends, the Psalms and the Proverbs, urge men, in the face of all apparent contradictions, to hold fast to the faith that God will

[54] Job 5:4; 17:5; 20:10; 27:14f.; Psa. 109:9–15; Dan. 9:7–16; Tob. 3:3; Judith 7:28; Bar. 1:15–21; 2:26; 3:8; Matt. 23:35.

[55] Jer. 12:1f.; *cf.* Job 21:7–34; Psa. 22:1–21; 44:9–26; 73:1–16; Hab. 1:2–4, 13–17.

[56] Job 5:3, 18–27; 20:4f.; Psa. 39:1f., 7f.; 73:18.

reward the righteous and punish the wicked in the present life.

An inevitable consequence of this theory was the assumption that happiness is the measure of goodness. If a man were a great sufferer, and no change came in his fortunes, it must be assumed that he was a great sinner. This was the logic of Job's friends. In view of his unparalleled calamities, they could only conclude that he was the chief of sinners. At first they only insinuated this, hoping to lead him to confession;[57] but gradually, emboldened by what they regarded as his obstinacy, they openly accused him of secret sin.[58] Job was conscious of innocence and indignantly repudiated their charges; still the fact remained that God afflicted him and other upright men. In view of this, he was forced to abandon the theory of individual retribution in the present life: "The just, the perfect man is a laughing-stock. . . . The tents of robbers prosper and they that provoke God are secure";[59] "It is all one therefore, I say, he destroyeth the perfect and the wicked. If the scourge slay suddenly, he will mock at the calamity of the innocent. The earth is given into the hand of the wicked."[60]

2. *The theory of retribution through resurrection.*—While Job was struggling with the mystery of suffering, the question suddenly flashed into his mind, Was it not possible that a vindication of his innocence might come after death? That could not be in *Shĕôl*, since there conscious existence ceased, but might not God bring him back to life again, so that on earth and in the flesh he should receive the reward of virtue? The cut-down tree revives. May not man also awaken from the sleep of death?

[57] Job 4:7; 8:3ff. [58] Job 11:3–6. [59] Job 12:4–6.
[60] Job 9:22–24; *cf.* 10:3; 16:11–17; 19:6–21; 21:7–34; 27:2.

There is hope for a tree, if it be cut down, that it
will sprout again,
And that the tender branch thereof will not cease.
Though the root thereof wax old in the earth,
And the stock thereof die in the ground;
Yet through the scent of water it will bud,
And put forth boughs like a plant (Job 14:7–9).

At first the poet rejects the thought of resurrection as inconceivable.

But a man dieth, and is prostrate,
And a mortal expireth, and where is he?
As the water vanisheth from the sea,
And as the river drieth up and is arid,
So man lieth down, and doth not arise:
Till the heavens be no more, they shall not awake,
Nor be roused out of their sleep (14:10–12).

But the new hope that has risen within him still asserts itself.

O that thou wouldest hide me in *Shĕôl*,
That thou wouldest conceal me until thy wrath should
turn away,
That thou wouldest appoint me a set time and re-
member me.
If a man die, shall he live again?
All the days of my enlistment would I wait,
Till my discharge should come,
Till thou shouldest call, and I should answer thee,
Till thou shouldest long for the work of thy hands
(14:13–15).

The hope here expressed does not mount to the height of assertion, and the theme is not pursued farther at this point; but in 19:25–27, Job again returns to it, and this time states as a conviction what before had been only a vague longing.

But I know that my avenger liveth,
And one who shall survive after I am dust;
And that another shall arise as my witness,
And that he shall set up his mark.
From my flesh shall I see God,
Whom I shall see for myself,
And mine eyes shall behold, and no stranger.[61]

This cannot refer, as many commentators have supposed, to a vision of God in the other world, for Job has asserted too often his conviction that there is no knowledge in *Shĕôl.*[62] It must be interpreted in the light of the hope that struggles to expression in 14: 7–15, that there is such a thing as a return from *Shĕôl* to the life upon earth. "From my flesh," accordingly, cannot mean "disembodied," but must mean "reëmbodied." The vindication of a disembodied spirit would be at variance with the whole development of Old Testament thought up to this point, while resurrection would not seem inconceivable to one who believed that Yahweh's power extended to *Shĕôl,*[63] and that at various times he had brought men back from the gates of death.[64]

There is no evidence for the existence of a doctrine of resurrection among the Babylonians or among the preëxilic Hebrews. The sudden emergence of this hope in the Book of Job may be due simply to the logical working of the author's mind upon the two tenets of prophetic theology, the righteousness of Yahweh and the lifelessness of *Shĕôl;* but it may also be due to direct or indirect influence of the Persian religion, in which the doctrine of resurrection was highly

[61] Translated from the text as revised by Duhm on the basis of the Septuagint.
[62] Job 7: 9; 14: 21; 17: 15f.
[63] Job 11: 8; 26: 5f.; 38: 16f.
[64] 1 Kings 17: 21f.; 2 Kings 4: 32ff.; 13: 21.

developed. By most recent critics the Book of Job is dated late in the Persian period, and it is certain that Persian ideas exerted an influence upon the eschatology of later Judaism.

The hope of an individual resurrection expressed by Job is extended to the righteous of Israel as a class by an apocalypse of the late Persian period in Isaiah, chapters 24–27: "Thy dead shall arise; the inhabitants of the dust shall awake, and shout for joy; for a dew of lights is thy dew, and to life shall the earth bring the shades."[65] This idea is based upon a literal interpretation of Ezekiel's vision of the valley of dead bones.[66] Here the raising of the dead army is only a symbol of the restoration of Judah, but in this apocalypse it is interpreted as a literal resurrection. According to this author only the righteous rise, and it is not stated expressly that all of these are included. The wicked, who have oppressed Israel, are to remain in the dreamless sleep of *Shĕôl:* "They will be swept together as prisoners into a pit, and led down to be confined in a dungeon; thus after many days they will be punished";[67] "The dead will not live again, the shades will not rise; to that end thou didst punish them, thou didst destroy them, and cause all memory of them to perish."[68] Here *Shĕôl* appears, not as the common fate of all men, as in the preëxilic period, but only as the punishment of the wicked, while the reward of the righteous is that they escape from *Shĕôl,* and participate in the messianic kingdom of the restored Israel. Through the rising of the righteous dead the numbers of the feeble Jewish community shall be increased, and it shall become a conquering power in the earth.[69] Thus the eschatology of the individual is combined with the

[65] Isa. 26: 19, text of Duhm and Cheyne. [66] Ezek. 37.
[67] Isa. 24: 22. [68] Isa. 26: 14. [69] Isa. 26: 15–18.

eschatology of the nation in a manner nowhere suggested in the Book of Job.

3. *The theory of retribution after resurrection.*—A further step in the doctrine of resurrection is taken in Daniel (165–164 B. C.): "And many that sleep in the land of dust shall awake, some to everlasting life, and some to shame and everlasting contempt. And those that teach wisdom shall shine like the brightness of the firmament, and those that turn many to righteousness like the stars forever and ever."[70] Here not all the righteous are raised to everlasting life, but only "many," apparently the righteous priests and scribes who suffered martyrdom in the persecutions of Antiochus Epiphanes. Many of the wicked also are raised. The reason seems to be that the sleep of *Shĕôl* is not regarded as a sufficient penalty for them. Justice requires that they too shall come to life, in order that they may receive the "shame and everlasting contempt" that their sins deserve. The prophetic conception of death as existence without thought or feeling is still too strong to allow the author to think of either rewards or punishments in *Shĕôl*. Hence he must bring both the good and the bad back to earth, in order that they may receive the just recompense of their deeds.

The resurrection, which hitherto has been asserted only for the conspicuously righteous, or the conspicuously wicked, is extended by later writings to all the dead. Thus in 2 Esdras 4: 41 we read: "In the grave the chambers of souls are like the womb; for like as a woman that travaileth maketh haste to escape the anguish of the travail, even so do these places haste to deliver those things that are committed unto them

[70] Dan. 12: 2f.

from the beginning"; 7: 32: "The earth shall restore those that are asleep in her, and so shall the dust those that dwell therein in silence, and the chambers shall deliver those souls that were committed unto them"; Enoch 51: 1: "In those days shall the earth give back those that are gathered in her, and *Shĕôl* shall restore those it has received, and *Abaddon* shall render up what has been intrusted to it"; Apoc. Bar. 21: 23: "May *Shĕôl* be sealed up henceforth, that it receive no more dead; and may the chambers of souls restore those that are shut up in them." This general resurrection of all men, to receive the judgment of the last day, became the orthodox doctrine of the Pharisees and of the Talmud.[n]

Through a return to life on earth, in which the righteous are rewarded and the wicked are punished, the problem of individual retribution received a fairly complete solution; nevertheless, some difficulty still remained. It did not seem just that the righteous should suffer the temporary extinction of *Shĕôl* along with the wicked, even though they were raised again at the last day. Pious souls, who had known communion with God in this life could not believe that He would leave them to the oblivion of *Shĕôl* for centuries before He would renew His fellowship with them. Moreover, those who were living when the last day came, or those who had died recently, enjoyed a great advantage over the ancient saints who were compelled to wait for ages before their release came. These considerations led in the Græco-Roman period to the assertion of a larger vitality of disembodied spirits and to belief in a judgment that took place at death.

4. *The theory of retribution without resurrec-*

[n] Acts 23: 6ff.

tion.—The magnificent heritage of Greek thought on the subject of immortality from the early Orphists down to Plato was well known to the Jews in Alexandria, and must have been accepted more or less extensively in Palestine. Wherever it was received men could believe that retribution occurred at death, and could try in one way or another to combine the Greek conception with the Perso-Jewish doctrine of resurrection. These efforts led to a number of new theories of the future life, some in accord with the Platonic doctrine, others similar to the ancient Hebrew conceptions.

The Book of Wisdom never mentions a resurrection, but teaches exclusively the Platonic doctrine of immortality. "God created man for incorruption, and made him an image of his own being."[72] Birth is a fall from a higher existence,[73] in which the soul receives a body in accordance with its deserts in a previous life.[74] The body is a clog upon the immortal spirit,[75] and death is a blessed release from imprisonment.[76] The righteous pass at death to an immediate reward,[77] but the wicked are punished with eternal torments.[78]

These thoughts are beautifully expressed in genuine Platonic language in Wisdom 2: 23–3: 6.

God created man for incorruption,
And made him an image of his own proper being;
But by the envy of the Devil death entered into the world,
And they that are of his portion make trial thereof.
But the souls of the righteous are in the hand of God,

[72] Wisd. 2: 23. [73] Wisd. 7: 3. [74] Wisd. 8: 20.
[75] Wisd. 9: 15. [76] Wisd. 4: 7–15.
[77] Wisd. 1: 15; 3: 2f.; 4: 7, 10, 13.
[78] Wisd. 2: 24; 3: 18; 4: 18f.

And no torment shall touch them.
In the eyes of the foolish they seemed to have died;
And their departure was accounted their hurt,
And their journeying away from us to be their ruin;
But they are in peace.
For even if in the sight of men they be punished,
Their hope is full of immortality;
And having borne a little chastening, they shall receive great good;
Because God made trial of them, and found them worthy of Himself.

The same view meets us in 4 Maccabees.[79] The patriarchs and other saints dwell with God, and are joined at death by the righteous, particularly by martyrs for the faith. A similar belief was held by Philo, and by the Essenes, if we may trust the testimony of Josephus.[80]

It is possible that the doctrine of immortality without resurrection is taught in a few psalms of the late Greek period. Thus in Psalm 16: 9–11 we read: "Thou dost not commit me to *Shĕôl*, nor sufferest thy faithful ones to see the Pit. Thou teachest me the pathway of life; in thy presence is fulness of joys, fair gifts are in thy right hand forever"; Psalm 17: 15: "I, who am righteous, shall look on thy face, and shall be refreshed at (thine?) awakening, with a vision of thee"; Psalm 49: 13–15: "This is their fate, who are full of self-confidence, and the end of those in whose speech men take pleasure. Like sheep unresisting they are cast down to *Shĕôl*, Death is their herdsman, their form soon falls to decay, *Shĕôl* is become their dwelling. God alone can redeem my life from the hand of *Shĕôl* when it seizes me"; Psalm

[79] 4 Mac. 5: 37; 7: 3, 19; 9: 8; 13: 17; 14: 5f.; 15: 3; 16: 13; 17: 5, 12; 18: 16, 23.
[80] *Antiquities*, xviii. 1: 5; *War*, ii. 8: 11.

73: 23–26: "Yet do I stay by thee ever, thou holdest my right hand fast, thou leadest according to thy counsel, and takest me by the hand after thee. Whom have I in heaven? Whom beside thee do I care for on earth? My body and my heart pass away, but the rock of my heart and my portion is God evermore."[81] In these passages it is doubtful whether an individual speaks, or the nation; and, if it be an individual, whether the redemption from *Shĕôl* means more than that one is kept from dying. The probability is that none of these utterances refer to a survival of the individual after death. In that case the Greek doctrine of immortality is not found in any of the writings that have been admitted to the Old Testament canon.

5. *The theory of retribution before resurrection.*— This doctrine first appears in the oldest portion of the Book of Enoch, chapters 1–36,[82] which some critics date as early as 170 B. C., but which others assign to the reign of John Hyrcanus (135–105 B. C.). In chapter 22 *Shĕôl* is described as containing three divisions, two for the wicked and one for the righteous. One contains the souls of the wicked who have received their punishment in this life. They shall remain there forever, and not be raised at the last day. The second contains the wicked who have not been punished in this life. "Here their spirits are placed apart in this great pain, till the day of judgment, and punishment, and torment of the accursed forever." The third division contains the saints. These dwell already in Paradise, and drink of the water of life, while they await their resurrection.

[81] These passages are quoted from the revised text and version of Wellhausen.

[82] See Charles, *The Book of Enoch;* Kautzsch, *Apocryphen und Pseudepigraphen;* Charles, *Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha of the Old Testament.*

In the Parables of Enoch (chaps. 37–71), which probably date from a time shortly before the beginning of the Christian era, the righteous pass at once after death into blessedness in the presence of God, and are guarded by the preëxistent "Son of Man."[83] At the time of the coming of the "Son of Man" they are to be raised to life, in order that they may share in the blessedness of the messianic kingdom.[84]

A similar conception appears in another independent section of the Book of Enoch (chaps. 102–4): "I swear to you now, ye righteous . . . that good of every sort, joy and honour, are prepared and recorded for the spirits of those who have died in righteousness. . . . Woe to you sinners, when ye die in your sins, and your comrades say of you, blessed are the sinners. . . . Know ye not that their souls are brought down to *Shĕôl,* that they fare ill, and that their affliction will be great?"[85]

In this development of the doctrine of retribution it is impossible not to recognize Greek influence. The theology of the Prophets and of the Law culminated in a denial of conscious existence in *Shĕôl.* Consequently a belief in rewards or punishments in the other world was impossible on a purely Hebrew basis. Resurrection, with the final attendant judgment, was the only conception that was natural for a Jewish mind trained in the eschatology of the canonical Scriptures.

The difficulty with all such combinations was that a judgment at death made a last judgment unnecessary; consequently there was no longer need for the dead to rise in order that they might receive the rewards of their deeds; the temptation, accordingly, was strong

[83] Enoch 38:1; 40:5; 43:4; 49:3; 60:6; 61:12; 70:4.
[84] Enoch 51:1.
[85] Enoch 103:1f.; *cf.* Apoc. Bar., 30; 2 Esd., 7.

either to abandon the Perso-Jewish doctrine of resurrection in favour of the Greek doctrine of inherent immortality, or to abandon the Greek doctrine and return to the Perso-Jewish doctrine of resurrection.

From this survey it appears that in the time of Christ some of the Jews still held the ancient belief in the unconsciousness of *Shĕôl* and the divine allotment of rewards and punishments in the present life, either to a man himself, or to his relatives. Others had outgrown the eschatology of the Prophets and the Law and believed in a life after death, either through resurrection, or through a continuation of the soul's powers in the other world. No clear conceptions had, however, been attained, and many remained sceptical on the whole subject. A new revelation was needed to clarify thought. Fresh light must be thrown upon the nature of God, the nature of man, and their relation to one another before the problem of immortality could be solved. That light came in Him, through whose life, and teaching, and rising again from the dead, life and immortality have been brought to light.

VII

IMMORTALITY IN GREEK RELIGION

ARTHUR FAIRBANKS

IN the extant literature of the classic period in Greece the only writer who has discussed at length the question of immortality is Plato. He treats it in connection with his system of philosophy, basing his views indeed on Greek religious belief but not handling the subject as primarily a religious one nor giving any hint of the development of a belief in immortality in religion. Consequently the writings of Plato throw only indirect light on the subject under consideration. It must be approached from the point of view of Greek religion and studied in connection with different phases in the development of that religion.

The study of Greek religion, as contrasted with Greek mythology, is relatively modern. It has been hindered first by the great development of stories about the gods and heroes in Greece which obscured the conception of the gods as objects of worship, and secondly by the tendency of investigators to indulge in brilliant speculation rather than to interpret the facts available. Although the data for such a study are abundant, they are not always easy to interpret. Especially for the earlier periods the study results in general and abstract statements, which depend largely on the soundness of the investigator's judgment. It is

all the more important to focus attention on what facts we have, in order to reach sound conclusions.

Before the fifth century B. C. three periods, or better three phases in the development of Greek religion may be distinguished, the phase depicted in the Homeric poems, the earlier phase presupposed by the epic, and the succeeding phase when the rationalism of the epic was succeeded by a more personal, mystic type of religion. The conception of immortality must be examined in connection with each of these three phases of religion.

I. For the period before Homer our knowledge of religion and in particular of the belief in immortality rests on data from three sources. The Homeric poems themselves throw some light on the subject. In addition to literary evidence we have secondly archæological evidence, mainly from graves. And thirdly there is the evidence from later religious practices which can best be understood as persisting from a primitive age. We cannot reconstruct the history of religion or in particular of a belief in the future life in the period before Homer. At best we can secure some conception of the attitude toward death and the spirits of the dead existing before the epic and modified by the epic point of view.

Early graves in Greek lands, to speak first of archæological data, suggest a belief not out of line with that in other eastern Mediterranean countries. In more primitive graves the remains show that the body was in a crouching posture, the knees drawn up to the chin; later it was laid flat, and with no particular orientation. In parts of Crete a square burial chamber with a passage leading to it was presently cut in the rock for chieftains and nobles; later the characteristic Mycenæan "beehive tomb" was devel-

oped, with its entrance passage, its domed chamber used in funeral ceremonies if not in worship of the dead, and its burial trenches or second burial chamber. The occurrence of beehive tombs widely scattered in Mediterranean countries indicates the extent of this phase of civilization. In general the dead were furnished more or less fully with the apparatus of daily life, in simpler graves with a few pottery vessels and figurines, in the splendid Mycenæan graves with vessels of bronze and silver and gold, arms, jewellery, carved ivory, etc., and in one set of graves portrait masks of gold were placed over the faces of the dead. Very thin objects of gold and the occasional use of miniature vessels suggest the unsubstantial nature of the dead. There is evidence, though slight, that food was placed in these vessels at burial and was brought to the tomb after burial. Fragments of bath vessels at the entrance of a Mycenæan tomb seem to mean that baths were provided for the dead. Layers of ashes with fragments of bones from animals are evidence of continued burnt offerings at and in the large beehive tombs, and the sacrificial pits at Tiryns and in the grave circle at Mycenæ presumably indicate that blood was allowed to flow down to the dead. Schliemann found remains of human sacrifices at these early graves.[1]

These practices are, of course, evidence of honour and respect to the dead. Further they imply an effort to prolong a shadowy existence of the soul at the grave, doubtless an existence in some relation to surviving members of the family. Such is the view which was so highly developed in Egypt where most

[1] Schuchhardt, *Schliemann's Excavations*, English trans., pp. 162f., 301, 107, 157, 296; Stengel, *Festschrift für L. Friedländer*, S. 425f.; *Jahr. Arch. Inst.* XIII (1898), 13f.; XIV, 103f.

elaborate provision was made to provide the soul with an imperishable body in the form which it would recognize as its own, to furnish it with food or the semblance of food for indefinite ages in the future, and to provide it with the magic formulæ needed for its safety and happiness. In themselves the early Greek remains do not throw much light on the question whether the ceremonial is purely an act of piety, or whether it aims to prevent harm and secure blessing for the survivors. Although the more interesting features occur in the large Mycenæan tombs, tombs of chieftains of a race which was subdued by the ancestors of the Greeks we know, the evidence cannot be neglected.

The second line of investigation for the period before direct literary evidence, is the study of later practice. Perhaps no customs are so slow to change as religious ritual, and where changes are introduced the old forms still tend to survive and reappear. Just as heathen customs persist to-day from centuries ago, their origin forgotten now that a Christian interpretation has so long been given them, so—but in far more marked degree—forms of ritual from early ages persisted in the periods of Greek history which we know best. Sometimes they find a place in the Olympian religion, sometimes they remain in spite of it. Their existence is attested by allusions in classical authors, though many details come from late comments on these allusions. None of the greater gods has a worship entirely free from alien elements, rites apparently from a primitive age and to be explained only by habits of thought among savage races. Pigs of Demeter, left to rot that their remains might be scattered on the fields and bring fertility; animals torn in pieces and eaten raw in the worship of Dionysus;

sheep burned to ashes at the Diasia to Zeus Meilichios, often himself represented as a serpent; two men driven from the city or in early time put to death to appease Apollo at the Thargelia; rites of initiation when manhood was attained; rites in connection with the rebirth of vegetable life in spring; rites of purification generally—all these are out of line with the conception of the Olympian gods and the communion-meal sacrifice in their honour.

Rites for the dead were not limited to the funeral and to gifts which men brought to the tomb. At Athens offerings and libations were made to the dead at the grave on the thirtieth of each month, on the birthday of the deceased, and at the city "All Souls" festival, the Genesia in early autumn. The most striking rites, however, occurred at the Anthesteria, a spring festival to Dionysus when the casks of new wine were opened.[2] Though the first two days of the feast were filled with Bacchic revelry, culminating in the marriage of the king archon's wife to Dionysus, the temples of the gods were closed because the spirits of the dead were abroad. Not only wine jars, but tombs conceived as burial jars, were open; each man summoned to his house the spirits of his dead and feasted them, while pitch on the door posts kept other souls away and every pains was taken not to anger them; finally, on the third day the souls are banished to their proper haunts. The particular interpretation of these rites is difficult to ascertain with any confidence; that they are an inheritance from early ages is a reasonable assumption; and their significance as touching belief in souls surviving after death is fairly clear. There is no question that the soul survives, that it has power to harm if not to bless the living, and

[2] A. Mommsen, *Feste der Stadt Athen in Altertum*, S. 384f.

that the family and tribal relations continue between the souls of the dead and living men. The souls desire food and are pleased by it; they are easily stirred to anger; they are free to visit the living only at certain times; but whether they have any real consciousness, whether they can be called "immortal," what their life is, we do not know. It is fair to say that the rites are not simply rites of aversion or riddance, but also rites of tendance; that these mysterious powers are known to men not simply as objects of fear, but as sources of blessing.

Thirdly survivals in early literature, particularly in the Homeric poems, throw light on belief in the period that preceded. The epic conception of the universe, as we shall see, is clear, definite, and reasonably consistent. The universe is ruled by gods patterned after man; mysterious incalculable forces in the spirit realm, the divine beings of a more primitive age, find no longer any place in the world; and with other such forces, the reality or effective existence of the spirits of the dead pales to the merest shadow. Souls go to the House of Hades when the body of the dead is burned; thenceforward they affect living men no more. But to use the comparison of Erwin Rohde:[3] Just as certain organs remain in the human body as mere rudiments, after their usefulness in earlier biological phases has ceased, so in the epic there appear rudiments of an earlier belief, the reality of which has been set aside. Such a phrase as "propitiate the dead by fire" (Il. 7.409), and the need of burial lest the neglected soul be an "occasion of divine wrath" (Il. 22.358; Od. 11.73) are such "rudiments" of belief, only to be understood as remainders from a time

[3] E. Rohde, *Psyche: Seelencult und Unsterblichkeitsglaube der Griechen,* S. 14.

when spirits of the dead were potent forces in a man's world. The spirits (κῆρες, ἐρινύες) which avenge wrongs to strangers (Od. 17.475), enforce the rights of the first-born, and fulfill curses due to neglect of duties to the family (Il. 9.454, 571), like the "spirits from Erebus" that avenge broken oaths (Il. 19.260), are presumably spirits of the dead; such things point back to the period when spirits of the dead were real powers retaining their relation to the family and the social group, and effective to enforce social institutions. Prophecy at the moment of death (Il. 16.851; 22.358–380) and in dreams is a familiar expression of the belief that the soul has prophetic knowledge of the future when released from the body. The rites of burial, described in the twenty-third book of the Iliad in connection with the burial of Patroclus, sacrifices of cattle, of spirited horses, of dogs that ate under the dead man's table, and even of twelve Trojan youths, are in themselves tokens of respect paid to the dead; at the same time they can hardly be understood except on the supposition that they are drawn from early practice, based on a belief that souls are potent to harm and to bless their survivors. Certainly they would not have served the purpose of the poet if they had been strange, unknown practices which his hearers did not understand. Finally the picture of the lower world in the eleventh book of the Odyssey, poetic picture that it is, cannot be regarded as a pure product of the imagination. That souls live on with at least a thirst for blood, that souls of the unburied dead wander without rest and may be dangerous, that some souls like Teiresias retain powers they possessed while living, and the particular rites for the evocation of souls, are elements drawn from earlier belief and practice.

Combining the evidence from these three sources, we find that the facts justify the following interpretation: The souls of the dead survive and preserve both their identity and their relations to their family, their tribe, and their locality. They retain some degree of consciousness; they may have knowledge of the future; they have a mysterious power to harm and presumably to bless those with whom they lived; they are not "immortal," for when this idea arises it is an attribute of gods, but depend on remembrance of them and offerings to them in some undefined way. Accordingly it is man's duty and only means of safety, to avoid their wrath, to make them "keep their distance," and so to meet their desires that they will help and not harm him. Psychologically, the souls of the dead exist because and while the memory of them exists among their survivors; their existence is changed from a visible and familiar form to one that is mysterious and awe-inspiring; and because they exist in such a form, man must inevitably perform toward them such rites as he conceives the facts to demand. There is no evidence of a general belief in retribution after death in early times and similarly no evidence that men looked forward to a blessed state of existence after death.

Two points deserve clear and definite statement. First, we cannot speak of a developed ancestor worship in this period. So far as we can discern, men felt themselves surrounded by vague and mysterious forces, the matter of which gods are made, and believed that in a measure they could modify these forces to avert evil and to secure blessing. These forces or influences, whatever word one may use to denote so vague a belief, were very real in their effect on man, otherwise their nature was not known; to modify their

effects, to ward off their evil and to secure their co-operation was a very important part of the business of life. Among these vague forces or influences were the spirits of the dead from the particular family and group and locality, but we cannot say either that the spirits of the dead occupied a prominent place in man's spirit world, or that the ritual for them was developed into a considerable ancestor worship.

Secondly, there was no question whatever that souls survived after death. No one asked about immortality, how long they survived. No one asked, so far as we know, what it was that survived. The unquestioned fact was that souls survived and retained some relation to the men with whom the dead had lived. The fact was unquestioned because it was recognized as a part of human experience. Men saw crops grow, they saw the sun rise, they felt the wasting power of disease, death was a fact of experience, and similarly they recognized the survival of the soul as a part of experience. Out of this fixed belief the later Greek view of immortality was developed.

II. The second period or phase of Greek religion is that described in the epic. Granted that the view previously stated of the period preceding the Homeric poems is correct, the importance of the epic as a document for the history of religion becomes evident. It is in no sense a religious document, but the light it throws on a vital change in Greek religion is comparable to the light thrown on the history of religion elsewhere by religious documents. In order to grasp its significance two points must be constantly kept in mind, (1) that we are dealing with poetry composed to entertain the people of Greece with its pictures of these heroes, and (2) that the poetic imagination inevitably, necessarily, used material drawn from hu-

man experience. The poems were purely a work of the imagination; it is equally a matter of course that the imagination played on familiar facts in creating its pictures. These statements apply to the epic language, the epic story, the picture of social and political and moral conditions, the account of the physical world; and they apply similarly to religion and the account of man's spiritual world. The "Olympian religion" of the epic was created by the poet out of material he found ready to his hand.

The Olympian religion of the epic means the belief in and the worship of gods fashioned in human moulds. The vague, mysterious, non-material forces or influences that beset men of earlier ages are here replaced by gods of human nature but with powers far greater than man's. Their knowledge and power are very great, their passions are great, their justice as rulers is far beyond man's, and their care for their favourites is stronger and more effective than man's. Because of their human nature they can be influenced as human princes are influenced, namely by gifts and by the expression of man's feeling of dependence. For the same reason they have definite social relations with man, which he may cultivate. Before the splendour of these divine rulers, the vague spiritual powers men used to fear pale into nothingness and are almost entirely ignored by the poet. This is not the place to enquire into the origin of Olympian gods, but only to state their significance for man's view of his spiritual environment. I need only remind you that however much the poet did to develop the picture of these gods, he cannot have created them out of nothing.

The account of death and survival after death is quite in line with other features of this Olympian re-

ligion. Death is a discordant note in the cheer and gladness of life for these epic princes; still it cannot be banished; the fact remains and is called "evil" (Il. 3.173), "most hateful" (Il. 3.454), "abhorred" (Od. 12.34), the symbol of what is most to be dreaded. When death comes, the body is burned and the soul which has left the body goes to Hades. In poetic phrase, the soul flies out of the mouth (Il. 22.467), or the limbs (Il. 16.856), or the wound (Il. 14.518); in one instance it is represented as mourning its departure from manhood and youth (Il. 16.856–22.362). It preserves the form of the deceased, it is in a sense the continuing self, but it has no substance any more than has a shadow. The reality of life, the power of achievement, the power to enjoy are ended. This shadowy soul goes to Hades, the Invisible King, and relations with its survivors are ended.

Attention has already been called to inconsistencies in this view of the dead, particularly in books eleven and twenty-four of the Odyssey, and book twenty-three of the Iliad. The influence of early belief was still strong, and the poet could still draw on this material when he chose; but he uses it purely for his poetic purpose in drawing pictures of a splendid burial and pictures of a lower world with which men might establish connection when they chose.

The epic view was, of course, helped by the practice of cremation. In certain localities the bodies of the dead had been burned before; but for the Ionians who had left their ancestral homes to win new homes in Asia Minor it became a general practice. Instead of trying to keep up a more or less fictitious life of the dead by gifts of food and ritual in their honour, the spirits of the dead were once for all laid to rest. And

as Zeus with his attendant gods ruled this world from Olympus, so Hades and dread Persephone were imagined as ruling the world of shades whither the dead went.

While the practice of cremation no doubt helped the epic view, the change in belief and practice cannot thus be accounted for. It finds its explanation in the Olympian religion. As other vague non-material forces were supplanted by gods, forces to be feared for their very indefiniteness, by gods with whom men cultivated definite relations, so the spirits of the dead as factors in human life were also supplanted. The spiritual powers affecting men came to be defined as gods, and the souls of the dead found no place in the new spiritual universe. Too much emphasis can hardly be laid on the fact that for the epic it was a new conception of the gods which all but nullified belief in the reality of existence after death; it was a more developed stage of religion which ended fear of the dead and continued care of the dead. A close parallel may be traced in the religion of the Hebrews.[4] Here also are survivals of a belief in mysterious powers of the dead and of superstitious rites in dealing with souls. We read of the lamp for the dead, of gifts of food to the dead, of sacrificial feasts for the dead, and of vague practices at the grave, as forbidden things. We read of the evocation of the soul of Samuel by the witch of Endor, and of "returning spirits" and "consulters of spirits." Here also it is a more developed stage of religion in the worship of Jehovah which ends such beliefs and practices. The spirits of the dead come to be regarded as powerless; they do not

[4] B. Stade, *Die alttestamentlichen Vorstellungen vom Zustand nach dem Tode;* F. Schwally, *Das Leben nach dem Tode nach den Vorstellungen des alten Israel.*

remember God; they become silent; they do not know what happens to their own families; they go to Sheol. The old religion which included a worship of the dead, is gradually set aside by the religion of Jehovah in which life after death is represented as a shadowy, joyless existence in Sheol. The analogy is useful in emphasizing the fact that for the Greeks as well as for the Hebrews it was primarily a development of religion which destroyed an earlier belief in supernatural powers of the dead.

The objection may well be raised that the epic is poetry and as such should not be regarded as a statement of belief. My purpose, however, is to point out that the epic inevitably describes, not the belief of any given time, but a tendency toward the belief in Olympian gods; not an actual attitude toward life after death, but an account of life after death which gained its sway because it was consistent with the belief in Olympian gods. Moreover the tremendous influence of the epic for centuries was exerted in favour of belief in the rule of these gods, and correspondingly in favour of the epic view as to the spirits of the dead.

In connection with the epic it should be noted that here the idea of immortality first appears in a definite form, not as applied to souls of the dead but as an attribute of the gods. Gods differ from men in the degree of their power, their passions and emotions, their knowledge, the justice of their rule; the one fundamental difference, however, the one difference in kind as opposed to differences in degree, is that the gods never die. Later stories based on early belief and practice speak of the death and rebirth of gods, but the Olympian gods of the epic have the attribute of immortality. It may be a mere device of the poet

to make the happiness of the gods more complete by removing the fear of death; more probably it was a real development of religious thought, seized on and emphasized by the poet; but in either case no question can arise as to the epic view. If we may call the epic account of religion rationalistic, the immortality of the gods as distinct from men is part of that rationalism.

III. The third phase of the Greek view of life after death is connected with the revival of mystic religion in the seventh and sixth centuries B. C. The epic account of the gods as divine heroes in the drama of the universe corresponds to a development of religion in the Greek city-state; it runs parallel to the communion meal sacrifice, the splendid procession, the athletic games, all the worship by which the state honoured its divine rulers and sought their favour. The very effort of religion to magnify its gods removed them farther from the individual and made them more vague. The new individualism which during the seventh century gained sway in politics, in commerce, in literature, and in art, appeared also in religion; the individual sought redemption from the woes of his own experience, a personal salvation which the apparatus of the state religion had not furnished. There is abundant evidence of a change in religous thought and practice, which may best be described as a revival of mystic religion.

The change was dramatically described in Greek story as the coming of Dionysus to Greece from his northern home in Thrace; the religious revival appearing sporadically in many places was explained as due to the visits of Dionysus and his cortège. What these visits meant is most graphically told in the Bacchantes of Euripides. The power of the movement on popu-

lar thought is attested by the many pictures of Bacchic revels on Athenian vases before and after 600 B. C.[5]

Dionysus is said to have come from Thrace, attended by his followers. Their progress was attended by wild orgies of the people:—frenzied dances with cries to the god and clashing cymbals, women fondling wild animals and then tearing them in pieces to drink their blood and eat the raw flesh, women and men drinking unmixed wine as itself the essential being of the god. The result was a religious frenzy in which men felt the very presence of the god in themselves, or the identification of themselves with the god. So far was this true that worshippers were called by the name of the god—Bacchoi (Bacchus), Saboi (Sabazius), Bassaroi (Bassareus). The goal of religion, the oneness of the man himself with the god, was here realized in its crudest form. Feeling himself freed from the restraints of the body and the material world, man saw what the god saw, prophesied the words of the god, lived the very life of the god. Somewhat the same result was obtained in the worship of Demeter, where men shared the experiences of the goddess, her sorrows and her joy, so intimately as to feel her presence if not to share her very nature.

It is now a fixed principle that the nature of the gods is immortal; consequently the soul which experiences a sharing of the divine nature has the experience of its own immortality. Mystic religion thus appears in contradiction to the epic in its view of the soul; just as religion had tended to destroy the fear of disembodied souls, so now a new phase of religion de-

[5] E. Meyer, *Geschichte des Altertums* II, S. 729f.; E. Rohde, *Psyche*, S. 299f.; cf. von Wilamowitz, *Homerische Untersuchungen*, S. 206f.; K. Sittl, *Dionysisches Treiben und Dichten um 7 und 6 Jahrhundert*, Würzburg, 1898.

veloped belief in the divine nature of the soul. In both instances we are dealing not with a theological proposition as such, but with belief based on the religious experience of the individual. When a man felt himself possessed by Dionysus, when a man himself shared the experiences of Demeter till he felt the bond uniting him with the goddess, then his experience taught him that his own spirit was akin to the divine and consequently was immortal.

The profound effect of the new phase of religion should cause no wonder. While it proclaimed itself as the coming of a new god from the north, its appeal found an immediate response in the minds of the people. On the one hand it met a religious need not satisfied by the religion of the city-state, that splendid ritual in honour of divine rulers on Olympus whose relations to men were no more intimate and personal than the relations of human rulers to their subjects. On the other hand it found among the peasants elements of ancient ritual of kindred meaning, which it adopted and extended to serve its purpose. Alien as it was to the Olympian religion, it was not wholly alien to Greece. The fear of vague spiritual forces had never been wholly banished by the epic. Old mystic rites, particularly rites for reviving the spirit of vegetable life in the spring, readily lent themselves to a religion which taught the rebirth of the soul at death.

The new movement found expression during the sixth century in the Orphic religion.[6] Who Orpheus was, where he lived, whether there ever was one founder of this religion we do not definitely know. We do know that under his name there developed a more refined, more spiritual form of Dionysus wor-

[6] E. Maas, *Orpheus: Untersuchungen zur griech. röm. altchrist. Jenseits-dichtung und Religion,* 1895.

ship, which was of a nature to appeal to the Greek genius. We know that religious associations, somewhat like our churches, sprang up as a protestant movement in different parts of Greece; and we know that the main centres of the movement were found at Thebes, at Delphi, at various points in Sicily, and more particularly at Croton in southern Italy and at Athens. We know that a definite theology developed about the story of the Titans, powers of evil, who devoured Dionysus and were burned to ashes by the thunderbolt of Zeus, a pantheistic theology which recognized one god as ruler of the world and manifest in it. This theology recognized clearly a duality of man's nature which was sometimes explained by saying that he was born of the ashes of the Titans and consequently had in himself an evil and material element from the Titans and a divine element from the Dionysus-Zagreus whom the Titans had devoured. However it was explained, the fact of man's dual nature was thrust into the foreground of thought. The soul, released from the body in dreams and in ecstatic worship, was recognized as a distinct entity over against the physical, bodily self; it was an entity of spiritual, divine nature and therefore immortal; it was the real man as distinguished from the accidents it experienced in the physical frame of the body. It was "a fugitive from god and a wanderer";[7] it was "yoked with the body and buried in it as a tomb" in the language of later Greek thought; on an early Orphic tablet from southern Italy the soul says "I am a child of Earth and starry Heaven, but my race is of heaven."[8] The idea of the soul as immortal led to belief in rebirths and a cycle of existences. When a man died, the soul went to Hades only to be reborn perhaps

[7] Empedocles, 1. 381. [8] Kaibel, *CIGIS*, No. 638, 17.

as a man, perhaps in some other form. So Empedocles declares he had been born "a youth, a maiden, a bush, a bird and a mute fish of the sea." [9] But at length it might hope for freedom. A series of Orphic tablets gives the words of such a soul: "I have flown out of the sorrowful, troublous round: with eager feet I have entered the ring desired; I have passed to the bosom of the Mistress, the Queen of the lower world." [10]

The conception of the soul as an immortal being imprisoned for a time in the body necessarily meant a new view of the significance of human life. In the epic men accepted what befell them as fated, or as the will of God, and found the satisfaction they might in what life brought them. For the followers of Orpheus, evil was retribution for sin in the past, and the one aim of life was to avoid sin which would bring suffering in the future,—not necessarily or in the first instance sins against morality, though that was included, but rather the sinful mode of life which bound the soul more closely in its prison and brought suffering in future existences. The theodicy was new, and it brought with it a new principle governing human practice. Outside the definite sphere of Orphism the conceptions of impurity that demanded ritual purification, and of sin that needed expiation gained wide sway. The oracle at Delphi was a potent force in explaining plagues, failure of the crops, disaster in battle, and other human ills as the result of pollution; and the same oracle prescribed the means of purification to escape these ills. The follower of Orpheus, however, guided his whole life by the purpose to free his soul from the bonds of evil. Clay and pitch were used to absorb the taint of evil from his body; he did

[9] Empedocles, ll. 383–384.
[10] Compagno Tablets, Kaibel, *CIGIS*, No. 481.

not eat eggs or beans; meat was abjured; woolen garments were taboo. Special piacular rites were employed to meet special occasions. Initiations served to develop the divine nature of the soul by promoting union with the god. Presumably they were rites adopted from places like Phrygia and Crete, rites savage in themselves, but here instinct with spiritual meaning. We are told that the Cretans sought to possess themselves of the divine nature by eating the raw flesh of the bull; the same rite in Orphic initiations was revived to symbolize the union of the soul with the god of all life. By these initiations Orpheus, who had himself visited the lower world, taught his followers to win release at length from the chain of rebirths and to reach the divine freedom to which they were entitled. By initiations, by magic incantations, by moral and ritual purity, the soul might hope to realize its true nature.

So far as we can learn, Pythagoras was an apostle of this movement. He taught the divine nature of the soul, and man's duty to free the soul from the bonds of evil. His significance lies *first* in his effort to realize the goal of human life by means of an ethico-religious state at Croton, and *secondly* in the philosophic form he gave to his conception of the universe. To the combination of religion and philosophy in his work may be traced the origin of the concept of the soul in later Greek philosophy.

The Orphic religion remained the cult of a relatively small and decreasing number of votaries, a protestant religion over against the public worship of the city-state. But another element of the same religious revival found an important place in the state religion of Athens. The mysteries celebrated at Eleusis and similar rites elsewhere were based—like some phases of

Dionysus worship—on the old peasant worship of agricultural deities. The gods of the dead who were buried in the earth and of the grain which grew out of the earth were quite generally associated, but the earlier worship of these gods at Eleusis was devoted to the earth-goddesses in order to secure abundant crops. The Homeric Hymn to Demeter tells the story of the Eleusinian goddess, her sorrow in the loss of her daughter, her wanderings in the search for Persephone, her kindly reception at Eleusis, the restoration of Persephone, and Demeter's grateful gifts to Eleusis, the gift of the grain and the gift of the mysteries. The same goddess who gave man the bread of life, the grain which dies in the ground only to live again in the growing crop and the ripening harvest, gave man also rites in which he found the assurance of a life for himself after death. After Eleusis became part of the Athenian state the festival began in Athens with rites of purification, following a proclamation of the secrecy of the rites and of their limitation to men of Greek race. In a grand procession the participants then marched to Eleusis, sacrificing at shrines along the way, and bringing with them the statue of Iacchus (a form of the infant Dionysus). At Eleusis the rites lasted three nights and days; they included sacrifices to many gods, nightly wanderings in imitation of Demeter to visit the spots she had visited, fasting which ended like Demeter's by drinking the holy mixture of meal and water, and finally the celebration in the great Hall of Initiation. What went on there we do not know; there were "things done" and "things said," presumably a kind of mystic drama representing the loss and restoration of Persephone and the birth of Iacchus, as well as the exhibition of sacred objects; quite surely no elaborate teaching, but perhaps a sim-

ple ritual or some explanation of what was shown. Aristotle says "the initiates are not to learn anything, but they are to be affected and put into a certain frame of mind." Of the result for the initiates we are not left in doubt. The existence of something after death, shade though it be, had never been questioned by the Greeks. For the initiates the conviction of the reality of this existence of the soul after death became vivid, and the life of the soul associated with the gods became a life of consciousness and blessedness. As men shared the experiences of Demeter in her sorrow, in her joy, and in her gifts to men, they felt a mystic bond uniting them with her and with her daughter who was Queen of the lower world. To be able to claim these goddesses as their personal friends and protectors, goddesses who sympathized with them in their deepest human experiences, was what men gained by sharing the rites of Eleusis. The chorus in Aristophanes' Frogs sing in the flowery meadows of the lower world: "We alone have the sun and its gracious light, we who have been initiated in the mysteries, and have lived a pious life toward strangers and our own people." [11] In the words of Sophocles "Thrice blessed they of men who see these mystic rites before they go to Hades' realm; these alone have life there, for others there all things are evil." [12] There is abundant evidence that the result of the mysteries was the clear hope of a real and happy existence of the soul after death. Greeks had always believed in an existence after death, shadowy and joyless as it might be. Those who at Eleusis felt for themselves the favour of Persephone, confidently expected the same blessing when they came into her presence after death. Moreover they saw Hades in the

[11] Aristophanes, *Ran.* 455f. [12] Sophocles, *Frag.* 719.

visions, not as a dread and awful king, but as the kindly husband of Demeter's daughter. Nor was this hope only for themselves. Worshippers who shared Demeter's sorrow at the loss of her daughter, who shared her love which won back her daughter and her joy in the restoration of Persephone, could but feel that their own bereavements would be consoled in a life after death where they would rejoin the loved ones they had lost.

As contrasted with the Orphic conception of the soul, the worship at Eleusis was not connected with a theology which taught man's dual nature, nor with a religious practice which aimed to free man's divine immortal soul from the prison house of the material world. It was simply an experience of mystic communion with the gods of Life and Death. A bond was established between these gods and the worshippers when the worshippers actually shared the experiences of Demeter, and felt for themselves the love of Demeter which conquered death and won back her daughter. The experience held good both for the Orphic who theoretically believed in an immortal soul and for others who had no such definite philosophy of its existence. Herodotus's reference to the tens of thousands who annually made the pilgrimage to Eleusis, along with the many allusions to the Eleusinian mysteries in Greek literature, indicates the profound impression of this worship on Athenian life and thought. Of similar "mysteries" elsewhere we do not know the details, but we know that they existed quite generally in Greek cities.

It is not easy to say how far the thought of a blessed life after death for the religious man prevailed for example in the Athens of Pericles. It is

clear that the Athenians and the Greeks generally, ordered their lives with reference to this world rather than with reference to a future state of existence. The epic point of view was never foreign to Greek thought. No people has enjoyed the satisfactions of life as they came more than the Greeks, none has been more sensitive to the impressions of the world about them, none has thrown itself with greater zest into the business of life as this was conceived. Old age and death were inevitable evils, to be forgotten amid the joys and efforts of life. "To serve the present age, my calling to fulfill" was essentially a Greek ideal in contrast to the view that the only real life was in the future, and that human existence must be ordered to secure blessings after death. Heaven and Hell found a small place in myth, and a relatively temporary place in some phases of religion; they never were determining factors in Greek life.

At the same time the Greeks never failed to pay honour and respect to their dead. Old practices of sacrifice and libation were kept up, though excesses were limited by law. The dead were buried with honour, ritual was continued at the grave on certain occasions each year, and gifts were brought to the tomb. The nature of these gifts is seen in the pictures on white lekythoi, perfume phials found in Athenian graves of the fifth century, B. C. Men are pictured bringing to the tomb flat baskets of cakes and fruit, offering phials of oil or perfume, pouring libations to the dead. A sword, a helmet, a mirror, or a fan is brought to the dead; dolls are brought to the graves of children; ducks, finches, rabbits, pets of the living, are brought to amuse the dead. The seated man playing a harp before the tomb is probably one of his family making music for the soul, as he had

made music for the dead man while he lived. On the tombstones of the fourth century at Athens [13] the dead person is represented with members of his family, a man clasping the hand of his wife or brother, the mother attended by her husband and her children. The scenes do not represent parting or sadness, they represent the dead in intimate association with those with whom he had lived. They are monuments to the relations maintained in life; in so far as they have any meaning, they mean that these relations are conceived as continuing after death. Like the gifts brought to the grave, they suggest not souls in heaven or hell, but men who still care for the things, the occupations, the persons for whom they cared when living. The dead are conceived not as in a different state of existence, but as they had lived. The monuments presuppose an existence, apparently a conscious existence, of the souls of the dead; but the nature and permanence of this existence is in no way defined.

It was the business of philosophy to make this definition. In a paper on immortality in Greek religion it is hardly fitting to take up the teaching of Greek philosophy on the subject of immortality; yet since this teaching was based on religion and in later ages had a profound influence on religion, a very brief statement of it is not out of place. In a word Greek philosophy of the fifth and fourth century in Athens accepted the dual nature of man, the only theory of human nature which had been consistently worked out in religious thought. Plato argues for the immortality of the soul as the real, the divine element in man. It is man's business to develop the controlling power of the reason as over against appetite and pas-

[13] P. Gardner, *Sculptured Tombs of Hellas*, 1896. Chaps. X–XI.

sion; education is directed to this end; the state provides the medium through which it is to be attained. Not by mystic rites of weird content, not by strange theologies, but by the grasp on eternal ideas and ideals the soul finds its true existence. Philosophy becomes the business of life and the guide of life. It is not a question of what follows death, but a question of how man is to live; and the answer is that man does not live by bread alone, but by the eternal truth for which his soul is fashioned. From the Orphics and the Pythagoreans Plato adopted the idea of the transmigration of souls, and he pictures in various ways the retribution for wrongs done in the body, the wanderings of the soul in its various existences, and its final return in purity to the Divine. But for Plato it is man's reason which is the means of his spiritual ascent. The goal of life is attained when the soul by its power of reason has vindicated its superiority to its bodily frame, has won freedom from the weaknesses and ills connected with the body, and has attained to the Divine likeness. As such it is immortal.

Aristotle also recognized the divine nature of man's soul in contrast to the material body. But Aristotle based his conception of the soul on its creative power. Man passively receives ideas from the world; his ability to perceive and know the world, to feel, to assimilate, is passive. On the other hand the human mind reflects on these ideas and creates new ideas of its own; here it is not dependent on the material world; because the reasoning element of the mind shares the creative nature of God as pure reason, it is immortal and eternal. Man's business is to establish the control of reason in his life as over against the appetites which he shares with the animals, and thus to vindicate the immortality of his soul.

I have merely touched on the work of Greek philosophy, in order to show what a hold the conception of immortality gained on the best Greek thought. Worked out first in a popular mystic religion, the idea was loosed from weird rites and strange beliefs and given a form in which it had a profound effect on later thought. In Greece, however, the philosophical conception of the immortal soul was the property of the few, not of the many. It was the gift of Greece to future generations, not to its own people.

In Plato's *Apology* he makes Socrates say that death is either a dreamless sleep or a blessed life with the gods, in either way a gain.[14] Such is perhaps the view of the ordinary Athenian as he approached old age. His fear of death, his longings for happiness hereafter, his desire to see again loved ones who had died, might be met emotionally by sharing in the celebration of the Mysteries at Eleusis. He might argue convincingly that the soul is divine in its nature and therefore immortal. But in any case, if his experiences and his arguments were wrong, death was at its worst a dreamless sleep, and the man's business was with the duties and pleasures which life brought him. Probably Thucydides expressed the general Athenian view when he reported the funeral oration of Pericles as containing no reference to a personal existence after death. "I do not now commiserate the parents of the dead who stand here," Pericles says.[15] "I would rather comfort them. You know that your life has been passed amid manifold vicissitudes; and that they may be deemed fortunate who have gained most honour, whether an honourable death like theirs, or an honourable sorrow like yours, and whose days have

[14] Plato, *Apol.*, 40 Cf.
[15] *Thucydides* II, 44; trans. by Jowett.

been so ordered that the term of their happiness is likewise the term of their life. . . . Some of you are at an age at which they may hope to have other children, and they ought to bear their sorrow better; not only will the children who may hereafter be born make them forget their now lost ones, but the city will be doubly a gainer. She will not be left desolate, and she will be safer. For a man's counsels cannot be of equal weight or worth, when he alone has no children to risk in the general danger. To those of you who have passed their prime I say: 'Congratulate yourselves that you have been happy during the greater part of your days; remember that your life of sorrow will not last long, and be comforted by the glory of those who are gone. For the love of honour alone is ever young, and not riches, as some say, but honour is the delight of men when they are old and useless.'"

Any examination of the concept of immortality in Greece cannot fail to impress the student with the influence of religion on its development. Not that the idea of a soul surviving after death was necessarily religious in origin. Living in the memory of his associates and appearing in dreams, the dead man can hardly be conceived as no longer existent; on the contrary, something has survived and passed into the category of vague, undefined influences which surround the living. Its wants must be defined and met, else it may be a force for evil; if it is properly treated, it may bring indefinite forces to bear for the good of its survivors. It has passed into that spirit world which is often more real to early man than the material world. If we use the word "gods," for the mysterious influences about men, the dead become

gods,—not immortal, not in a blessed state, certainly not personal gods, but forces of tremendous importance to man and greatly to be feared.

As was pointed out in speaking of the epic point of view, it was a new phase of religion which destroyed the fear of spirits of the dead. When the gods were defined as rulers of the world and religion was organized into worship of these rulers, no place was left theoretically for such vague forces as the dead had been. It was religion, the new conception of the gods, which reduced them to mere shades and banished them to another world. Moreover it was the religion of the epic which developed the idea of immortality as an attribute of its gods, and paved the way for an ultimate belief in the immortality of the soul.

Finally, it was yet a third phase of religion, a revived and developed mysticism in contrast with the rationalism of the epic, which gave man the experience of union with the gods and thus taught him by experience that his own nature was divine and immortal. Buddhism did not need gods, for it postulated the divine eternal nature of the soul; Confucianism is often said to find its gods in the souls of the departed dead; various forms of religion never reached the idea of the soul as immortal; but for the Greeks, and in a measure for the Hebrews, the idea of life after death was developed under the influence of the idea of God, till it led to a belief in the divine and therefore immortal nature of the soul.

VIII

IMMORTALITY IN THE SYNOPTIC GOSPELS

BENJAMIN WISNER BACON

I. THE SYNOPTIC VIEWPOINT

FOR the modern Occidental, more or less directly affected in his conceptions of the life to come by philosophic argument largely derived from Plato and the Greek thinkers, it is difficult to appreciate sympathetically the Jewish conceptions which underlie the teaching of our Synoptic Gospels. Yet these must be understood if we would obtain the real meaning of the evangelists.

It comes to us with something of a shock of surprise to read the following passage in the leading Church writer of the second century: "If you have fallen in with some who are called Christians, but who do not admit this (he has been speaking of the millennial reign), and venture to blaspheme the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob; who say there is no resurrection of the dead, *and that their souls when they die are taken to heaven;* do not imagine that they are really Christians. . . . I, and others who are orthodox Christians on all points, are assured that there will be a resurrection from the dead, and a thousand years in Jerusalem, which will then be rebuilt, adorned, and enlarged, as the prophets Ezekiel and Isaiah and others declare."[1] Justin Martyr, who

[1] *Dial. with Trypho,* lxxx.

writes this about 150 A. D., could tolerate Jewish-Christians who held that Christ was "man born of men," so long as they did not insist on Gentile believers observing the Mosaic ordinances to which they clung themselves. But he refused the very name of Christian to those whose doctrine of immortality included no return from the underworld to reign with Christ in a visible restored Jerusalem. To say that "our souls when we die are taken to heaven," was for Justin equivalent to blasphemy of the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, who had promised the patriarchs this reign. How many of us would be able to call ourselves Christians if Justin's standards prevailed to-day?

And yet Justin regards himself on the general question of immortality as a devout disciple of Plato, Pythagoras and other Greek philosophers, though his doctrine is of conditional, not intrinsic or inalienable immortality. "The souls of the pious remain in a better place, while those of the unjust and wicked are in a worse, waiting for the time of judgment. Thus some who have appeared worthy of God never die; but others are punished so long as God wills them to exist and be punished."[2] If we go back another century to a Christian environment scarcely affected by Greek philosophy we shall find a still wider divergence from modern ideas. We shall be approximating those Jewish and Jewish-Christian sources to which Justin had accommodated his Greek philosophy.

The viewpoint of Mark, the earliest of our extant Gospels, is already affected, as I shall later attempt to show, by the teaching of Paul. The same is true of the two subsequent writings whose narrative is mainly based on Mark, the double work Luke-Acts, and the

[2] *Ibid.* v.

Gospel of Matthew. These writers are affected not only in what they take over from Mark, but to an even greater extent in portions where they depend upon other unknown sources. Nevertheless all three of the Synoptic writings (thus called to distinguish them from the widely different, completely Pauline, fourth Gospel) in spite of the Greek dress for which they have exchanged their original Semitic idiom, are fundamentally Jewish in their world-conception and point of view. And the characteristic thing about this Jewish idea of the life to come is that it is not primarily a doctrine of immortality at all. It is really a doctrine of escape from what stood for immortality in primitive Jewish belief. Resurrection in its proper sense means return from the grave to a renewed life in the body,—indeed Justin, and the rest of the second century fathers, who give us the original Greek of the so-called Apostles' Creed say plainly "in the flesh" (*τῆς σαρκός*).

Resurrection Jewish-Christian thought may claim as its very own. No Greek thinker will dream of disputing it. The Greek's belief is really a belief in *immortality*. He holds to a persistence of soul-life after death, whether in heaven or elsewhere. He may imagine Isles of the Blest beyond the setting sun, or Tartarus beneath the earth as a place of torment for the damned. He never thinks of return to earth. The Jew is either a Sadducee who admits no persistence at all of conscious soul-life, or else a Pharisee, one of the sect who in the later years of Judaism were driven to admit a return from Sheol, that shadowy realm of ghost-life beneath the earth, of at least the most heroic and deserving of the dead to share in the joys of the messianic reign.

Of course from the moment when Pharisees began to dispute with Sadducees, the question could not fail to be asked, "With what body do they come?" It received various answers. But the essence of the matter was the escape of the soul thus divinely redeemed from Sheol, brought back from the gloomy prison-house of the dead. For indeed the soul's mere persistence after death was deemed a poor boon indeed. In the best of cases it was only a provisional storing up for the glorious "age to come"; in the worst it would be a corresponding holding in chains for ultimate punishment. In all cases immortality alone, for the Jew, means a mere survival of the belief common to all primitive peoples of the ghost-life of the shadow-world. To allege that Jehovah's promise to Abraham, Isaac and Jacob means no more than this is "blasphemy." For Jehovah, in all Jewish thought both earlier and later, is emphatically not a God of the dead, like Minos or Rhadamanthus, or Pluto, or Hades, but a God of the living. To become members of the kingdom which He intends to inaugurate, the souls of the righteous dead must be delivered from their prison. The gates of Sheol must be broken down before them, as when Israel came forth out of the house of bondage and the darkness of Egypt, or as when Jehovah a second time put on the armour of His vindication and deliverance and broke the gates of brass and bars of iron of the captivity in Babylon. Moreover, the returning dead must be clothed with some sort of body, else they will be but pitiful shadows and ghosts, present at the banquet of the Kingdom, but deprived of all real share in it.

In the older days the prophets had been the statesmen of the national religion. Hence necromancy, and the attempt to hold converse with the dead was con-

demned and denounced along with witchcraft. It involved disloyalty to Jehovah, illicit dealing with the enemy.[3] The very contact with any dead body made one ritually "unclean." Much more was it forbidden to participate in rites symbolizing the death and resurrection of Adonis, or to cut one's flesh for the dead. One might not even meet the thirst of the pitiable shades for momentary renewal of their former existence by pouring for them libations of wine or blood to reanimate their bloodless frames. In the later time all hope of restoration of the national life lay in a supernatural intervention of Jehovah. But mere deliverance of the living from the alien yoke was conceived as but the lesser part of His working. His conquest of the powers of death and hell was the greater part. A late addition to Isaiah[4] promises this deliverance of the dead. In Jesus' time the masses of the people believed that the gates of Sheol would not prevail against the Deliverer, when at last He should come. Their struggle was not so much against the yoke of Rome as "against the principalities and powers in heavenly places" who were "world-rulers of this darkness." The history of this belief in Palestine makes it widely different from that of Greece. It is essentially a return from the grave, a restoration of the spirit to the body; not a release of the soul from the body to enter its natural sphere of immortality somewhere beyond the grave. Israelites who come at last to believe in a share (for at least some of the dead) in the life of "the age to come" do so in spite of centuries of opposition on the part of all the religious leaders of the

[3] The remark is a just one that where messianism is strong the hope of immortality is weak, and conversely. The personal hope tends to flourish at the expense of the national.

[4] Is. 26–27. See especially 26: 19.

past to everything pertaining to the nature-worship of the Canaanite religions whose ritual looks toward participation in nature's annual renewal of life. When they accept the doctrine they do so purely and simply on religious grounds, not in the least because they have learned from their philosophers to consider the soul a monad incapable of dissolution, or believe in the conservation of energy in the form of a mysterious force known as vitality. It is simply a reasonable religious hope in Jehovah, a confidence that He will keep His promise to the patriarchs to make their seed His people even should it require His invasion of the gloomy recesses of Sheol and rescue of its prisoners.

Both Greek philosopher and Jewish religious teacher fall back ultimately upon the Animistic view, instinctive to all primitive peoples, that the spirit which leaves the body inert with the parting breath is hovering somewhere about, revealing its presence in dreams, capable (if only the right spell were found) of being recalled to its accustomed haunts and ways. The Greek philosopher finds a rational ground for the ancient belief. He argues from the nature of soul as ethereal and indestructible. The Jewish teacher takes refuge in the power and goodness of Jehovah, whom he personifies as champion of his imprisoned people. Both postulate immortality in the sense of continued existence of the soul; and the Jew is even truer than the Greek to the primitive form of the belief, since he scarcely advances beyond the conviction that this life of the "shades" is, and must ever remain, a poor, weak, bloodless existence, more pitiable than that of the lowest menial in the upper regions of sunlight and the zest of life. "Art thou become weak like one of us?" cry the peering shades in Isaiah 14: 10 as Nebuchadnezzar is "brought down to Sheol." But the

Greek tries to reconcile himself to this inevitable fate. He paints scenes of delight in the Elysian Fields or fables Gardens of the Hesperides. He even persuades himself by his philosophy that he is better off without the body. The cumbrous flesh is but the prison of the soul. As the butterfly emerges from the chrysalis to soar on wings of beauty in the light, so will it be for the spirit when it frees itself from the clay. It will find itself in its true environment, and recognizing at last that the things which are seen are temporal, the things not seen eternal, will marvel that ever it mistook shadow for substance, and rejoice that the illusion is past. So the Alexandrian-Jewish author of Wisdom of Solomon (9: 15). But this author, like Philo, Platonizes.

It is the opposite road that is taken by genuinely Jewish faith. So long as it is true to itself it is never reconciled to the shadow life. In the later time, when it is forced to meet the scoffs of Greek philosophy at its crude picture of the coming age, it changes here and there a detail, or adapts itself where it must. It borrows from Persian and Greek a Paradise and a Gehenna, thus providing preliminary limbos of partial bliss for the righteous, foretastes of perdition for the wicked. It accommodates its doctrine of physical restoration to the unsuitability of this earthly frame, especially if crippled or mutilated here, making certain qualifications and provisos to meet the ideal conditions assumed for the "age to come." For purposes of recognition all bodies when they first arise will retain their earthly blemishes and imperfections. As soon as friends have identified one another these will be miraculously removed. All bodies will be perfect. Since there should no longer be need of the command "Increase and multiply and fill the earth"

those who have a share in the "age to come" will be uni-sexual.[5]. Other adjustments and accommodations are found, as difficulties are suggested by reflexion or cast up by opponents. All these are mere expedients, evasions rather than answers, to the question, "With what body do they come?" Ever the hope of the Jew is against separation from the land he loves and the bodily life that to him is alone real "life." He cannot be satisfied while a realm remains outside the dominion of Jehovah, holding captive those who once had been loyal subjects of Jehovah's rule. The Greek makes the most of his "immortality." The Jew either will hear nothing of life beyond, or he insists upon "resurrection." He must have return from among the dead. First the Kingdom of God, the supremacy of God's will upon the earth, in the presence and with the participation of all His people. After that add what you will.

II. The Teaching of Jesus in Galilee

Encounter with Sadducees was a great exception in the ministry of Jesus. In Galilee, at least in the humbler circles among whom Jesus lived, there would seldom be seen one of the priestly aristocracy of Jerusalem. Even in Jerusalem Jesus would have little occasion for any interchange with the Sadducean priesthood save as He roused their hostility by exciting messianic agitation liable to bring on Roman intervention to the taking away of their tolerably comfortable place and partial control of the nation. As a rule, therefore, we cannot expect in the Galilean ministry any record of argument in proof of a doctrine

[5] *Eth. Enoch* 1:4; *Apoc. Bar.* 49–51. "They shall be made like unto the angels."

which the mass of Jesus' hearers would accept as matter of course. We must consider first His ordinary teaching, afterward the exceptional case.

The matter-of-course references to the future life, if I may so designate those in which Jesus merely takes for granted the traditional beliefs of His hearers, are all, I think, of one class. They are all appeals to the great moral law of retribution which Paul summarizes in the ancient proverb, "Whatsoever a man soweth that shall he also reap." They reënforce the motives to right living of the old-time prophets by extending the boundaries of Jehovah's kingdom without limit either in time or space. "Fear not those that kill the body, but fear Him that hath power to destroy both soul and body in hell." [6] Learn the higher use of money. A mere swindling steward is shrewd enough to know that by making concessions to the landlord's creditors he can feather his own nest for times of adversity. Let us take the hint that friendship and gratitude are powers that can bridge even the grave. "I say unto you, Make to yourselves friends by means of the mammon of unrighteousness, and they will receive you into the eternal habitations." [7] So Jesus broadens and deepens moral motives by the power of an endless life. He bids the self-indulgent rich realize that the moral law outlasts all provision for fleshly appetite, and remember that a time is coming when the starveling at his gate may have the comforts and he the torment. To the penitent thief he offers a share in His own place in the Father's house. These teachings are not new so far as they merely

[6] Cf. *Aboth R. Nathan* 24, the saying of R. Jochanan b. Zacchai on the greater terrors of the divine judgment.

[7] Cf. the rabbinic teaching cited by Nork (*Rabb. Quellen*, p. 147) from the preface of *Chesed Samuel* 2b "The poor make intercession on behalf of the (charitable) rich in heaven."

presuppose the common Pharisean doctrine of the "Age to Come." They are to be studied for two purposes: first, that we may appreciate their essential message, the true new principle that Jesus applies to the conditions He confronts; second, that we may avoid a certain misuse of them that is very common. We must cease to draw from them unwarranted inferences in matters that do not concern the message, but are only part of the common background of current belief.

Let me give first an illustration of the misuse I have in mind. In Mark 9: 43–48 Jesus gives three examples of the relative importance of values in things material as against things eternal. It is better, He says, to enter into life maimed as to right hand, right foot, or right eye, than having every member whole to be cast into the unquenchable fire. I suppose there are no longer any so materialistic in their views of the life beyond as to hold that the possession or lack of hands and eyes and feet at death makes any difference to the spiritual body. Christians will probably now grant that we are not compelled to hold to the persistence of mutilations in the life to come because of the particular form of Jesus' illustration. Even if we assumed because of the ordinary form of belief in His time that He Himself presupposed this conception, we should not consider that He endorsed it. We say quite rightly, He was not talking about the nature of the resurrection body, or its relation to the earthly; He was simply reminding His followers as they faced possible martyrdom that no sacrifice is too costly for entrance into the eternal life. He was measuring the value, as He so constantly does, of things temporal by comparison with things eternal.

But what about the closing verse? Do we apply the same logic there? The warning ends, if you re-

member, with a characterization of the *Gehinnom* into which those are cast who are adjudged unworthy to "enter into life." It is "where their worm dieth not, and the fire is not quenched." Is not that a direct endorsement of those lurid pictures we find in the apocalyptic writings of the time, *Ethiopic Enoch,* or the *Apocalypse of Peter?* Does it not imply the eternal torments of the damned? Must we not judge of this as of the great phrase which our first evangelist coins into a refrain five times repeated in his Gospel: "There shall be the weeping and the gnashing of teeth," or of the awful picture of judgment with which he concludes his account of the public ministry: "These shall go away into eternal punishment, but the righteous into eternal life"? Does not Jesus here pave the way for Tertullian, and make Himself sponsor for the vindictive hell of our human craving for vengeance?

If we so reason we are not only, as it seems to me, inconsistent with our own logic, but we do a threefold injustice to the real message of Jesus. To begin with, let me venture a general caveat. We have no right (in my personal judgment) to insist to this extent upon the ipsissima verba of the Gospels. They are not only translations of Jesus' originally Aramaic utterances; they are free traditional reports, written down a full generation later, by evangelists who often vary widely from one another in reporting the same utterance. Moreover all scholars will agree that the particular utterances characteristic of our first Gospel which threaten the penalties of hell with such reiteration, utterances of which the great concluding parable of the last Judgment (Matt. 25: 31–46) is typical, must be taken to reflect in peculiar degree the special convictions of this evangelist. The passage in Mark

9: 43–48, with which we are now dealing, is not indeed to be classed with the special denunciations of judgment characteristic of Matthew, but it is of the Matthean type. It has the same literary structure which characterizes many of Matthew's longer discourses. And this polished artistic form is not easily explained in comparison with most of the sayings of Jesus, unless we admit some degree of literary recasting by the writer to give rhythmic form, strophic balance and cadence. Especially does the recurrent refrain (verses 43, 45, 47) belong rather to poetic art than to colloquial speech. I am not here propounding an argument which can be pressed to avoid a difficulty, and I do not propose to deal with the record otherwise than as if every word were an exact transcript of the actual utterance of Jesus. But I do offer a warning to those who attempt to build on particular words and phrases rather than on underlying principles. Jesus Himself would have rested only on the underlying principles, since He never took the trouble to write out a body of precepts. Fortunately the great principles of His teaching are really determinable, in spite of variability in the report.

Returning, then, to the threefold refrain. "Having two hands, two feet, two eyes, to be cast into hell," what shall we say as to the closing utterance attached in Mark 9: 48, "Where their worm dieth not, and the fire is not quenched"? Is not this an endorsement of the doctrine of endless torment?

First of all we note that the clause is a simple quotation of the last words of Isaiah, where the prophet depicts the safety and peace of the redeemed city. Its inhabitants look forth with infinite relief and thankfulness upon the heaps of offal and refuse swept out upon the dunghills of the southwestern valley, Gehinnom—

Aceldama of the later time. The elements of evil have met a destruction so complete that they can never plague the city again. Jesus borrows this Isaian imagery of decay and burning not for the purpose of insisting upon the particular nature of the doom that is to overtake the wicked, but (as usual) to reinforce His appeal to men to choose the higher values. He uses for this purpose the higher lights and deeper shadows of the "age to come." We do injustice to His real message if we fail to remember (1) that we have no right to insist upon the ipsissima verba of the evangelists' later reports, without carrying them back to the general underlying principles of Jesus' teaching; (2) that we ought to differentiate between the new lesson Jesus is trying to bring home, and that which is mere assumption by common consent among all parties at the time, such as the Isaian picture of the dung-heaps of Gehinnom outside the new Jerusalem, which *Ethiopic Enoch* develops at great length. In this case the new lesson is simply the futility of seeking to save one's life in this world if thereby one loses it unto life everlasting. We must remember (3) that Jesus as well as Paul was an opponent of the letter that killeth, and an advocate of the Spirit that giveth life.

I have dwelt at some length upon this particular Galilean teaching of Jesus because I believe it to be typical of all. It certainly affords a fair example of that misuse of the records which I deprecate, because here as much as anywhere men are disposed to cling to the husk and disregard the kernel. But I think it is also typical of all because it shares with the rest of Jesus' appeals to the current eschatology the fundamental purpose of deepening the significance of moral distinctions by indefinitely enlarging the sphere of their

application. "Reward in heaven," hopeless remorse in the "outer darkness." These are not new doctrines forming part of the individual message of Jesus. They are axioms of the faith in which both He and His auditors have been brought up, but whose implications His generation have failed to fully realize.[8] Jesus appreciates their full significance, because He has a sense of the infinite value of human personality which they do not share. Their belief in a resurrection, limited (it would seem) at first to the supremely heroic and deserving, rested, it is true, historically upon similar ground. They had come to know "souls that were not born to die," heroes and martyrs who had given their lives for God's Kingdom, and could not be excluded from it. On this ground they had begun to cherish the new hope, but without consistent application. Jesus applied the principle of human worth consistently. "Not a sparrow falleth to the ground without your Father."[9] He clothes the lily. He feeds the ravens. Are not ye much better than they? Therefore ask, and ye shall receive, seek and ye shall find, knock—knock even at the gate of heaven—and the doors of your Father's house shall be opened unto you. Jesus accepts and applies the doctrine of the Pharisees. But He does not give the endorsement of His own authority to the details of the conception, the place of torment for the unmerciful, Abraham's bosom (that is, a reclining-place next to Abraham on the couch before which the messianic banquet is spread) as compensation for those that suffered here undeserv-

[8] A century later we find R. Jochanan b. Zacchai making similar application of the new doctrine. Cf. *Berachoth* 28*b*.

[9] Cf. Simon b. Jochai in *Bereshith* R. §79, f. 77, col. 4. "No bird falls from the sky without the decree of heaven. How much less can danger beset the life of a man save by permission of the Creator?"

edly. He uses these conceptions because as a whole they are in line with His own consciousness of the value of a human soul in the sight of the heavenly Father. But the *lesson* lies elsewhere. The parable of the rich man and Lazarus does *not* teach anything as to the particular nature of reward and punishment in the world to come. It *does* teach that what we see in this world of the distribution of happiness and wealth is not the last word upon the subject. There is something more to the divine justice than can be inferred from earthly experience. Whether Jesus had ever read that great Alexandrian-Jewish argument for immortality, the Wisdom of Solomon, I cannot say. The parable of the Rich Man and Lazarus does show, however, that Jesus would have heartily welcomed the noble faith of this Alexandrian poet-philosopher in its expression of the conviction that immortality is necessary not merely to give room for the real greatness of finite moral beings, but also to give room for the adequate self-expression of a moral Creator.

Because God created man for immortality,
And made him an image of His own proper being (cf. II Cor. 5:5) . . .
But the souls of the righteous are in the hand of God,
And no torment shall touch them.
In the eyes of the foolish they seemed to have died;
And their departure was accounted their hurt,
And their journeying away from us their ruin:
But they are in peace.
For even if in the sight of men they be punished,
Their hope is full of immortality:
And having borne a little chastening, they shall receive great good.
Because God made trial of them and found them worthy of Himself.
As gold in the furnace He proved them,

And as a whole burnt-offering He accepted them.
They that trust on Him shall understand truth
And they that keep faith in love shall abide in His presence.[10]

III. Jesus' Teaching in Jerusalem

Thus far I have spoken only of the implications of Jesus' utterances when He and His hearers occupy common ground, accepting the modernist doctrine of the time, the Pharisean doctrine of return from Sheol (at least for some of the worthiest of its occupants) to share in the glories of the messianic age. We have now to consider the single occasion on which we hear of the belief being challenged. In Jerusalem, as Jesus was teaching in the temple, "there come unto him Sadducees, who say that there is no resurrection." Against the scoffing objection raised by these Jesus is obliged to make good His acceptance of the belief itself.

The objection presupposed only the cruder form of Pharisean doctrine, in which the resurrection body was assumed to have the same substance, form, functions, and relation to its environment as its predecessor. Accordingly it was not difficult to answer. From what we know of the answers made at the time to the question, "With what body do they come?" it is probable that most intelligent Pharisees would have taken substantially the same ground as Jesus. He explains, you remember, (1) that the life hereafter is the gift of an almighty Creator who is not limited to the forms of which we happen to have had experience; (2) that the angels are not supposed to have families, and that in

[10] Cf. Paul's twice cited extract from *Ass. Mos.* (so Euthalius, Georgius Syncellus, and a MS. of the xi. cent.) in Gal. 5:6, "faith working through love" the only ground of acceptance.

the age to come marriage may be an obsolete institution.[11] This is a quite adequate rebuttal of the crude objection. But Jesus does not stop here. The significant part of the recorded saying follows after. It is the added rebuke of Sadducean unbelief from the incident of God's promise to Moses when He sent him to bring Israel forth out of Egypt. This reveals the real basis of Jesus' faith, as well as that of His people. It shows His insight into the things that belong unto God: "But as touching the dead that they are raised; have ye not read in the book of Moses, in the place concerning the bush, how God spake unto him saying, I am the God of Abraham, and the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob? He is not a God of the dead, but of the living: ye do greatly err." I must dwell for a few moments on this great utterance.

The later evangelist Luke attaches a clause taken in substance from IV Maccabees 16: 25, "For they well knew that men dying for God live unto God, as live Abraham and Isaac and Jacob and all the patriarchs." But Jesus was not here appealing to the Alexandrian belief expressed in IV Maccabees of a special, immediate resurrection of the martyrs to the abode of the patriarchs with God. Hence we cannot admit the Lucan gloss, "For all live unto Him." Again those modern interpreters who think that Jesus is inferring from the use of the present tense, "I *am*," instead of "I *was* the God of Abraham" are still more wide of the mark; for there is no verb at all either in the Greek or the Hebrew. And there surely would be, if this subtle distinction of tense were intended. Both in the

[11] Cf. e. g. *Ber.* 17*a* "In the age to come there is neither eating nor drinking, nor marrying, nor envy nor hatred; but the righteous repose with crowns on their heads and are satisfied with the glory of God" (cf. Ps. 17: 15). See also *Eth. Enoch*, 51: 4.

original and the quotation the utterance is simply: "I, the God of" the fathers. The copula must be supplied. Moreover, we have not, as even our American Revisers render, "the" God of the dead, but "a" God of the dead. Jesus is contrasting the "God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob," with such gods of the dead as Pluto, Hades, Rhadamanthus, Osiris, etc. At "the place concerning the Bush," Jehovah, the covenant-keeping God, had commissioned Moses to bring forth their descendants from the house of bondage, that they might be a peculiar treasure, a people for an own possession unto Him. Jesus believes in this promise, which could only be fulfilled when Jehovah reigned supreme in the midst of His own delivered people. And no such redemption was possible unless, as in the days of redemption out of Egypt, Jehovah should manifest the glory of His strength by prevailing over the gates of Sheol. It was because the Sadducees knew neither the Scriptures nor this "power of God," the power shown in His triumph over the powers of the Underworld that they so greatly erred.

To appreciate the real ground of Jesus' argument, and how completely the faith of Israel in His time is based on their hope in God's promise of *national* deliverance, we must place alongside this rebuke of Sadducean materialism the ancient prayer, second of the so-called Eighteen Blessings. It is among the oldest of all, a prayer as familiar to their ears, no doubt, as the *Shema* itself, the Credo of Israel, with which Jesus answered the question of the scribe immediately after. This well-known Blessing of Jehovah, second of the Eighteen, may not actually have been called The Power of God, but at all events it celebrates Jehovah's power in restoring the nation from death to life after the Captivity, and it makes further appeal to His

promise to the Patriarchs. But we must couple together the first two Blessings, probably the oldest of the Eighteen, to bring out the completeness of the connection with Jesus' reply to the Sadducees:

(1) "Blessed art thou, O Lord, our God and the God of our fathers, the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, the God of Jacob, the great God, the mighty and tremendous, the Most High God, who bestowest gracious favours and createst all things, and rememberest the piety of the patriarchs, and wilt bring a redeemer to their posterity, for the sake of Thy name in love. O King, who bringest help and healing and art a shield.

(Response?) "Blessed art Thou, O Lord, the shield of Abraham."

After this follows the Blessing for the Power of God:

(2) "Thou art mighty forever, O Lord; Thou restorest life to the dead, Thou art mighty to save; who sustainest the living with beneficence, quickenest the dead with great mercy, supporting the fallen and healing the sick, and setting at liberty those who are bound, and upholding Thy faithfulness to those that sleep in the dust. Who is like unto Thee, Lord, the Almighty; or who can be compared unto Thee, O King, who killest and makest alive again, and causest help to spring forth? And faithful art Thou to quicken the dead.

(Response?) "Blessed art Thou, O Lord, who restorest the dead."

The symbolism for this sublime hymn of confidence

in God's faithfulness to His promise to the patriarchs is taken from Ezekiel's vision of the Valley of Dry Bones, from which the broken, crucified, dead nation is raised up when the wind from God breathes upon them, and they rise up an exceeding great army. In the dark times that had come for Israel under an alien yoke the figure had been many times recalled. We have in the fragments of pseudo-Isaian literature a form of it which describes in poetic imagery how "The Lord God descended to his dead people that slept in the dust of the grave, that he might proclaim unto them his own salvation." [12] Paul, in Ephesians 5: 14, even quotes a similar hymn in which God does this in the person of the Messiah: "Awake," cries the poet to despairing Israel, "and arise from the dead, and the Christ shall shine forth upon thee."

But the essential point of resemblance between the utterance of Jesus and the Blessing for the demonstration of God's power in restoring life to the dead, is that both rest upon His faithfulness to His promise to the patriarchs. God had declared that He would make their descendants His "people for an own possession." In the place concerning the Bush He declares to Moses that the time has come. Now if He were "a god of the dead" His "people for an own possession" might be conceived as a vast company of shades, like the pitiable denizens of the empire of the underworld. But neither Jesus' contemporaries nor their forbears could tolerate the idea of Jehovah as a God of the dead. No more than we moderns can logically conceive the Creator, whose very nature it is to give life and breath to all things, turning all back again to primeval chaos, reckless of the values wrought

[12] Quoted by Justin Martyr (*Dial.* lxxii.) as from "Jeremiah," by Irenæus (*Haer.* III, xx. 4) as from "Isaiah."

out through æons of evolution, an immutable Absolute enthroned over a lifeless universe. Jesus is appealing to His nation's hope, the messianic hope, the hope and faith that God *means something* by the vast vicissitudes of history, and that the faith of the generations past that sought the "city that hath the foundations" is not in the end to be put to shame. He takes the nature of God as a *faithful* Creator, that has not made all men in vain, as the ultimate ground of His doctrine of immortality. And because our Christian faith is rooted in this genuine *national* hope of Jesus and His people it can never be merely a hope of immortality, but must be a hope of resurrection. It rests upon the *value* of the individual soul and of human society.

IV. The Effect of Calvary

We have considered the teaching of Jesus in its two aspects, first where there is no challenge to the commonly accepted faith, second where He is thrown back to render a reason for the hope that is in Him. In both cases we found that the teaching of the Master is typically Hebrew. It is exactly what we might expect from one thoroughly grounded in the law and the prophets. Indeed it scarcely differs from that of the most spiritual-minded of contemporary Jewish teachers save in going deeper, and laying the foundation in the worth of man and the goodness of God. Even the details of the picture coincide with current conceptions, though we know from the whole course of Jesus' teaching that He wished His disciples to distinguish the weightier from the less vital, and not to be slaves of the letter.

But it was not the *teaching* of Jesus which gave rise to the Christian doctrine of immortality. Paul never

dreams of citing any word of Jesus in support of his doctrine, though he does once refer to an unknown saying on the Gathering together of the Elect (a feature of Jewish conceptions of the establishment of the messianic kingdom), to the effect that the living would have no precedence over the dead. We should not expect Paul to cite teachings. In the nature of the case no Apostle or witness to the Resurrection would think of resorting to sayings of the Master in exposition or vindication of the accepted views of the Synagogue, when he could point to his own visions and revelations of the risen Lord. Jesus had taught them, of course, to think less meanly and ignobly than they had previously thought about the conditions of the age to come; but He had brought life and immortality to light *by the resurrection itself*. All their highest messianic hopes were now proved true since they had seen Him clothed in His resurrection glory, and heard the voice "as of many waters" proclaiming: "Fear not; I am the first and the last, the Living one. I was dead, and behold I am alive forevermore, and hold the keys of death and of Hades." It is the *story of Calvary* which made the Christian religion. The teachings of Jesus were gathered up afterward as a precious treasure of which they had at first not realized the value. Pastors and teachers turn them to account when the churches begin to feel the need of admonition, training and discipline in the way of righteousness; but the Apostles were "witnesses of the resurrection."

However, there is a sense in which we may say that the teaching of Jesus (though not the *public* teaching) was itself the origin of this faith in His resurrection. I do not mean the forewarnings of His fate which the evangelists relate as preceding the last journey to

Jerusalem. Whatever the degree of definiteness with which Jesus then placed before them His own assurance of victory even through death, we know that they disregarded it and only recalled it afterward, when they had become convinced by other means that He had been raised again from the dead. It was another utterance which made it possible for them to receive the Easter message. What I refer to is a much more intimate and more unmistakable utterance than any of these warnings on the way to Jerusalem, a saying given under such circumstances that the disciples neither did nor could disregard it.

We know that Jesus' farewell utterance in the upper room, declaring that His body was broken, His blood poured out for the disciples' sakes, and "making covenant" with them in His blood, that they should eat and drink with Him at His table in His Kingdom, was neither forgotten nor disregarded. For, as Paul tells us, the breaking of the bread was observed as a memorial rite "from the Lord himself." The very fact that the words were thus reinforced by symbolic act was a guarantee that though heaven and earth should pass away this farewell message at least should not pass away, but should testify the Lord's own faith "till he come."

It is hardly possible for us to say what effect reports of visions and revelations of the risen Lord might have had on the minds of disciples destitute of any preparation in His own words for a belief in His resurrection. Yet experience would seem to indicate, if indeed the references to His being recognized "in the breaking of the bread," and similar reawakenings of past impressions in the Gospels do not suggest it, that without some such preparatory nucleus personal visions might not have been experienced, and reports of visions

granted to others would scarcely have found acceptance. There is, then, a sense in which we may say that it was the private teaching of Jesus Himself which gave rise to the Christian doctrine of the resurrection. If we hold that only hearts made ready could have had the experience we might almost say it was this doctrine which produced the resurrection visions, rather than the visions which produced the Christian doctrine.

But what was this doctrine, or belief, to which Jesus appealed when He declared that His body and blood were "given" for His followers' sake, when He made tryst with them at the messianic banquet? Was it simply the current Pharisean teaching referred to by the sisters in the story of Lazarus, when Martha says with more of resignation than of hope, "I know that my brother shall rise again in the resurrection at the last day"? If so, there can have been but little connection between the belief and the acceptance of the Easter message. The broken bread would have betokened only a very remote comfort.

But there is reason to think that quite a different belief is here made use of, a belief which looked for no prolonged sojourn in the treasury of righteous souls, or other place of preliminary safe-keeping until "the last day," but for immediate restoration to life and activity; a belief which concerned not the generality, but only those who "died on God's account," who when escape was offered them chose rather the way of martyrdom; a belief, in short, of an immediate "first resurrection," given to those who had willingly dedicated themselves in martyrdom "on God's account." For, according to IV Maccabees 17:18, those who thus dedicated themselves "are already standing before the throne of God, and are living the blessed life; for

Moses also saith, 'All who have sanctified themselves[13] are underneath thy hands.'" It is true that the clause we have just quoted comes from an Alexandrian-Jewish writing of marked affinities with Platonism. Even II Maccabees, where a similar doctrine is expressed at an earlier date, is also probably Alexandrian, though the resurrection of the martyrs is here in bodily form. But both books were written to promote the observance of the feast of Dedication of the temple, a Palestinian feast. Both continue the thought of resurrection as we have it in Daniel, a Palestinian apocalypse of ca. 165 B. C., as a special intervention of God in behalf of exceptional heroes; and both stand midway between this and the New Testament Apocalypse, with its special "first resurrection" of the martyrs, and its representation of them as "underneath the altar," interceding there on behalf of their people. The words of the second martyr in II Maccabees 7: 9: "The King of the world shall raise up us who have died for his laws, unto an eternal renewal of life" might easily have been uttered by a Palestinian martyr of Jesus' time. Those of the last of the seven in verse 36: "These our brethren having endured a short pain have now drunk of everflowing life under a covenant with God" would sound no unaccustomed accent. When the youthful martyr concludes: "But I, as my brethren, give up both body and soul for the laws of our fathers, calling upon God that He may speedily become gracious to the nation," he at least helps us realize how those who sat with Jesus at the farewell Supper must have understood His words when He said: "This bread is my body that is given for you,

[13] *Ἡγιασμένοι* cf. John 17: 19: "for their sakes I sanctify (*ἁγιάζω, i. e.* dedicate) myself." The citation is from Deut. 33: 3.

this cup is the new covenant in my blood that is shed for the many. Do this in remembrance of me." They did not need to be told what it meant that one who for the Kingdom's sake had refused escape when it was open to Him should dedicate His body and blood in martyrdom that God might be propitious to His people and forgive their sin. They were not unfamiliar with the hope of joyful reunion to which the mother of the seven martyrs looks forward, and which Jesus holds before the twelve when He covenants with them that they shall drink the wine of the redemption feast new with Him in His kingdom. We have as yet no definite proof that they accepted the idea current in Alexandrian Judaism at about this time, that such dedicated souls pass at once into the very presence of God, to "live even now the blessed life," and to intercede "before the throne of God" for His people. But we have some indications that such a belief was not distinctive of Alexandrian Judaism alone, but belonged to all sections of popular Judaism, however the later conflict with Christianity may have tended to procure its obliteration from the records of the official Judaism of the Synagogue.

It is no less an authority than the great historian Tacitus[14] who gives it as a Jewish belief that "the souls of those who perish in battle, or by the executioner, are eternal." This special immortality for heroes and martyrs rests, of course, upon the case of Eleazar, the Arnold Winkelried of Jewish history, who, according to I Maccabees 6: 44, "gave himself to deliver his people" in the battle against Antiochus, and the other Maccabean martyrs, who perished as Second and Fourth Maccabees relate, at the hands of the executioner. Tacitus could very well know of this pecu-

[14] *Hist.* V, 1ff.

liar form of the belief in immortality, because there was not only a great annual Jewish feast at winter solstice but even the beginnings of a literature, in celebration of the Maccabean heroes and martyrs. In festival and literature alike resurrection was the central theme.

The very Talmud itself, purged as it is of everything that could be suspected of favouring Christianity, furnishes unwilling witness to this doctrinal fruit of the heroic struggle of the Maccabean times. In Jewish literature of the times contemporary with and immediately following the age of Jesus we have many references to a widespread belief in the assumption to heaven of two individuals corresponding to the "two sons of oil" (R. V. "anointed ones") whom Zechariah sees in vision "standing in the presence of the Lord of the whole earth" and supplying with oil the lamp of remembrance of Israel that stands ever-burning before Jehovah.[15] In Revelation 11: 3–13 these are called the "two witnesses" (or "martyrs") of God, and are unmistakably identified with Moses and Elijah. It is their function to descend from heaven before the great and terrible Day of Jehovah to effect the Great Repentance, which, according to Malachi 4: 4–6, is to precede the messianic judgment and renewal of the world. When they shall have finished their "prophecy," and the "martyrdom" which will be inflicted on them in Jerusalem by the agents of the Beast "the breath of life from God" will again enter into them, and they will again be taken up into heaven in a cloud in obedience to "a great voice from heaven" which says "Come up hither." It is well known that our Gospels also furnish many traces of this expectation of the second coming of Elijah, and not a few of

[15] Cf. Isa. 62: 6f.

the return with him of Moses, to whose supposed taking up into heaven a whole book called *The Assumption of Moses* was devoted, of which some fragments are still extant. Those who are interested in the study can trace much of the long history of this Jewish belief in "The Two Witnesses of Messiah" in Bousset's well-known work entitled *The Legend of Antichrist.* The special point of present interest is simply the ground on which the figure of Moses comes to be associated with Elias in the heavenly mission to prepare for the messianic Judgment.

In less orthodox sources outside the Canon the associate of Elias in the rôle of "the Lord's remembrancers" seen by Zechariah is Enoch, who like Elias had "never tasted death" but had been "taken up" alive into heaven. Enoch, whom even angels entreat to intercede for them with the Heavenly Judge (*Eth. Enoch* xiii, 4), was an obvious surrogate. But in the New Testament, and apparently in orthodox Jewish circles as well, it is not Enoch but Moses who plays this extraordinary part. Nor can it be accounted for by the currency of any legend regarding Moses similar to the story of the translation of Enoch and Elijah, for the story of the death and burial of Moses in Deuteronomy 34: 1–8 does not easily lend itself to such legendary development. On the contrary the legend which we know to have been current was the outgrowth of the belief, not the belief of the legend. Moses, as we know from a host of Talmudic passages, was looked to as the great Intercessor for Israel with God, because at Horeb he had obtained the forgiveness of Israel's sin by the power of his "atonement" (Ex. 32: 30–32). The Talmudic comment upon this passage (*Debarim R.* III, 255b) relates that after Moses had prayed "Forgive now their sin, or else, blot me, I

pray thee, out of thy book (of life) which thou hast written" God answered him: "Because thou didst offer thy life for Israel in this world, so shall it be again in the world to come. When I shall send Elias to my people thou shalt appear together with him." As Elias, who at Carmel had been Jehovah's agent to "turn the heart of Israel back again" to Himself, becomes in the last days His agent to effect the Great Repentance, so Moses who "offered his life" to make atonement for their sin becomes the partner of Elias in the work of the final Reconciliation.

With these almost forgotten elements of contemporary Jewish faith in mind it will be easier for us to appreciate that the resurrection faith of the first Christian believers was something quite beyond the ordinary expectation of rising again "in the last day," and more like the belief that spread at once in Galilee after the martyrdom of the Baptist, when they began to say of John, "This is Elias that should come," or "John, whom Herod beheaded, is risen again." The new resurrection faith of the followers of the Crucified was not the mere conventional belief of the Synagogue in which they had been brought up. It was not the mere rising again in the last Day, but went back to the deeplying root from which that now conventionalized faith had sprung, the *special* resurrection for heroes and martyrs, who had "offered their lives" for the redemption of God's people.

The nature of the appearances which the earliest records describe confirm this view of the origins of our Christian resurrection faith. The "visions and revelations of the Lord" of which we hear were not visitations in the night of some poor bloodless ghost, wandering from the abode of shades; nor do the witnesses describe a mutilated corpse galvanized into a few

weeks of forced reanimation. Such conceptions may be left to an obsolete rationalism or to fiction writers of the nineteenth century. The appearances that sent the new faith on its victorious way were not of one issuing from the nether world or from the tomb. What we have of stories of this type is of later date. They concern themselves with the secondary question of debate ignored by Paul, as to what became of the buried body. He whom the disciples saw came from heaven, clothed in the glory of God, bearing in triumph the keys of death and of Hell. The radiance of His form outshone the noonday sun, and His voice was "as the sound of many waters." The wounds of His martyrdom were there, for by these He made intercession for the saints before the eternal Judge. They saw Him as a new Passover Lamb "in the midst of the throne," standing "as it had been slain"; and they looked for reunion with Him at the wedding feast of the eternal redemption. The witnesses of the resurrection saw what they were prepared to see. But the preparation was that of the parting feast below, renewed as the Memorial of Jesus' "covenant of life" [16] from week to week and from year to year "until he should come again." I say, then, that the experience of Calvary introduced a new factor into the Christian doctrine of immortality.

V. Further Development

In speaking of the Teaching of Jesus in both its aspects, and of the Effect of Calvary I have not exhausted the information to be drawn from the Synoptic writings alone on the question of the further development of the Christian doctrine of the Resur-

[16] II Macc. 7:36.

rection. These writings in their present form are not mere records of transactions of the generation already past when they first saw the light. By the most ancient tradition and by internal evidence as well they are documents of the post-apostolic age. Their underlying material is translated from older Aramaic records and gives us trustworthy report of the teaching and life of Jesus in its main outline and substance. But not without evidences of the intervening time of discussion and interpretation as well. During the lifetime of Paul, as we know, the air was full of debate as to the nature and implications of this new-found faith. If already in Judaism the doctrine of return from the grave had precipitated conflicts as to the conditions and environment of that life of the "age to come," if Alexandrian and Palestinian Judaism were already at odds as to whether when we die our souls are taken to heaven, or whether our souls return from Sheol to the surface of the earth, how much more when the resurrection doctrine in Christian form came directly in contact with the Greek doctrine of immortality. The question "With what body do they come?" is one of those which no teacher in the days of Paul could possibly avoid, least of all Paul himself. Fortunately a discussion of this subject will be given in the present series by a scholar of ample qualifications. You will have opportunity to perceive how Paul accommodates his own conception of resurrection and the life of the age to come, a conception based indeed upon Pharisean teaching but in everything conformed to his personal vision of the risen Christ, to Greek ideas of immortality. The essence of it is what he designates "transfiguration" (*μεταμορφούμεθα*), or "conformation" of the body of humiliation into the likeness of the "body of glory" of the risen Christ,

because in the nature of the case "flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God, neither doth corruption inherit incorruption." This is his answer to those who ask "With what body do they come?" The "tabernacle" of perishable flesh must "put on" the imperishable "building" of God reserved for each believer eternally "in heaven." It is an adjustment, or compromise, between the extremes of a Greek doctrine of bodiless immortality in heaven, and a Jewish doctrine of return to fleshly existence upon earth. As we shall see, it was more than a century before the two elements in the church came to even partial agreement on this question; and then they compromised on a doctrine more Jewish than Pauline. But our own enquiry passes over the Pauline period of debate. We are to resume at the beginning of the post-apostolic age, an age in which Church teachers on both sides, Jewish-Christian and Hellenistic or Alexandrian, are doing their best to meet the same questions as Paul. They use largely the same ideas as Paul, and to some extent even the same phraseology. The story of the Transfiguration, which teaches the reluctant twelve that the true goal of the Christ is to lead the way to the glorious mode of existence of "the men who had been taken up"[37] not to abide on the earth provided with perishable "tabernacles," is an example of interpretation by apocalyptic imagery of the inward significance of the doctrine of a suffering Christ. It is what the Synagogue would call a "midrash" on the story of the Confession of Peter to which it is attached in Mark 9: 2–10. This represents Jewish-Christian incorpora-

[37] So Moses and Elias are designated in II Esdr. 6: 26. In contemporary Jewish and early Christian apocalypse they are the "two witnesses" of Messiah, or "advance patterns of immortality" (Irenæus, *Haer.* V, v. 1) having been already transfigured into the glory-body.

tion of Pauline teaching, in the secondary strata of Synoptic tradition. Over against it, in the great Pauline Gospel given out at Ephesus, the headquarters of the Pauline mission field, toward the close of the first century or beginning of the second, the so-called Gospel of John, we have a different combination of the same two elements. In the Fourth Gospel the writer has made the entire history of Jesus one comprehensive Transfiguration story, going back through Mark not to Peter but to Paul, the Apostle of a "Christ not after the flesh." But of these post-Pauline developments I have no time to speak now. They must be reserved for treatment in another Lecture on "The Johannine Doctrine of Immortality."

IX

PAUL'S BELIEF IN LIFE AFTER DEATH

FRANK CHAMBERLIN PORTER

THE apostle Paul was certainly one of the very greatest of those who through the ages have believed in a future life for man. One naturally thinks of him, among ancients, by the side of Plato. Is there indeed a third who can be put with these two for the quality and value of their testimony and the extent and permanence of its influence upon mankind? We naturally ask them both, not with curiosity but with reverence, why they held this belief, how they conceived of life beyond death, of its nature and of the conditions upon which men can hope to attain it. They differ widely and even radically in their grounds and in their conceptions. Plato's doctrine was the immortality of the soul in contrast to the body. Paul argues in direct opposition to this for the resurrection of the body, although he opposes also the current Jewish conception that flesh and blood can inherit the kingdom of God, and must add the word "spiritual" in order to make the idea of resurrection correspond to his experience of the resurrection of Christ. The grounds of all of Plato's arguments are found in the nature of the soul; the one ground of Paul's assurance is the historical fact of Jesus Christ, His death and resurrection, and the experience already in part present, though also a matter of hope, of the

dying and rising of Christians with Him. Whether this difference precludes any real relationship between the testimony of Paul and that of Plato is one of the questions which the study of Paul's thought naturally suggests. For the present it is enough to point out a likeness between the two which is important for the understanding of both. In both it is possible to trace a change, perhaps a development, from writings of earlier to those of later periods. But of both it is certainly true that the fact of their hope, the persistence and assurance with which they held to it, is of more value to us than the arguments by which they defended it or the terms in which they defined it. We desire proof in this matter, and sometimes seek it in dubious ways, through some sort of evidence of the senses, or some supernatural phenomenon that forces our doubts back and enables us to rest our faith on authority. But for most of us the age of authority in that sense is past. If we are to have convictions about the unseen world and the unknown future we cannot accept them on the bare testimony of those who claim to have seen what lies beyond the perception of common men, or to have been in regions inaccessible to others. Even for our hope in life after death we must find grounds in human nature and points of contact in our own experience if we are to justify belief. We must look within, not without, for our evidence. Confirmation, indeed, can come from without; and the greatest confirmation, the best aid to faith, is the experience and testimony of men of the highest intellectual and spiritual quality. Human nature and human experience at their highest and best reveal our own natures to us, create in us like experiences, and confirm our trust in our best hopes and deepest insights. The language and methods of argu-

ment of Plato and of Paul belong of necessity to their own times. What is of greatest and most permanent significance is the fact that these two men, representing at the very highest the intellectual and ethical greatness of the two races and cultures that are the main sources of our own spiritual life, agree in the intensity of their interest and in the persistence of their belief in the immortality of man.

Matthew Arnold truly said that we shall always need the Old Testament because we shall always need the enthusiasm of Israel's conviction that the power not ourselves makes for righteousness, and that to righteousness belongs blessedness. The Old Testament has not many arguments for theism, and meets few of the difficulties to faith in one God by convincing proofs; but the prophets and poets of Israel were great spirits, and their hold upon God was living and confident. God was their light and joy and strength; and they are themselves our greatest help to faith, as their inner life expresses and imparts itself in words that glow with joy in God and love for Him. In some such way Paul's witness to the hope of life after death makes its appeal. His are the words we like to read in the presence of death; and we read them not for the arguments they contain nor for the details they set forth but for the enthusiasm of their confidence, for their emotional quality and appeal. We need and shall continue to need for our faith in immortality the enthusiasm of Paul's conviction that even death cannot separate us from the love of God. Everything that Paul says about life after death is touched with emotion; and the fact that he was a very great man of religion, a great Christian, gives to the confidence and enthusiasm of his hope the right to be contagious and reassuring.

We have our own questions that we should like to ask of so great a man who has so sure a confidence; and there are other questions which as historical students we are obliged to ask. For ourselves I think there are especially three matters about which we want to know the normal attitude of the human mind, the reaction natural to the mind at its best. First, does preëxistence in any sense underlie man's survival of death? To Plato, and perhaps we may say to the Greek mind in general, preëxistence corresponds to immortality, and is surer, as being a thing experienced, than that which is still future. Second, is it the self-conscious personality that survives, or does immortality mean a return to our source in the divine nature, or a re-absorption in the race or in the universe? Third, what is there in present experience that anticipates the future and justifies us in saying that the ground for our hope lies within and not in a purely outward revelation? We shall not be disappointed in the expectation that Paul throws light directly or by implication on these problems of our own.

It is of course to be freely recognized that we shall not understand the language of Paul about this or any other matter unless we read it in the light of the ideas of his inheritance and environment. This is so fully recognized now that I am more anxious to urge sympathetic response to that emotional quality in Paul's language to which I have referred, and to avoid the danger of forgetting that poetic and prophetic speech is not bound too closely to the letter.

From the Old Testament Paul may have derived some fundamentals of his faith in the future, in spite of the fact that the Old Testament is almost entirely concerned with the present life. The conception of Sheol never became a starting point for hope but re-

mained wholly negative, the very embodiment of hopelessness. It was just so with the Greek Hades. The element of hope in the Old Testament religion centers in the nation, and is the expectation of Israel's independence and rulership over mankind. It is necessarily, therefore, a hope for the present world; and when at the end of the Old Testament period the claim of the individual made itself felt, this could only take the form of the hope of resurrection, the return of the dead to a fully human life on earth and a share in the glory of the nation. That resurrection rather than immortality of the soul should remain natural to Hebrew thinking rests also on the fact that the Hebrew conception of the nature of man did not allow the idea that the soul could live apart from the body. Before Paul's time, however, some Jews had developed the conception that men would rise with angelic rather than earthly natures, their bodies being fashioned of light or glory, a conception of which perhaps the most natural image was given to the senses by the starry heavens. Paul's conception of the spiritual body has therefore some connection with earlier Jewish thought which developed as a part of a more heavenly conception of the Messianic consummation.[1] Because of the cases of Enoch and Elijah, an Israelite would be prepared for the possibility that God might take men to Himself without death; but such translation remained wholly exceptional.

Another important Old Testament point of connection for Paul's thought is found in the word "spirit." The spirit of God is the divine breath that gives man life. It is always a divine element in man. When God takes it back to Himself the body returns to dust and the man dies; "in that very day his thoughts perish"

[1] See Dan. 12:3, and especially *Apoc. of Baruch*, 50–51.

(Psa. 146: 4). When we read, "and the dust returneth to the earth as it was, and the spirit returneth unto God who gave it" (Eccles. 12: 7), this does not mean immortality, for the spirit is not the man himself. Nevertheless when Jews under Greek influence came in touch with the idea of the immortality of the soul they found it more natural to connect personality with this spirit which comes from God and returns to God than to think of the soul (*nephesh*), which was to them simply the living man, the man himself, as surviving death.

Still another foundation for belief in life after death in the Old Testament, and the most vital of all, was the experience of living communion with God, which seems to become first fully conscious of itself in Jeremiah, and finds wonderful expression in some of the Psalms. It is remarkable that this experience could be so deeply and intensely felt as it is, for example, in the seventy-third Psalm without bringing with it the demand and the certainty of continuance after death. This is explained perhaps by the persistent dominance, even in Jeremiah, of the nation as the object of God's supreme care and the heir of His promises.

In the post-canonical Jewish literature of New Testament times we naturally look for interactions between the Hebrew and Greek ways of regarding death and the future, and we expect to find some anticipations of Paul's attitude, remembering that he was a Jew of the dispersion whose native language was Greek but his education that of a Palestinian rabbi. It is interesting to find in the Apocalypse of Enoch, in one section, the Similitudes, a conception of the future in which the spiritual world quite takes the place of this earth as the place of the consummation;

and the conception of the resurrection is correspondingly spiritualized. In another section (chapters 91–105) we find an assurance of eternal life for the spirits of the righteous which surprises us in a Palestinian and probably Semitic writing, and seems to suggest that the Greek way of looking at the future life sometimes found for itself a place in the native Jewish mind. The Wisdom of Solomon is particularly interesting because of the possibility that Paul was influenced by it, and in any case because it was written by a man like Paul who wrote in Greek but still thought prevailingly as a Jew. The writer of Wisdom knows the sort of denial of immortality which Plato also combats, the view that when the body turns to ashes the spirit is dispersed as thin air; but he does not answer this argument by the effort to prove that the soul is immaterial. It is with a religious faith not a philosophical argument that he meets this scepticism. He affirms that God did not make death, but that men bring it upon themselves by sinful choice; that righteousness is immortal; that the righteous only seem to die; and that man can attain immortality and nearness to God by love and obedience to wisdom. There is here no suggestion of resurrection, although there is no emphasis on the soul as immortal, but only on immortality as belonging to righteousness and to the religious ascent of the soul toward God.

Philo is a Jew who not only speaks Greek but thinks much more as a Greek than as a Jew in spite of the fact that the Pentateuch is his text-book. Philo knows his Plato and also that later Platonizing Stoicism which accepted immortality. He adopts the theory of the preëxistence of souls, and regards their descent into human bodies as at least a calamity if not a sinful choice. But he is not interested in immortality as

merely the soul's escape from the prison of the body into its native ether and the purity of its original freedom from contact with matter. It would carry us much too far to discuss his treatment of immortality in detail. Immortality belongs properly to God, while man is the mortal race. It belongs to the Logos and to the world of ideas, in contrast to the world of sense; to the genus also in contrast to the individual. The philosopher attains immortality in so far as he is able to rise into the world of the immortals, that is to abstract himself from the body and outward things and lose himself in contemplation of truth and goodness. This ascent of the soul to God is its ascent to virtue as well as to knowledge; and seems in certain passages to bring with it a real immortality; yet one is left in the end with some uncertainty as to the persistence of the human personality itself. It is certain that Philo does not emphasize the hope of immortality as a motive, and that he seeks in this life that escape from the material world and from the body which is the soul's salvation and blessedness.

Of the Hellenistic mystery religions which offered escape from death by union in a sacramental rite with a god who dies and rises again, something will be said later on.

As we turn back again to Paul we are impressed anew with the vividness and power with which he held to the hope of life after death, its importance to him and the confidence of his conviction. The foundation of his hope is Christ Himself. It is according to Christ that he interprets life after death, and it is because of Christ, in Christ, that he knows it to be a certainty. Paul had seen the risen and exalted Christ; he had seen the man who was crucified as now the heavenly Lord. But behind the vision there was a

knowledge of Jesus which made the vision possible; and after the vision there was an inner experience which meant to Paul that the risen Christ was not only Lord but spirit; and one will misunderstand Paul if he regards his vision as the explanation of his Christianity apart from his knowledge of the earthly Jesus, or apart from his experience that the mind of Jesus was constantly and more and more filling his nature, displacing his old self and forming itself within him. Paul's belief in the life after death is not only an inference from the resurrection of Christ but is inseparably bound up with this abiding, progressive re-creation of Paul's inner life by the spirit of Christ and after the likeness of Christ. The fundamental principle of Paul's Christianity is that Christ is altogether, from beginning to end, what the Christian ought to be, and what because of Christ he now can be, and is, and will be. His doctrine of resurrection is therefore simply the doctrine of the Christian's likeness to Christ.

The passages with which studies of Paul's doctrine of the future usually most concern themselves are 1 Thessalonians 4: 13–5: 11; 1 Corinthians 15; 2 Corinthians 5: 1–10; Philippians 1: 19–26. The necessity of a careful study of these passages is evident; yet it is possible that too exclusive occupation with these sections may lead one to a better understanding of primitive Christian eschatology than of the thoughts most original with Paul. It is certain that these passages need to be interpreted in the light of many others found in all parts of his writings. It will serve our purpose to look briefly at the passages just named. In the first of them Paul answers the fear lest those who die before the Parousia will miss their share in the glory of the consummation, that is fellowship with Christ. Paul answers that Christ's resurrection makes

certain the resurrection of His disciples; that "we that are alive" will have no advantage over those who have died; that the destiny of all alike is to be "ever with the Lord"; that we should live meanwhile in the light of this expectation and in preparation for this hope, that is that we should live together with Him now in order that we may live with Him then. Christ's resurrection is therefore the proof that we shall rise, and fellowship with Christ is the nature of the Christian life as well as its final goal.

In 1 Corinthians 15 the same fears are answered. Christians, dead and living, will fare alike at the coming of Christ, the living being transformed into the same heavenly, spiritual natures in which the dead will be raised. But here Paul has especially to confute the position of Greek Christians who believed in the immortality of the soul but not in the resurrection of the body, to whom the resurrection of Christ was either an exception or only an appearance. He meets this antipathy by a sort of compromise between the Hebrew idea of the resurrection of the body and the Greek conception of the immortality of the soul. No doubt the compromise was necessary in order to adjust the Hebrew and the Greek elements in his own mind. He rejects the physical conception of resurrection which on the whole prevailed in Pharisaic Judaism, but resurrection itself was absolutely essential to his fundamental faith that the future life of man rests upon and is wholly like that of Christ Himself. The strange phrase "spiritual body," which would seem a contradiction in terms to every Greek, was a not unnatural effort on the part of a Greek-speaking Jew to preserve the distinct personality and at the same time free the life of the future from the burden and corruption of flesh and blood. The resurrection of the

physical body could not but be repugnant to every one who had in any measure the inheritance of Plato in his veins. But Paul believes that if the physical body is thought of as transformed and spiritualized this repugnance may be overcome. For Paul is vehemently opposed to the Platonic conception of the immortality of the soul, partly no doubt because he is a Hebrew, but chiefly because it is not according to Christ; it was not the way in which the first believers could have experienced as a reality Christ's life after death; and Paul's own vision of the Lord was necessarily a sense experience, the real appearance of Christ embodied in glory or light. But the resurrection of Christ, which Paul knew from his own seeing just as Peter did and the other disciples, was not, to Paul, His return even for a time to a flesh and blood existence. In this Paul is clearly at variance with later traditions found in the Gospels. Of Jesus it was true that that which was sown was corruptible and that which was raised incorruptible; that it was sown a physical body and raised a spiritual body. Another thing which also the whole argument of this chapter aims to make clear is that Christ's resurrection is typical; that it is not unique except that it is first; but that all who are in Christ will rise just as He did. "As we have borne the image of the earthy (Adam), we shall also bear the image of the heavenly (Christ)." The present body, which does not rise, Paul calls not physical or material but psychical, a body fitted for the human soul. Soul, *psyche*, the word of honour in Plato's hope, is lowered in Paul, and made inseparable from the physical, to which in Plato it is absolutely contrasted; and the word spirit, *pneuma*, which to the Greeks was more material and less personal than *psyche*, and contained less promise and potency of immortality for man, is

exalted and becomes the essential nature of the risen Christ and so of risen Christians; it becomes also as we shall see the expression for that present experience of the indwelling Christ which is already working out the miracle of the Christian's transformation into both the character and the nature of his Lord. It would seem that to Paul the word "body" means individual personality, and is essential in his thought to the distinction and the permanence of the separate self. It is therefore necessary to Christ's heavenly life, and must remain necessary for that personal communion of disciples with their Lord and with one another which is the essence of the Christian life. As at many other points of difficulty in the understanding of Paul, so in regard to this paradoxical union of body and spirit the clue to the understanding of his thought is to be found in the nature of love, in other words in the personal quality of Christ.

This deep feeling of Paul that the distinct personality which loves and is loved must not be dissolved by death, comes to still more distinct expression in 2 Corinthians 5: 1–10. It is a passage of peculiar difficulty and should not be interpreted apart from the chapter preceding and the discussion that follows. It would seem that owing to the "affliction" to which Paul refers in 1: 8–11, and probably also to the hardships and dangers which he was constantly encountering, Paul now faced the probability that he would himself die before the coming of the Lord; and the passage before us expresses at least his shrinking from the thought of death as a complete separation of soul from body. He longs as much as any Greek for deliverance from the present burdening body of flesh, but he requires a heavenly body in order to keep and to perfect that communion of his real self with Christ

which is the only value of life either here or hereafter. What is not clear is whether his longing is for the speedy coming of Christ before death overtakes him, so that the immortal nature may be put on over the mortal without any interval of nakedness, or rather for a beginning even now of that being clothed upon with his heavenly habitation which will make death incapable of interrupting his being at home with the Lord.

In Philippians also Paul looks forward to death, and even desires it as a departing to be with Christ, accepting a longer life in the flesh only that he may magnify Christ by further ministry to his converts.

The passages we have thus briefly reviewed contain many problems and suggest many questions of which we have not taken account. The questions that are most discussed are, (1) Whether there is a change in Paul between First and Second Corinthians from a more Jewish eschatological form of hope to greater emphasis on inner union with Christ the Spirit; and (2) whether Paul's eschatology remains purely Jewish in its fundamental features, or is influenced either by the philosophy or by the mystery religions of Hellenism.

It has been argued (especially by Schweitzer) that the most essential thing for the understanding of Paul is to see that all his teachings, ethical and theological, are determined by the peculiarity of the short interval between the resurrection and the parousia of Christ in which his own work must be done; and that it is our chief task to attempt, in the light of this, and with the help of occasional hints in his letters, to reconstruct his eschatological scheme by answering such questions as these: Are there two resurrections or one; one judg-

ment or two? Who are to rise at the parousia? Does judgment take place then? What is the relation between judgment and election? Can believers who fall lose their final blessedness? Is there a general resurrection? When are the elect to judge angels? Such questions, I cannot but think, indicate an external and remote attitude toward Paul himself.

There are other passages, many of them, besides those referred to, in which Paul expresses in varying terms but with clearness and emphasis the things that he is most anxious to have his converts understand and make their own. The following are some of the many passages of fundamental importance for the understanding of Paul's doctrine, passages which need to be read and reread and understood even more through sympathy and spiritual response, through tact and insight, than through comparison with contemporary eschatologies and current conceptions of the world: Galatians 2: 19–20; 5: 16–6: 10, 14; Romans 6–8; 14: 7–8; 1 Corinthians 3:21–23; 2 Corinthians 1: 8–10; 3: 17–18; 4: 1–5: 19; 13: 3–4; Colossians 2: 20–23; 3: 1–17; Philippians 1: 20–25; 2: 1–11; 3: 10–14, 20–21.

It would be better to read these parts of Paul's letters and let his words have their natural effect upon us than to discuss, as we must proceed to do, some of the questions they suggest. Words such as these impart not only truth, but a great and distinct personality; and yet not only a particular personality, but universal truth, "truth not individual and local, but general, and operative; not standing upon external testimony, but carried alive into the heart by passion; truth which is its own testimony." For this man is not only a great disciple and prophet of Christ, but a creator of Christian experience and of the language in

which it can be expressed and imparted. He is a great Christian poet; and one is tempted to quote Wordsworth further because the application of his words to Paul is so exact and illuminating. The poet "is a man speaking to men: a man, it is true, endowed with more lively sensibility, more enthusiasm and tenderness, who has a greater knowledge of human nature, and a more comprehensive soul, than are supposed to be common among mankind; a man pleased with his own passions and volitions, and who rejoices more than other men in the spirit of life that is in him; delighting to contemplate similar volitions and passions as manifested in the goings-on of the universe, and habitually impelled to create them where he does not find them,"—it would be difficult to describe better the author of the eighth chapter of Romans or the fourth of Second Corinthians. Further Paul is a genius of the sort that "sends the soul into herself, to be admonished of her weakness, or to be made conscious of her power." And with such a writer one can make progress only if "he is invigorated and inspirited by his leader, in order that he may exert himself." Paul is one of those who calls forth and bestows power, who requires and creates in his readers thoughts and feelings like his own.

If now we undertake the often thankless and even perilous task of changing poetry into prose, of looking for intellectual conceptions in words of imagination and passion, there are especially two thoughts in Paul that often recur, and that challenge the mind to grasp them and to test their value. One is the thought that the resurrection of Christ is typical, normal, not unique, the first, but the first of many, a disclosure, therefore, of the reality, the grounds and the nature of man's life after death. The other is the thought that the

dying and rising of Jesus is also experienced here and now in the life of every believer, and describes the present moral oneness of the disciple with his Lord. Our questions, therefore, concern especially these two conceptions. How did Paul think of the resurrection of Christ, and, therefore, how of the future life of the Christian? And how did he think of the oneness of the believer with Christ, and especially in what relation to each other did he put present ethical oneness or likeness of character, and future sharing of deliverance from death and transformation into a heavenly nature?

In regard to the first of these questions, a matter of fundamental significance is that it was God who raised Christ from the dead. After the word "Father" (Abba), Paul's ruling title for God might almost be said to be, He that raised up Jesus Christ from the dead.[2] The same God who raised up Jesus Christ from the dead will raise us also with Him. We have seen that there is in Paul no doctrine of the immortal nature of the soul, or of that higher part of the nature of all men which Paul calls the mind, or the inward man. There is also no intimation of the preëxistence of the soul. Immortality is God's creative act, the work of His power and gift of His grace first to Christ, and then to all who are His. Christ is the first fruits, the first born, the first of many brethren (Col. 1: 15, 18; Rom. 8: 29). But Paul accepts the preëxistence of Christ, and even, in a few sentences, implies His identity with that divine Wisdom through whom God made the world. Our first thought naturally is that the life after death of one who lived with

[2] 1 Thess. 1: 10; Gal. 1: 1; Rom. 4: 17, 24; 7: 4; 6: 4; 8: 11; 10: 7, 9; 7: 4; 1 Cor. 6: 14; 15: 15; 2 Cor. 1: 9; 4: 14; Col. 2: 12, 20; 1: 18; 3: 3.

God before His earthly life is only natural, His resumption of His true nature after the brief interruption of His incarnation. It is surely a matter of great significance that Paul makes no use whatever of the preëxistence of Christ as explaining His immortality. It is strange that even though He preëxisted in the form of God it should still be necessary that God should raise Him from the dead by a direct act of creative power, exactly as He will raise every follower of His. The account of the life, death and exaltation of Christ in Philippians 2: 1–11 is peculiarly striking. He preëxisted in the form of God, that is as an angelic or divine being; but it was not for this reason that He attained life after death. He did not, because of His divine nature, return at death to His former state. He was not one whose humanity was only an appearance. God raised Him from death and exalted Him to a new place and title greater than He had before because He renounced such honours and powers and chose instead humility and sacrifice, even the death of the cross. In all this He was not unique. Paul describes his experience only in order to enforce the admonition to love and lowliness and to a care not for one's own things but also for the things of others. So that what Paul here says of the preëxistent Christ does not in Paul's own mind prevent His being fully our example, not only in moral character but even in His attainment of life after death. Nothing is attributed to the preëxistent Christ who was in the form of God except precisely that mind of humility and compassion which ought to characterize men upon earth; and it was because of this that He lived after death.

A different, less human and personal, conception of the preëxistence of Christ underlies those few expressions of Paul which identify Him with the divine Wis-

dom. It cannot be doubted, in view of Proverbs 8, Ecclesiasticus 24, Wisdom of Solomon 7, that when Paul says, "There is one God, the Father, of whom are all things, and we unto him; and one Lord, Jesus Christ, through whom are all things, and we through him" (1 Cor. 8: 6); or, "In him were all things created . . . all things have been created through him, and unto him; and he is before all things, and in him all things consist" (Col. 1: 16–17), he implies that Christ is the divine Wisdom. Such references, however, are few and the thought is not elaborated. We have not yet in Paul so developed a Logos doctrine as in the Fourth Gospel. Moreover in 1 Corinthians 1: 24, 30; 2: 6, where Christ is called the wisdom of God, it is without any suggestion of an eternal divine hypostasis. It is rather the Gospel itself which is here a divine wisdom in contrast to the pretentious foolishness of Greek philosophy. But perhaps the most striking proof that Paul did not create but only here and there recognized the Wisdom Christology is to be seen in the fact that he makes no use of it as an explanation of Christ's life after death. One who is in reality only the incarnation of the eternal divine Wisdom, the reason, or power, or spirit of God, through which the world was made and in and by which it consists, would not require a divine act to raise Him from the dead. Death could only be His release and return to His former and abiding divine and eternal existence. Paul, must we not say, interprets the Wisdom of God as Jesus Christ, in the sense that in Him men have fully all that knowledge of God and access to Him and experience of His indwelling which such a Jew as the writer of the Book of Wisdom found in that Spirit of Wisdom which fills the world and comes freely in answer to prayer into human lives,

making men friends of God and prophets, and imparting its own immortality. But Paul does not so interpret Jesus by the divine Wisdom as to endanger his fundamental principle that Jesus is altogether, from first to last, that which every Christian can be and should be. The case is somewhat different with the writer of the Gospel of John, although even here the natural logic of the Logos Christology is not carried through. The story of the resurrection-appearances of Christ retains its place; but at many points we are reminded that eternal life belongs to Christ by origin and nature rather than by a special act of God. Christ came from God into human life, and it is but according to His nature that He should return to God. He is always, even while on earth, divine. That His earthly life is real, that the Logos became flesh, that He was really crucified and really rose from the grave, is insisted upon no doubt precisely because there were those who made the natural inference from the Logos doctrine that the earthly life of Jesus was only a seeming, and the death either unreal or the dying of a human being who had been for a short time the bearer of a divine presence, not his own human self. Yet the writer is himself, of course, convinced that Jesus was the incarnate Logos, and in some ways reveals the consequences of this doctrine as Paul does not. Never in John is God spoken of as the one who raised Jesus from the dead. Jesus, on the contrary, is one to whom God has given His own distinctive power of raising the dead, of having life in Himself, and giving life to whom He will (John 5: 21–27). The account of the resurrection of Lazarus with its culminating sentence, "I am the resurrection, and the life: he that believeth on me, though he die, yet shall he live: and whosoever liveth and believeth on me shall never die," would seem

to make his own resurrection unnatural and out of place. We can well understand how in opposition to Docetism the death and resurrection retain their place, but we can understand also the emphasis with which it is said, "I lay down my life, that I may take it again. No one taketh it away from me, but I lay it down of myself. I have power to lay it down, and I have power to take it again" (10: 17, 18). It is true that the Son does everything as the Father gives Him commandment. It is true also that even in John the oneness of the Son with the Father is to be fully shared by all who are one with Him in love and obedience. Yet it is perhaps not too much to say that John marks a stage between Paul and the later theology which professes to rest upon them both, but in reality departs still more than John from Paul's conception that the death and resurrection of Christ are entirely typical and in every respect parallel to that of all whose life is like His. It is seriously to misunderstand Paul if we fail to recognize that Christ's resurrection was significant for Christ Himself. It signifies His designation as Son of God with power (Rom. 1: 4); it was His elevation to the supreme office and title of Lord (Phil. 2: 10, 11); through it He became life-giving spirit (1 Cor. 15: 45). All that Christ is to the Christian He came to be through His resurrection.

But why did God raise Him from the dead? About this Paul is explicit. It was because of the mind which was in Him, because of the moral character of His self-renunciation and obedience even unto death, because in lowliness of mind He counted others better than Himself. In other words, Christ attained to the resurrection from the dead through what He was and suffered and achieved, and in this respect also is

not removed by the uniqueness of His nature from His place as the first among many brethren.

We have already answered the question in what form or nature Christ was raised; but may still ask what Paul's thought probably was as to the relation of the "spiritual body" to the body that died and was buried. Does Paul's description of the resurrection in 1 Corinthians 15: 35ff. enable us to say whether the appearances of the risen Christ to Peter and last of all to Paul himself implied in Paul's mind the empty tomb of Gospel tradition? That the body that arose was not the body that was buried is emphatically affirmed. The relation of the new to the old is likened to the relation between a grain of wheat and the blade that grows from it. Christians who live when Christ comes are to be suddenly translated, the corruptible putting on incorruption, and the mortal putting on immortality. In so far as Paul's interest in affirming bodily resurrection lies in his Hebraic feeling that to the body belongs the personality it would seem necessary to him to think of the spiritual body as having a real connection, in spite of its radical difference, with the earthy and psychic. Perhaps we can further make an inference in this case from the experience of the Christian to the experience of Christ, reversing the usual order, and infer from the fact that Paul thinks of the Christian as already being transformed into the bodily as well as the spiritual nature of Christ, that the heavenly nature is a transformation of the earthy rather than a complete substitute for it. Yet perhaps all these considerations do not outweigh the opposite impression of Paul's vehement assertion that "flesh and blood cannot inherit the Kingdom of God; neither doth corruption inherit incorruption." It is not easy to suppose that Paul's conviction that Christ was raised

on the third day depended at all upon the discovery of the empty tomb, or involved any knowledge or care as to what became of the fleshly body.

Our second main question concerns the nature of the Christian's oneness with Christ. This is the point at which it is now usual to compare Paul's language with that of various Hellenistic mystery cults of Paul's time and soon after of which we have fragmentary records. The common feature in these Oriental religions which made their way into the Greco-Roman world is the conception that through some ceremony, some magical sacrament, the worshipper may become so identified with a deity, and especially with the death and rising of a god, that he escapes the mortality of human nature and becomes immortal, and in that sense deified. The possibility is not to be excluded that Paul could have known something about such cults and could have heard the language in which their devotees described their experience of dying and rising again with their god. What his relationship was to such movements it will probably never be possible to know with any certainty or fullness. What can be said with confidence is that Paul here as elsewhere knew how to subject the thoughts and fancies of those about him to the mind of Christ. That which distinguishes the mystical language of Paul from that of the so-called Mithras-Liturgy and other similar records is above all his ethical emphasis. Death is the evil from which the mystery-religions sought redemption. To Paul also death is an evil the fear and burden of which he deeply feels; and it is an evil from which Christ brings redemption. But there is another evil which lies deeper and from which redemption must be sought first. It is sin through which man has been brought into subjection to death, and even the whole creation put in bond-

age to corruption; and the fundamental Christian experience is not the sense of immortality through union with a divine being, but the sense of righteousness, the feeling of moral capacity, the ability to do the good that one wills, the consciousness that pure impulses have the upper hand over the lusts of the flesh, and above all that unselfishness triumphs over the natural human assertions of pride, envy, anger and hatred. The Christian, then, in Paul's experience is first of all one who because of Christ is making his own the moral nature of Christ; and Paul knows that this transformation after the image of Christ, this forming of Christ in the Christian, means in the end sharing His resurrection.

There are two peculiarities which Paul's language about the oneness of the Christian with Christ suggests, two directions in which apparent opposites come together and seem even fused into one. The transformation of the Christian into the likeness of Christ is on the one side a divine miracle, comparable only to that of creation itself, the work in man of the Spirit of God, which is the Spirit of Christ, or Christ Himself; but it is at the same time the duty of the Christian, a thing constantly to strive after, never to be certain of, but always to make the object of strenuous endeavour. Paul in one breath tells Christians what they already are, sons of God, spiritual beings, no longer in the flesh, no longer even men, and then urges them to become what they are, to make actual their real nature as Christians by their choices and desires, to suppress by moral effort the passions and self-assertions that are already dead, or to which they have died, because Christ is in them.

The second peculiarity in Paul's thought is found in the relation in which the ethical redemption and the

physical redemption of the Christian stand to each other. We should perhaps have expected that Paul would put side by side the influence of the mind of Christ, the power of His example, the divine inworking of His spirit by which His character is reproduced in men, and, on the other hand, the proof derived from His death and resurrection that resurrection and eternal life await the Christian also hereafter; so that we should have first the present conquest of sin through the indwelling spirit, and then for the future the hope of deliverance from death and reunion with Christ in some more outward way as of person with person. But in fact Paul seems especially to like to put these two things together so that they are even sometimes confused or blended, so much do they seem to him to be two aspects of one and the same thing. Dying and rising with Christ means not only nor even chiefly for Paul being raised by God as Christ was from the dead to a spiritual nature like His and to a share in His glory; but it means also and more often dying to sin and rising to newness of life. The death and resurrection of Christ are literally to be repeated in case of every Christian; but they are also to be spiritually experienced or undertaken by the Christian, and they constitute the principle of his inner life. Dying in order to live is the very essence of the imitation of Christ. Moreover the purifying of the nature from sin and the transformation of the body into incorruption are two processes that go on continuously together. No doubt when one reads the eighth chapter of Romans one's first impression may be that the Christian has already experienced fully the new inner life of the spirit in which sin has no place, but that he still looks forward in hope to that which is still lacking in his sonship, that is, to the redemption of his

body; that only with this will come the full revelation of Christians as sons of God, and that with this the weakness and corruption to which the whole creation is subjected will also be overcome. But Paul does not look at the matter quite so simply as this; for on the one hand the end of sin and the attainment of the spirit of Christ although it is given in the death of Christ and in the spirit of life which the Christian has already received, is nevertheless still to be worked out by man through moral effort; and on the other hand the redemption of the body does not wait altogether for death, but begins and in some mysterious way goes forward here and now.

If we glance at some of the passages that are most characteristic of Paul and have the least connection with anything to be found in the literature of his time we shall understand better than by generalizations the peculiarity, and perhaps get a clue to the understanding, of his characteristic way of looking at the Christian experience. In the sixth chapter of Romans Paul finds that baptism signifies a union with Christ in His death and in His resurrection, an end of the body of sin, a walking in newness of life, and yet at the same time the assurance of future life with Him. Paul's use of these expressions is so free and various that we cannot think that he was bound by a hard and fast interpretation. He writes far more as a poet than as a theologian. But one thing is beyond doubt, that his emphasis is ethical, and that he does not mean Christians to suppose that the death and resurrection of Christ carry with them by any physical necessity either the moral perfection or the exemption from death that belong to Him. His "therefore" is, "Let not sin reign in your mortal bodies." They are to think of themselves as dead to sin and alive unto God, and then

are to act accordingly. Man's redemption from both sin and death is already historically accomplished and is at the same time in both cases future; both redemptions are gracious acts of God, yet both are achieved by man's choice and effort; having been made free from sin we are to make ourselves servants of righteousness; since death has no more dominion over us we are free to attain as servants of God the end, eternal life.

In the eighth chapter of Romans Paul's high self-consciousness as a Christian comes to its supreme expression. He has described the reign of sin, and has brought it certainly into close relation with the flesh, the body and its members, and the law or impulse that resides in these. Now all these are dead, Christians no longer live in the flesh, but in the spirit; because Christ is in them the body is dead on account of the sin belonging to it, but the spirit is life because of righteousness. And then by that quick confusing turn, so characteristic of Paul, death becomes literal death again and life the future resurrection which Christ's resurrection makes certain and His spirit dwelling in us brings about. It is evident that the moral renewal which Christians see in themselves is to Paul the most convincing proof of the physical renewal which is yet to be. The word *spirit* is extremely helpful to Paul in his effort to express both the inwardness and the divine source and quality of what is new in the Christian experience. Since it is divine the spirit is eternal and is a principle of eternal life in man; but since it is the spirit of Christ, it has also the quality of His moral nature and creates likeness to Him in those who possess it. It is the spirit of sonship, enabling man to say "Father"; and having made us sons it makes us thereby heirs with Christ and sharers with Him both

of suffering and of glory. This whole chapter makes it evident that Paul's faith in the resurrection is bound up with His experience that the spirit of Christ is already in the Christian and is already transforming him into the likeness of Christ.

Christians now have to suffer more than other men, and Paul himself more than other Christians; yet this very suffering is only a part and a proof of likeness to Christ. Like His, these are the sufferings of love. Death may be their outcome for the disciple as for the Master, but that Christ was raised from the dead is proof of the love of God and of the certainty that from that love no power, neither death nor life, neither things present nor things to come, can separate us.

A passage that is hardly less great than the eighth of Romans is the fourth of second Corinthians. At the end of the third chapter Paul describes that transformation into the image of the Lord which is effected by the Christian's unveiled vision of His glory or by the presence of the Lord Himself as the indwelling spirit. Then the sufferings of the present life, Paul's own weaknesses and distresses, are interpreted as a bearing about in the body the dying of Jesus that the life of Jesus also may be manifested in our body; a death in him which becomes life in his converts. Our outward man is decaying, Paul says, yet our inward man is renewed day by day, as if he were already experiencing the transformation by which what is mortal is to be swallowed up of life.

The striking way in which the divine and the human, the present and the future are blended in Paul is seen again in the third chapter of Colossians. Christians, Paul says, have been already raised together with Christ. He therefore admonishes them to set their minds on the things that are above, where Christ is.

He would have them realize that they have died, and that their life is hid with Christ in God; and since this is so he urges them to put to death their members that are upon the earth. Having put off the old man and put on the new, he presses upon them the duty of putting away anger and wrath, malice and lying, and putting on a heart of compassion, kindness, and humility.

One more passage which guards us against neglecting the ethical or substituting a mystical and magical conception as Paul's understanding of the Christian life, is in the third chapter of Philippians. The righteousness which is not his own but is from God by faith, is nevertheless a righteousness that he still strives to attain by every effort to the end of his life. Fellowship with Christ, which is the power of the new life in Him, and also of life after death, is even still something to strive after, and he will make no claim that he has attained. "That I may know him, and the power of his resurrection, and the fellowship of his sufferings, becoming conformed unto his death; if by any means I may attain unto the resurrection of the dead. Not that I have already attained, or am already made perfect: but I press on, if so be that I may apprehend that for which also I was apprehended by Christ Jesus."

Paul's doctrine of the dying and rising of the Christian with Christ does not, therefore, divide sharply into two doctrines, that of a present complete dying to sin and rising to the fullness of the new and perfect life according to Christ, and that of the future rising from the dead by the deed of God. For on the one hand the perfect life in Christ is not yet fully attained, though Paul likes to assert it in order to kindle the desire to make what is ideally true actual in one's conduct and spirit; and on the other hand the coming transforma-

tion of the body is in some way anticipated in the Christian's present experience. Somehow Paul was convinced that his own body with its weaknesses and sufferings, failing and decaying as it seemed to him, was becoming a fitter dwelling place and instrument of the Spirit, freer from impulses that held him to earth and things of sense; although he still longed for that complete translation through which would come to him a bodily life free from weakness and suffering, and lifted above death, in which the spirit could realize without hindrance its full and perfect life. Many things in Paul's letters remind us that he is not a Greek to whom soul and body are two unrelated natures foreign to each other, the body being but the tomb or prison of the soul. To Paul man is a unity. It is not the body that weighs the soul down and from which relief is sought; the body is capable of redemption. It is even now holy as a temple of God since the spirit of God dwells in it. This helps us understand how it is that the dying and rising of Christ can be to Paul at the same time an ethical experience present and continuous, and also a future physical dying and a rising no longer in the image of the earthy but in that of the heavenly.

We have seen that the experience of the spirit is the present attestation of the truth of the Christian hope. We know from Paul's discussion of the gifts of the spirit that of all the various phenomena in which early Christianity saw proof that a divine power had taken up its abode in man, Paul values most those that were most in accordance with the character and purposes of Jesus, those that most conduced to the unity and to the upbuilding of the Christian brotherhood. It is certain that to Paul the supreme proof that Christ had risen and therefore the proof of life after death

was the experience that Christ's spirit in him and in other Christians was creative of a new moral nature, that in Christ the old man, the sinful nature, had died. "If any man is in Christ, he is a new creature: the old things are passed away; behold they are become new." Paul is one of the most confident and greatest of all witnesses for hope in immortality; and the ultimate ground of Paul's hope is not his vision of the risen Christ but, deeper than that, his experience of the spirit of Christ as the creator of a new moral nature. What shall we say, then, of this foundation on which Paul's structure stands? Is it indeed so firm a fact that it can sustain the faith that he founded upon it? Paul himself had to face the fact that Christians did still sin. He urged them to be in reality by moral effort and achievement, that which they were ideally in the thought of God, in their true life which is in Christ. Paul no doubt sometimes put the experience of newness of life in strong terms expressing his exultation of feeling and his deep sense of gratitude. But when we look at his life as a whole, at the richness and fullness of his Christ-likeness in love and sacrificial devotion, we are ready to accept his testimony that in Christ he was a new being, that he no longer lived but Christ lived in him. For ourselves the truth of the ideals of Jesus and the power of His personality to reproduce itself in the disciple, His capacity to become the spirit of life, the spirit of love, in human beings, remain realities, the greatest realities in the religious life. Paul is often criticized for his apparent neglect of the records of Jesus' earthly life and teachings. Yet the thirteenth chapter of first Corinthians is a marvellous character-sketch of Christ and is entirely inexplicable except as the result of His earthly life. It is wholly owing to Jesus that Paul goes so far in the direction of giving

ethical meanings to the religious language, traditions, institutions of his time. Certainly the greatest thing in Paul is his reinterpretation of religion in accordance with the character of Jesus of Nazareth. He is not deceived in thinking that his life reflected the glory of the Lord and was being transformed into the same likeness from glory to glory. Nor was he mistaken in believing that a character such as that of Jesus, a ministry and sacrifice like His, with the revelation it brings of human values and of divine forces, and with the powers that go forth from it for the re-creation of human life, constitute the best assurance we have or can have of the immortal life. In His life the reality of the world of the spirit is so evidently seen as to be above denial. Immortality belongs to the things that are in their nature eternal, to God, to truth, to duty, to goodness; and the only immortality which has worth and is to be desired is that which is attested by the reality of these things and attained by living in fellowship and agreement with them. Paul knows this world of the spirit, its supreme excellence and beauty, its joy and its power. He has seen it in the face of Jesus Christ, and is convinced because of Him that it is destined to prevail, and that it is the safe and abiding dwelling-place of all who choose to make it their home.

Paul's hope for life after death rests then ultimately upon his present dying and living with Christ; that is, upon his present experience of the spirit of Christ remaking his nature after its own likeness. We may not understand best what this meant by the more mystical expressions of it (Gal. 2: 20; 2 Cor. 3: 17–18; Rom. 6: 2–11; 8: 9–11), characteristic though these are of Paul's mind. The real contents of this view of life, which Paul knows to be divine and therefore undying, can be understood best by his description of his

own character, purposes, and conduct given, in defense of his ministry, not in boasting or self-interest, in 1 Thessalonians 2: 1–12, and especially in 2 Corinthians 10–13; and in his account of the fruit of the spirit, "love, joy, peace, long-suffering, kindness, goodness, faithfulness, meekness, temperance" (Gal. 5: 22–23; comp. Col. 3: 12–14; Rom. 12); and in his judgments as to the relative value of those gifts of the spirit which were to early Christianity evidences of God's indwelling in man, and so of man's sharing in the immortal nature; Paul subjects them all to the test of Christ-likeness, and makes love therefore the test of the value and reality of the rest, and the greatest of the three that are destined to abide (1 Cor. 12–14).

According to Paul's experience the spirit which creates these divine effects in human lives and is the present evidence and possession of eternal life is not the divine part of human nature as such, but has come into human life through an historical event, the life, death and resurrection of an historical person. This Spirit of God is the spirit of Christ; it is Christ Himself as He takes possession of men and becomes their life, their new self; and the nature of this spirit is Divine Love. Man shares this divine nature only by the gift of the love of God; so that life beyond death is assured and created in man by the eternal love of God manifested and given to us in Christ. Nothing—not death itself—can separate us from the love of Christ, the love of God which is in Christ. This is the ultimate ground of Paul's confidence. But love can be given only as love; it can be received only by those who love. The work of love is to create lovers, says Royce. If the divine love is the source and power and nature of man's eternal life then the conditions and purpose and goal of that life must be interpreted in accordance with the

nature of love, the mind of Christ. This is Paul's guiding principle throughout. The future life can be hoped for only as it is now practiced and attained by likeness to Christ. This oneness of Christians with Christ which is both Christ's effect in them and their following of Him, is described and urged too clearly and constantly by Paul to leave any doubt that he means by it the actual character of the actual Jesus. Likeness to Christ is not a law which if one obey he will receive life after death as his reward. It is already that life; and one possesses it only by dying and living with Christ, dying now to sin, and rising to newness of life.

But love cannot be a thing given by one and received by another. It is received only when it is given back, or given forth. Mutuality and coöperation are involved in the very nature of love. There is a loss of self in love which is nevertheless the finding or gaining of self. Paul's answer to our most pressing question, that which concerns the permanence of personality, would be, we may be sure, determined, as all else is, by the nature of love. Since love is a relationship between persons, Paul clings, as we have seen, to that "spiritual body," both for Christ and for all who are Christ's, which meant to him the continuance of distinction and individuality. Yet Paul knows that it is not according to love, or according to Christ, to seek one's own, either for this life or for the life to come. When Christ lives in him, the "I" no longer lives (Gal. 2: 20). Love destroys the self in every sense in which it involves selfish assertion and separateness. Oneness, not division, is the creation of love. For those who have put on Christ "there can be neither Jew nor Greek . . . bond nor free . . . male nor female; for ye are all one (man) in Christ Jesus"

(Gal. 3: 28). The immortality that is according to love would seem to require both the saving and the loss of individuality, its saving in and through its loss. He that would find his life shall lose it, and he that loses his life shall save it. That Paul understands this paradox is evident (2 Cor. 4: 7–18; 6: 3–10); but perhaps nowhere more strikingly shown than in what he says of the final purpose of the risen life of Christ Himself. "All things are yours; whether Paul, or Apollos, or Cephas, or the world, or life, or death, or things present, or things to come; all are yours; but ye, Christ's; but Christ, God's" (1 Cor. 3: 21–23). Christ rises to Lordship, and must reign, till He has put all His enemies under His feet, death last of all; but "when all things have been subjected unto him, then shall the Son also himself be subjected to him that did subject all things unto him, that God may be all in all" (1 Cor. 15: 20–28).

The final place of individual personalities will be that which is determined by the nature of love, the nature of God. Paul's doctrine of immortality is not a doctrine of self-assertion or self-centered desire. Christ means to him the opposite of this. "Ye are not your own." "He died for all, that they which live should no longer live unto themselves." "For none of us liveth to himself, and none dieth to himself. For whether we live, we live unto the Lord; or whether we die, we die unto the Lord; whether we live therefore, or die, we are the Lord's."

X

IMMORTALITY IN THE FOURTH GOSPEL

BENJAMIN WISNER BACON

I. THE CONFLICT OF CHRISTIAN BELIEF IN THE PERIOD AFTER PAUL

IN the lecture on Immortality in Synoptic Teaching you were reminded that these writings have a twofold significance: (1) in the record which they preserve of the teaching and influence of Jesus; (2) as products of the church life of the sub-apostolic age, in the evidence they afford of contemporary ideas in the Church. By far the greatest influence of which we have any record on the further definition of Christian doctrine on this vital subject in a period when closer definition was doubly unavoidable was the Apostle Paul. He alone in the apostolic circle was qualified by education as well as mental capacity to meet Jewish opposition, whether in the form of Sadducean scepticism or Pharisean sneers at the apparitions on which the Christian brotherhood based its faith. More important still, Paul was the Apostle to the Gentiles par éminence, and invariably the issue on which Judaism came into most violent and incessant conflict with Greek religious thought was the doctrine of resurrection. What we have really to consider therefore is Christian belief as affected by Paul.

As we have seen, the Greek, if he gave any thought

at all to the future life, was almost inevitably a believer in immortality. He conceived the soul as leaving the body at death for good and all, and passing through the grave to another world. In the case of the righteous this other world would be a blessed one, but in no case would there be any return to the body and its relations with this world. In some exceptional cases, as in the Alexandrian-Jewish writing known as Fourth Maccabees, and in the New Testament the almost equally Alexandrian Epistle to the Hebrews, Jewish thought has been so far swerved by Greek influence from its basic Judaism as to acquiesce in this Greek idea of mere immortality, with no trace of the characteristic national idea of resurrection, or return from beyond the grave to resume relations with this world (more especially the Holy Land of Palestine and its "City of the Great King"), in a body more or less adjusted to the new conditions according as the particular believer found himself able to conceive them. The general rule, however, is the following: Every Jew not a complete Sadducee accepts the doctrine of a "world to come." He does so, however, only on condition that it provide in some way for the fulfillment of the national messianic ideal, and this seemed to almost all to involve a return to Jerusalem *in the body*.

The question, What body? was the chief subject of debate. It might be a glory-body of light-substance, like that of which the sun and stars are supposed to consist. It might be a kind of transfigured flesh, corresponding in outward appearance with the earthly, but otherwise "like the angels," who were regarded as immortal and uni-sexual. It must be a real *body*, else there could be no real dwelling with Messiah in Jerusalem "as the prophets Ezekiel and Isaiah and others declare"; and to deny this by saying that "there is no

resurrection of the dead, but men's souls when they die are taken to heaven" is "to blaspheme the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob."

Usually the crudeness of the Jewish believer's doctrine of the nature of that resurrection body was in direct proportion to the intensity of his faith in the messianic New Jerusalem predicted by "Ezekiel, Isaiah and others." A few Hellenistic Jews, less concerned for a literal dwelling in Palestine, had relinquished, as we have seen, even the last vestige of a doctrine of return from the grave. Most, if hard pressed by Sadducean or Gentile ridicule of a doctrine which demanded the continuation of earthly bodies and relationships under super-terrestrial conditions, took the usual Oriental means of escape from a dilemma by compromise. Both views are right, but we must have first one and then the other. First Jehovah's special promise of the victorious reign of Messiah with His people in Jerusalem must be fulfilled; after that, "when he shall have put all things in subjection under his feet," Messiah will "deliver up the kingdom to him who put all things in subjection to him, that God may be all in all." Our own Christian Apocalypse makes the duration of this reign of Messiah in Jerusalem 1,000 years, and this view became dominant in the post-apostolic Church among all who accepted the authority of the book. The nearly contemporary Jewish apocalypse of 2 Esdras fixes its duration at 400 years, after which "my Son Messiah will die and all that have the breath of life. . . . And after seven days the world, that yet awaketh not, shall be raised up, and whatever is corruptible shall die." The Most High then executes the general judgment (2 Esdras 7: 29ff.).

Opposition to "those who deny the resurrection and

the Judgment"[1] went so far in the second century that the baptismal confession which we call "the Apostles' Creed" actually chooses the term "resurrection of the flesh" (*ἀνάστασις τῆς σαρκός*) in preference to "resurrection of the body" as we moderns unwarrantably translate it. Justin, as we have seen, excommunicates those who reject the idea of the millennial reign in Jerusalem on the ground that they make the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob faithless to His promise. Justin simply ignores the teaching of Paul. 2 Peter, who attacks the same heretics, admits that in Paul's epistles there are some things "hard to be understood," but declares that it is the "ignorant and unsteadfast" who "wrest them to their own destruction," while Irenæus, who tells us plainly that the Pauline utterance in debate was the teaching in 1 Corinthians 15: 50, "Flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God, neither doth corruption inherit incorruption," finds a way to harmonize the Pauline dicta with current orthodoxy.

Thus in their loyalty to the primary Jewish principle of the millennial reign, on which Jesus had built, the second century Fathers certainly went as far as it is possible to go without repudiating the Pauline principle altogether. I am not sure, however, that they went quite as far as some modern preachers who have built up a great reputation by the easy method of "out-Heroding Herod" in their zeal for orthodoxy. The second century "chiliasts," or "millenarians," as they came to be called, insisted that we must wear bodies of flesh for the first thousand years of our resurrection life. After that, as 2 Esdras has it, we "escape from that which is corruptible and inherit that which is to come, receiving a large room, with joy and immortal-

[1] *Ep. of Polycarp*, vii. 1 (*ca.* 115 A. D.).

ity, our faces shining as the sun, our bodies made like unto the light of the stars, being henceforth incorcuptible."[2] If I understand correctly the modern hyper-orthodox they expect us to resume our bodies of flesh for good and all.

It is easy to see how irrepressible this conflict of opinion regarding the nature of the resurrection body would be from the very beginnings of the faith, even if we did not have the explicit testimony of Paul at a date a score of years before our earliest Gospel, that some in the Corinthian church were beginning to ask: "With what body do they come?" It would be strange if we did not have reflections of it in the Synoptic writings, still more strange if a comparison of the Synoptic writings with the fourth Gospel did not reveal something of contrast. For the Synoptic writings are fundamentally Semitic, Palestinian, and Petrine, however adapted in their present Greek form to the use of Pauline churches, whereas the Ephesian Gospel comes to us as an almost pure product of Pauline Christianity of the second generation in Greek-speaking Christendom.

II. The Infusion of Synoptic Story with Higher Values

I must take up first a phenomenon presented by the Synoptic writings which I have elsewhere[3] designated "the Paulinizing of Petrine tradition." It is the least cumbrous term I can find to describe the process by which Synoptic tradition was made the vehicle of ideas founded on the spiritual Christ of Paul's faith. The tradition really does go back as the earliest wit-

[2] II Esdr. 7:97.
[3] *Jesus and Paul,* New York, 1920, pp. 154–167.

nesses maintain, to memorabilia of the preaching of Peter. But it was compelled to adjust itself to the conditions of the sub-apostolic age. It took up in a form characteristic of Jewish teachers and intelligible in proportion as we familiarize ourselves with these Synagogue methods, such elements of Pauline teaching as were absolutely indispensable if its preaching was to have any effect in the Greek-speaking world.

Three elements of Pauline teaching were conspicuously such as to make some such adjustment inevitable. In every case we find the method adopted to be that of Jewish midrash (homiletic interpretation),[4] more particularly that of vision and voice from heaven (Bath Kol). For the Oriental, who has little capacity for abstract thinking, makes good the deficiencies of an unphilosophical vocabulary by larger resort to the concrete expressions of symbolism. Instead of saying, "I came to perceive," he says, "The veil was removed

[4] See the chapter entitled "The Midrash and its Poetry" in *Short History of Jewish Literature,* I. Abrahams, 1906. I will quote Abrahams' definition. "Midrash ('Study,' 'Inquiry') was in the first instance an *explanation of the Scriptures.* The explanation is often the clear, natural exposition of the text, and it enforces rules of conduct both ethical and ritual. Midrash often penetrates below the surface; and, while seeming to depart from the letter of the text, attempts to reach its spirit. In the Talmudic phrase Midrash is a hammer which wakes to shining life the sparks slumbering in the rock. The historical and moral traditions which clustered round the incidents and characters of the Bible soon received a more vivid setting. The poetical sense of the Rabbis expressed itself in a vast and beautiful array of legendary additions to the Bible, but the additions are always devised with a moral purpose, to probe motive or to analyze character, to give point to a preacher's homily or to inspire the imagination of the audience with nobler fancies. Besides being expository, the Midrash is, therefore, also didactic and poetical, the moral being conveyed in the guise of a *narrative* (Haggada), amplifying and developing the contents of Scripture. The Midrash gives the results of that deep searching of the Scriptures which became second nature with the Jews, and it also represents the changes and expansions of ethical and theological ideals as applied to a changing and growing life."

from the eyes of my heart," "I saw in vision what was transpiring in heaven, or in the invisible world." Where it is a question of matters that appeal to the ear, rather than to the eye, he says, "My inward ear was opened," "God sent me an echo—a 'daughter,' —of His own voice." Very often both methods are combined and the rabbi says, "I saw in vision, so and so, and heard a Bath Kol saying, so and so." Pinner, in his *Introduction to the Talmud,* has collected more than thirty cases of this mode of expression, all of which naturally belong to the haggada, because unlike the ḥalakha the haggada has no legal authority but aims solely at edification of the people. Inevitably Bath Kol fell into disrepute, because this kind of confirmation is too easily invoked in support of one's own opinion. In no less than three different passages of the Talmud the saying of R. Judah quoting R. Samuel is repeated: "Every day there goes forth a Bath Kol saying, 'So and so's daughter is intended for so and so,'" which may be interpreted: "Every time a young couple are betrothed they are convinced the match was made in heaven." The story of the decline is told quite fully, with many examples by Dr. Edwin A. Abbott in Chapter III of his volume *From Letter to Spirit* (1903) entitled "Bath Kol on its Defence."

It is perhaps something more than a coincidence that the downfall of this form of appeal to the supernatural comes just at the period when the Tannaim, the rebuilders of Judaism under the Torah after the overthrow of Jerusalem, were grappling with Christianity. For the inroads of Christianity into the ancestral faith were to a large degree based on the appeal to miracle and revelations from heaven. The following incident is related, as Schwab, the editor of the Talmud in the French translation, correctly remarks, to show

that miracle and voices from heaven were, as we say, "played out." The story and connected saying "We do not care for Bath Kol" is appealed to over and over again in both Babylonian and Jerusalem Talmud to establish the principle that matters of law (ḥalakha, in which cases of conscience are decided) are to be settled by vote of the majority, not by appeal to the supernatural. The passage of Scripture invoked was Exodus 23: 2, which our versions render "Turn aside after a multitude to wrest justice," but which the Targum of Onkelos, punctuating differently, renders: "After the many (*i. e.* the majority) shall thou fulfill judgment." As an example of real rabbinic wit, as well as mingled sanity and boldness of decision, it is well worth quoting. R. Eliezer, the greatest of the college of sages at Jamnia early in the second century, had been overruled by his colleagues on a question regarding the purification of a certain kind of oven. He refused to yield the point and began an appeal to miracle. "Let this carob-tree prove, said he, that the ḥalakha (decision) prevails as I state." The carob-tree was thereupon miraculously thrown off to a distance of one hundred ells, or according to others four hundred ells. "But they said: 'The carob proves nothing.' Again he said: 'Then let the spring of water prove that this ḥalakha prevails.' The water then began to run backward. But again the sages said, 'This proves nothing.' Again he said: 'Then let the walls of the college prove that I am right.' The walls of the college thereupon were shaken till they were about to fall.[5] But R. Joshua

[5] The story of the falling walls appears in several connections. See Herford, *Christianity in Talmud and Midrash*, p. 112 (*Sanh.* 25*b*), and cf. Irenæus, *Haer.* III, iii. 4 (Polycarp's encounter with Cerinthus in the bath).

rebuked them saying, If the sages of this college are discussing a ḥalakha what business have *you* to interfere?" Eliezer's last and supreme appeal was this: "'Let it be announced by the heavens that the ḥalakha prevails according to my statement.' Hereupon a Bath Kol was heard, saying: 'Why do you quarrel with R. Eliezer, who is always right in his decisions?' But the indomitable R. Joshua was ready even for this. He arose and proclaimed "The Law is not in the heavens," quoting the same passage that Paul quotes in Romans 10: 6 from Deuteronomy 30: 12ff. in support of the doctrine that the inward monitor, the law of which Moses had said "It is nigh thee, in thy heart and in thy mouth" is a safer guide in matters of conscience than even alleged voices from heaven. You recall that Paul also insists that even a revelation uttered "in the Spirit" in the Christian assembly must be judged in accordance with the moral sense of the brotherhood.[6]

You will think that the comment of the still later rabbis on this celebrated decision of the Tannaim goes quite too far in the direction of irreverence; but the insight we get into Jewish haggada, and its method of pointing a moral with a tale, would not be complete if I stopped at this point. I will continue with the comment: "How is this to be understood?" said R. Jeremiah: "It means, The Torah was already given to us on the mountain of Sinai, *and we do not care for a voice from heaven,* as it reads (Ex. 23: 2), 'After the majority shalt thou fulfill judgment.'" R. Nathan met Elijah the prophet (who was believed to stand in the presence of God) and questioned him: What did the Holy One, blessed be He, when R. Joshua made

[6] 1 Cor. 12: 3; 14: 32f.; 1 Thess. 5: 19–21. See also 1 John 4: 1–3 and *Didaché* xi. 7ff.

this decision? Elijah rejoined: "He laughed and said, 'My children have overruled me, my children have overruled me.'"

The man who hears or reads such midrash as this is supposed to have too much common sense to take it literally. He knows that the story means only that if we could meet some one who could tell us just how God in heaven feels about a decision that in matters of conscience we go by the inward light even against Scripture itself, we should learn that the Almighty is delighted with such evidence of moral courage.

This may seem a long digression, but I do not know how to prepare you otherwise for the proper understanding of the *midrashoth* of the Synoptic writers, which have had the misfortune to be interpreted by readers ignorant of Synagogue methods of teaching ever since they were translated into Greek. I have said that we have three outstanding examples of midrash in Petrine tradition, and that all three aim to put in figures which appeal to the eye and ear doctrines which in the language of Paul are addressed to the understanding. Two of these instances I shall cite only by way of illustration of the method. The third is directly concerned with the subject we have in hand, so that I must dwell upon it more at length.

III. The Three Midrashoth of Petrine Narrative

1. We know from Galatians 2: 10–21 how disproportionate a part was played in early Christianity by the question whether Jews who had always abstained from foods forbidden by Moses as "common" or "unclean" might under any circumstances disregard

the commandments in question. We also know that Paul came to open rupture with Peter, Barnabas, and all the Jewish element in the church at Antioch, by insisting that when it was a question of table-fellowship with their Gentile brethren, Jewish believers must disregard the Mosaic distinctions whether it suited them or not. Our Book of Acts has two solutions of this question not really reconcileable with one another, and neither of them reconcileable with Paul. Luke's own solution is given in the story of the Apostolic Council in chapter fifteen in the four "decrees." This is, as Lightfoot properly called it, "a compromise." But Luke has embodied at an earlier point in his story the account of a much broader and more comprehensive settlement through a Conclave at Jerusalem whereat Peter obtains the unanimous decision of the Church *on the basis of vision and Bath Kol.* This might be called a Pauline settlement if it were not attributed to Peter; for it maintains that the distinctions of meats are not of God, that "in every nation he that feareth God and worketh righteousness is accepted of him" without national distinctions, and even that Peter himself was right in "going in to men uncircumcised and eating with them" (Acts 10: 1–11: 18). We are accustomed to pass over the real bearing of the vision and Bath Kol in which Peter's scruples against eating anything "common or unclean" are swept away as mere human distinctions ("what God hath cleansed, make not *thou* common") by treating the revelation as a sort of anticipation, or preliminary lesson, of which the real significance is to appear later. Doubtless the compiler, Luke, so intended, but the intrinsic meaning is not so limited, nor can Peter have had this experience. The subsequent Jerusalem Council could not have imposed the limitations which it did if this

broader decision had come beforehand, nor could Paul have spoken to Peter, or Peter have behaved as he did at Antioch, if he had previously been vouchsafed this settlement of the whole question on the broadest possible principles, by divine authority seconded by the unanimous approval of the Church. The story of Peter's vision and Bath Kol at Joppa is, therefore, not historical but a midrash. It probably belongs to an early account (perhaps from Jewish Christian circles) of how Peter, not Paul, carried the Gospel to the Gentiles.[6b] It aims to explain how Peter was led to see the futility of his scruples about distinctions of meats, and how it was divinely revealed to him and to the Church as a whole, that there is no distinction in God's sight either of meats or persons. We could hardly expect that the tradition of Peter's missionary career would preserve the actual story which Paul tells, but which Acts suppresses, of the public altercation at Antioch. It has a shorter and (for the lay hearer) better and simpler way. Peter ultimately did come to see that Paul was right on the great issue. Or at least Peter's followers believed he had. The writer of Acts has found a story which sets forth by the conventional midrashic method of vision and Bath Kol how Peter learned the right view of things on occasion of a celebrated conversion at Cæsarea. For the narrator at least the real point is not when or how Peter came to see the truth, but that he did see it. This the story makes clear.

2. Another element of Pauline teaching even Jewish-Christian missionaries would find it necessary to introduce somehow, abstract as it is, into their pre-

[6b] Cf. Luke 5: 1–10, a midrashic expansion of Mark 1: 16–20, in which Peter becomes chief agent in the growth of the Church through Gentile missions.

sentation of Jesus as Son of God, and not mere Son of David. It is the doctrine which is theologically expressed in Colossians 1: 13–19 by saying that Jesus was God's "Beloved Son," His "image" and the "first-born of the creation," and that it was the "good-pleasure" (*i. e.* the divine decree of election) that the whole "fullness" (of the divine attributes), the *middoth* or δυνάμεις should take up its abode in Him. How does the Gospel of Mark express this very abstract bit of Pauline (and Alexandrian) theology? By means of a prologue to the Gospel, in which the reader, conducted as it were behind the veil, sees what was the divinely determined beginning of Jesus' career at a time when none of the Twelve had yet come in contact with Him. His baptism of self-dedication is accompanied by a vision and Bath Kol. The inward eye is opened to see the Divine Spirit descending from heaven to take up its abode in Jesus. Spiritually the voice of God is heard: "Thou art my Son, the 'Beloved,' my 'good-pleasure' was fixed upon thee." Here the name Beloved "*Son*," corresponding to the Pauline "*Son* of God's love," replaces the epithet "Servant," which early passed out of use in the Church. Otherwise the Markan midrash simply follows the Isaian description quoted in Matthew 12: 18 (for it is one of the characteristics of midrash as far as possible to follow Old Testament language): "Behold my Servant whom I have chosen, my Beloved in whom my soul is well pleased: I will put my Spirit upon him, and he shall declare judgment to the Gentiles." I suppose that even Mark, to say nothing of later Greek evangelists and interpreters, may have taken this story of vision and Bath Kol as concrete fact, perceptible even by ordinary bystanders. And so in a sense does the composer of the midrash, when

he tells of the descending dove[7] and heavenly Voice. He, too, tells no more than what he thinks *would be* perceived if we had spiritual eyesight and hearing. But he does not mean that *others* would perceive it. And even Mark has nothing to say of any witness from whom the story was derived. When we consider the story in itself it bears every mark of the typical vision and Bath Kol by which the contemporary Synagogue teacher tries to enlist the imagination of his hearers to apprehend that which he has not philosophical language to express. In fact if you only understand it this *is* the simplest, briefest and most intelligible of all methods of conveying the thought.

3. We come finally to our third instance of the application of midrash in a case which could not possibly be avoided by missionaries attempting to define the real nature of the deliverance and salvation effected by Jesus. It is the case with which we are immediately concerned, and which Paul meets in such detail in 1 Corinthians 15: 35ff., when he answers the question: "With what body do they come?" I refer to the story of the Transfiguration.

It might be supposed that the true place for this revelation to "Peter and those who were with him"[8] by vision and Bath Kol would be after the crucifixion, when Jesus has returned from Paradise to resume for a brief time His intercourse with the Twelve. This is actually the place occupied by it in a recently discovered fragment of the early Petrine tradition called the

[7] Symbol of the yearning Spirit of Redemptive Wisdom which broods over God's people.

[8] There is some reason to regard this Lucan characterization of the witnesses (Luke 9: 32) as more original than that of Mark. Our second evangelist adds on this and a few occasions of similar significance the sons of Zebedee who shared Jesus' cup of martyrdom (Mark 10: 35ff.). See Bacon, *Fourth Gospel in Research and Debate,* 1909, chapter V.

Revelation, or *Apocalypse* (*i. e.* the unveiling) *of Peter*. I will transcribe the parallel portion of the fragment, which of course dispenses with the apparatus of vision and Bath Kol since it supposes the disciples to be speaking with the risen Christ.

"And the Lord added and said: Let us go to the mountain, let us pray. And as we were departing with Him we, the twelve disciples, entreated that He would show us one of our brethren the just (or "justified") who have departed from the world, that we might see of what sort they are as respects their form, and taking courage ourselves might encourage the men who should hear us.

"And as we were praying, suddenly there appeared two men standing before the Lord, upon whom we were not able to look. For a radiance as of the sun proceeded from their face and their raiment was glistening such as eye of man never beheld; for neither mouth can tell nor heart conceive the glory with which they were clothed and the beauty of their countenance. And as we beheld them we were amazed, for their bodies were whiter than any snow and more ruddy than any rose, and the ruddiness of them mingled with the whiteness, and I simply cannot describe their beauty. For their hair curled like the petals of a flower and fell about their face and shoulders like a wreath plaited of nard and many-coloured flowers, or like a rainbow in the air. Such was their beauty.

"And when we saw their splendour we were amazed at them, because they had appeared suddenly.[9] And

[9] "The rabbis taught: Six things are said with regard to demons, three in which they are like the angels: they have wings, they float from one end of the world to the other, and they know the future. In three they are like men (and unlike angels): they eat and drink, they reproduce, and they are mortal." *Ḥagiga*, Rodkinson, *B. Talm.* III, ii. 6, p. 37. Bodies "like the angels"

approaching the Lord I said: 'Who are these?' He saith to me 'These are your brethren the just, whose forms you desired to see.' And I said to Him, 'And where are all the justified, or of what nature is the world in which they possess so great glory?' And the Lord showed me a great region outside of this world, shining with surpassing light, and the air of the place brilliant with the rays of the sun, and its soil blooming with unfading flowers and full of perfumes and of flowering and imperishable plants bearing blissful fruit; and so great was the bloom of it that the fragrance was wafted even unto us.

"And the inhabitants of that place were clad with the shining raiment of angels, and their clothing was like their country. And angels walked about with them, and the glory of all who dwelt there was equal, and with one voice they praised the Lord God, rejoicing in that place. This, saith the Lord to us, is the country of your high-priests, the justified."

The *Apocalypse of Peter* draws out at greater length the data of the Markan "revelation" for the same purpose that our so-called Second Epistle of Peter employs it against those who "denied the resurrection and judgment." Whether it depends solely, as seems to be the case with 2 Peter, on our own canonical Gospels; or makes use of the same Petrine tradition in some partially independent form, is an open question. But the motive for the development is obvious to all who are familiar with the history of second century debate both in Jewish and Christian circles on the nature of the resurrection body and its abode in Paradise.[10] The use made of the Transfiguration story in

in respect to "appearing suddenly" where the owners will are ascribed to all the glorified. Cf. Luke 24:36; John 20:26.

[10] See *e. g.* Irenæus, *Haer.* V, xxxiii–xxxvi.

Apoc. Petri is the same as in 2 Peter 1: 16–18, and of itself suffices to explain the transposition. But this is not the principal motive of the evangelists' story, and the principal motive shows that it is correctly placed by Mark, in spite of its breaking the connection, as we shall see.

Mark 9: 2–10 is interjected into the midst of the story of Peter's recognition of Jesus as "the Christ of God" and Jesus' rebuke of his rejection of the doctrine of the cross. It is interjected for a reason closely analogous to that which brings in the story of the vision at Joppa in Acts 10: 1ff. The evangelist wishes the reader to understand that these disciples who had shared the "hardness of heart" of their fellow-countrymen in rejecting a redemption according to the things of God, once their spiritual perception had been awakened, began to see that the true, divine redemption which the Christ should bring must be a redemption from the corruptible world into the glory of Paradise. This redemption could only be by Jesus' own entrance through death into the glory which in Jewish belief was the portion of Moses and Elijah, the "translated" men, who in the "traditions of the Elders" quoted by Irenæus from Papias are called "the forerunners of immortality." In fact they were believed to be already enjoying by special dispensation of God the glorified conditions of the messianic age, and to be destined to be sent from Paradise in advance of Messiah as His "witnesses." In 2 Esdras 6: 26 it is predicted that after the great woes of the last times the survivors "will see the men that have been taken up, who have not tasted death from their birth." These are Moses and Elias, whose function is described, as we have seen, in Revelation 11: 3–13. The Markan midrash comes in, we notice, immediately

after a reference to a similar experiencing of the present kingdom without "tasting death" as predestined for "some of those that stand by." This shows the real nature and purpose of the midrash. If Jesus and those who follow Him are destined to be "clothed upon" with a "house from heaven" in the shape of such a "body of glory" as the heavenly ones wear it is folly for Jewish unbelief to cling to a Messiah "according to the things of men." It is like asking not only Jesus, but Moses and Elias also, the forerunners of immortality, to come back to earth, abide there, and be clothed once more in their "earthly house of this 'tabernacle.'" The true place for the supplement, therefore, is just that which it occupies in our Synoptists; because the object for which 2 Peter and *Apoc. Petri* employ it is only secondary. Primarily it is concerned with the vindication and sublimation of the apostleship of Peter. Its motive is substantially the same as that of the supplement interjected by Matthew at almost the same point, introducing a congratulation of Peter by Jesus on the "revelation" which has been made to him from heaven, and an endowment with supreme authority to bind and loose (Matt. 16: 17–19). In terms corresponding to those which Paul had employed in vindicating his apostleship against the Judaizers as "not from flesh and blood" but by a divine revelation to him of the glorified Christ, Peter, in the Matthean supplement, is made Christ's vicar. The supplement of Mark 9: 2–10 accomplishes the same object by giving to "Peter and those who were with him" an experience corresponding to that which Paul in 2 Corinthians 3: 6–4: 6 declared to be the basis of the divine commission of all "ministers of the new covenant." According to Paul the ambassadors of this greater "reconciliation" have received a vision even

greater than that which transfigured Moses on Sinai. They, too, have beheld "the glory of God," the forgiving God of Exodus 34: 6f., in the face of the glorified Christ. Paul even maintains on this ground a doctrine of progressive transmutation of the flesh into a kind of glory-substance, incapable of dissolution and like in quality to the "body of glory" worn by the risen Christ, who is the "image" of God (Phil. 3: 21; Rom. 8: 11, 29; 12: 2; 1 Cor. 15: 35–49). Similarly Philo at the close of his *Life of Moses* had spoken of Moses' vision of God in Sinai as transfiguring his body by fusing all its elements into a "single sunlike mind-substance, in preparation for immortality." "We who have seen this vision," says Paul, "are transfigured (*μεταμορφούμεθα*) by it 'from glory to glory,'" reflecting as a mirror the glory of God, which does not vanish, as from the face of Moses, but is renewed day by day, so that while the outward man is decaying, sufferings and hardship breaking down the earthern vessel, "we know that if our earthly house of this 'tabernacle' be dissolved we have a building of God, eternal, reserved for us in the heavens, with which we shall ultimately be 'clothed upon.'" This "glorification" by "conformation" even of our mortal bodies into the likeness of Christ's glory-body is of the very essence of Paul's apostolic commission. It is as much a part of it as his doctrine of justification (*i. e.* forgiveness) for the sake of the crucified Intercessor. He could not imagine a witness of the resurrection with whom this would not be an essential part of the "ministry of reconciliation" committed to him as an "ambassador from God." We may well believe that Peter's own preaching came to embody something like the same doctrine. But how should an evangelist whose narrative did not include any account of Peter's

later enlightenment convey to his reader the idea that Peter also was "awakened" to perceive the reality? If he followed the accepted methods of Jewish midrash he would introduce after the account of the rebuke of Peter's blindness a vision and Bath Kol to explain how his inward eyes and ears were opened. And he would not shrink from abrupt interruption of the context. In Mark 8: 27–9: 1 Jesus reveals His mission as a suffering Christ, rebuking the incredulity of the disciples and Peter, and promising to achieve the kingdom as glorified Son of Man. This continues in 9: 11, where the difficulty raised by the question: "How then, say the scribes, that Elias must first come?" is answered by the teaching that John the Baptist's ministry and fate fulfills the prophecy. The Transfiguration, with its totally different answer to the question, is interjected between the two. But this is characteristic of midrash, which the Talmud throws in at any point, regardless of interruption, to acquaint the reader with the new point of view. In the story of the extension of the Gospel to the Gentiles the reader of the story of vision and Bath Kol at Joppa learns how Peter was brought (as was really the case in due time) to see that his Jewish distinctions of clean and unclean were insignificant in God's sight. Here the same devices are employed to show the reader how "after the Son of Man was risen from the dead" Peter and they that were with him came to apprehend the glorified Christ and His mission just as Paul apprehends the matter in his description of the "revelation in him" of the risen Son of God when he received the "ministry of the new covenant." The story shows how it was not the purpose of God to bring back to earth the "witnesses" who had already been glorified, to resume their earthly "tabernacles"

as Peter's conception would require; but that Jesus, through His sacrificial death, was to be transfigured into the same immortal form which is worn by Moses and Elias and the rest of the denizens of Paradise. With Peter are associated by Mark James and John, who like Peter had shared the Master's cup of martyrdom (10: 39). Possibly this was not part of the original midrash, which aims only to supplement the story of Peter's spiritual blindness in 8: 27–9: 13. It does inform the reader in any case, how the Apostles' spiritual eyes and ears were opened to see what Paul describes as the "gnosis" of the apostleship of the Redemption in 2 Corinthians 3–6. Peter's apostleship is thus sublimated by infusing it with the divine authority and meaning Paul found in his, just as Matthew 16: 17–19 supplements the same story by adding the substance of Galatians 1: 1, 11f., 16.

I do not mean that the authors of these midrashoth had before them copies of the epistles of Paul, and artfully constructed allegorical parallels to the minutiæ of these. I would not even claim that they have borrowed from them the technical expressions "transfigured," or "tabernacles" (*i. e.* bodies), nor the conception of the radiant glory-body belonging to the immortals. Jewish haggada is much too untrammelled for that, and these expressions and conceptions are too generally used in the literature of apocalyptic eschatology for me to press the coincidence. I only present the three companion instances of vision and Bath Kol in Synoptic story to show how the necessity for infusing it with the values of Paul's great teachings of a Christ not after the flesh was met. Those who carried on the preaching of Peter among the Gentiles had somehow to incorporate this spiritual sense. In our particular case they use the Synagogue

preacher's method of midrash, interjecting the vision-supplement into the midst of the story precisely as we find the midrashoth interjected into the haggada of the Talmud.

To compare small things with great let me add one more rabbinic parallel. It is a story told in Ḥagiga 14: 2 of R. Jochanan ben Zacchai, the youngest disciple of Hillel; for Jochanan was a contemporary of Jesus and the Apostles, having survived the destruction of the temple. In respect to substance of teaching there is no comparison, for Mark 9: 2–10 embodies the sublimest elements of the teaching of Paul. Jochanan is only commenting on some words of his own disciples. But as respects midrashic method, *i. e.* the mode of speech by vision and Bath Kol, the story is instructive. Jochanan himself was famous for his ability to expound the abstruse doctrines of Paradise and the heavenly world called doctrines of the "chariot" because based on Ezekiel's vision (Ez. 1: 4–28). Discussion of them was therefore forbidden to all save the greatest sages. Nevertheless two of his disciples reported to Jochanan one day how they had discussed this forbidden subject and had received heavenly manifestations of approval. Magnanimous as Moses when Eldad and Modad prophesied in the camp R. Jochanan expressed his congratulations thus: "Blessed are ye, and blessed is she that bare you. Blessed are mine own eyes, for they have seen likewise. I, too, beheld in vision how you and I were resting on Mount Sinai, and a Bath Kol went forth, saying (Ex. 24: 1) 'Come up hither. Come up hither. A banqueting place is prepared here for thee and for thy disciples.'" This is not meant to be taken literally, as we take the words of Jochanan's namesake and contemporary the Christian seer who begins his story of

vision by saying "I saw, and behold, a door opened in heaven, and I heard a voice saying, 'Come up hither'" (Rev. 4: 1). Jochanan does not mean to be understood as we rightly understand Paul, when he tells of being transported to Paradise. For Paul refers to a condition of cataleptic trance, and regards it as an actual transportation of his spirit (whether with or without the body he will not venture to say, nor would it have mattered to his contemporaries) to the third heaven, where he heard words he dared not utter. Paul believes himself to have been actually there. But it is doubtful if even the Christian John means to be understood literally. Still less should this be assumed in case of the Jewish John, who merely makes use in more condensed form of the same Scripture developed by Paul when he compares an earlier experience, his primary experience of God's manifestation of His Son "in him," to the vision of Moses. It was "after six days" of preparation that Moses entered into the cloud, when he and the elders "went up unto God and did eat and drink" (Ex. 24: 1, 11, 16, 18). Not only Paul but Jochanan and his disciples compare their experience to this.

When, therefore, I read after Mark's story of Peter's rebuke for rejecting the doctrine of a suffering and glorified Son of Man, that "after six days" Jesus took him and the two other companions of His martyrdom up into a high mountain apart, where in vision (or as Luke more significantly says "when they were fully awakened") He was transfigured before them, and talked with the glorified, I understand this story of vision and Bath Kol just as I would understand it if uttered by any other Jewish teacher of the same period. I understand that the description of Jesus' appearance in His

transfigured form together with the two denizens of Paradise, "the men who were taken up, which had not tasted death since their birth," is intended to meet the discouragement of the disciples by a parallel to the saying on seeing the kingdom of God without tasting death. For the *Apocalypse of Peter* understands and employs it thus,[11] adding to it just as Matthew does, the stereotyped conception of the glorified that their faces "shone like the sun" (Matt. 17: 2; cf. 2 Esdras 7: 97). I understand that Peter's ill-advised plea to provide for the continuance of Jesus and the two "forerunners of immortality" with the disciples on earth, and his offer to build them "tabernacles," is a parallel to his before-related utterance as the mouthpiece of "Satan" and of "things according to men." For Peter had said of Jesus' prediction of His martyr fate, "This be far from thee, Lord, this shall not be unto thee." I understand that the Voice which proclaims from the overshadowing cloud: "This is my Son, the Beloved, hearken to him" repeats with divine approval the ideal that Jesus had laid before them, and corrects the disciples' unworthy conceptions, just as in the vision at Joppa it rejects Peter's human distinctions in favour of "what God hath made clean." Therefore the whole interjected episode of vision and Bath Kol interrupting the account of Jesus' self-revelation to the disciples at Cæsarea as a Redeemer of Israel through martyrdom, and their objection, "What, then, about the expected coming of Elias?" is to me not history, but poetry. It is the typical symbolism of midrash, an effort on the part of the preacher (for midrash is *pulpit* exposi-

[11] See above, noting the words "that we might see of what sort they are as respects their form (μορφή), and taking courage ourselves might encourage our hearers."

tion) to convey to the hearer the idea that when the disciples learned to use their spiritual eyes and ears they came to see the Redeemer and His Redemption not as men mean it, but as God means it. It is symbolism, not fact, and it has taken me a long time to put its real meaning before you. It has taken Paul himself three long chapters to express substantially the same conceptions; and if in some respects these chapters are the most sublime of all his writings, certainly they are by no means the easiest. You may object that it is hard for modern westerners to penetrate to the real meaning of Mark 9: 2–10; but can any of us put as much meaning into seven verses?

It is needless to follow down the history of the Transfiguration midrash through its employment in 2 Peter, the *Apocalypse of Peter,* and the "traditions" of Papias' "Elders" quoted by Irenæus. What I have already said will suffice to show its place in relation to the development of Christian belief as I conceive it. It represents the post-Pauline attempt to sublimate Petrine tradition with the elements of Pauline teaching, recasting them, however, in the conventional forms of current Jewish eschatology. I must pass from this secondary element of Synoptic tradition to a widely different attempt, not much later in date, but from a different environment, to achieve a similar result, the restatement of the doctrine in the Gospel of Ephesus attributed to John.

IV. Immortality in the Fourth Gospel

The Johannine writings come from the very headquarters of Paulinism, a centre for ages of Greek philosophy. They date from a full generation after Paul's death. It would be strange if they did not reflect a Hellenistic type of teaching rather than the

Palestinian which we have seen to prevail in the Synoptic writings. Indeed the outstanding fact in their presentation of the story of Jesus is that the writer conceives it primarily as a manifestation of the divine Logos. In other words His Christology is not, like the Synoptic, an apotheosis doctrine, but an incarnation doctrine. Jesus is not so much exalted to heaven to be made the Son of God as sent forth from heaven to "manifest his glory" for a brief period on earth, returning after completion of His mission to "the glory which he had with the Father before the foundation of the world." The Christ they depict is the "spiritual" Christ of Paul.

Greek philosophy, it has been well said, cannot logically conceive immortality without preëxistence. If with Plato it conceives the soul as a monad incapable of dissolution it must with the same philosopher seek in the intuitive categories of reason for remnants of former experience. The principles of mathematics, for example, which not even the untutored can deny, Plato holds are brought with us from a former existence not wholly submerged under the Lethean waters through which we passed on entering the world. Plato agrees with Wordsworth that

> Not in entire forgetfulness
> And not in utter nakedness,
> But trailing clouds of glory do we come
> From heaven which is our home.

To some extent even Jewish belief had yielded in Paul's time to this doctrine of preëxistence, as we have seen from Enoch and elsewhere. But it remains still possible in truly Jewish writings to draw the line between logical and real preëxistence. Enoch sees the soul of Messiah laid up in Paradise, waiting to be sent

for the consolation of Israel. But this is only a symbolic way of saying that God's promise of His coming is as sure of fulfillment as if the eye of the spirit could be opened and one could see the preparation already made. It remained for Paul the Hellenist to take the final step in ascribing to Jesus a conscious part in His own sending (2 Cor. 8: 9; Phil. 2: 6f.). The real point of transition is Paul's adoption of the Alexandrian Wisdom doctrine, identifying the Son of Man of Daniel and Enoch with the pre-creative divine Spirit which according to the Wisdom books is God's agent both in creation and redemption (1 Cor. 8: 6; Col. 1: 16). Unlike Philo and the fourth evangelist Paul does not take the further step of identifying Wisdom with the Stoic Logos, a metaphysical rather than religious principle. Even with his Ephesian disciple the Christology is still fundamentally a Wisdom doctrine, in which the redemptive function predominates and that of creating and sustaining the universe is an adjunct. There may be significance in the fact that we find no trace of this distinctively Alexandrian Logos-doctrine, which so strongly colours the Epistle to the Hebrews and the Ephesian Gospel, in any Epistle of Paul antecedent to his association with Apollos; but it undoubtedly affects his teaching in the later Epistles, and it could not fail to have its effect upon his doctrine of immortality. In point of fact it is a commonplace of the studies of Paulinism that as he approaches the end Paul's hope becomes less and less an expectation of "the coming of the Lord" (1 Thess. 4:15; 1 Cor. 15: 51ff.), and more and more a longing "to depart and be with Christ" (Phil. 1: 23). This would be natural enough as with advancing age the likelihood of Paul's survival to witness the actual "coming of the Lord" became less

and less. But apart from this Paul's whole conception of immortality was based, as we have been again and again reminded, upon his experience of spiritual contact with the risen and glorified Christ, and (next, perhaps, to his struggle with the Judaizers) it was the great battle of his life to prove that this spiritual contact is *morally* conditioned and *morally* effective in its results. The new life which it gives produces a continual, daily moral regeneration, to which the transmutation of "our mortal flesh" into the glory-body is altogether secondary. Hence a continual insistence on the present-day character of the new life; although in another, and equally true sense it is "hid with Christ in God," *i. e.* laid up in heaven, so that when "Christ who is our life shall appear, then we also are manifested with him in glory." In either case it is no longer we that live, but Christ that liveth in us.

To meet the objections of those who declared that his doctrine of grace removed all barriers to sin, an objection which found only too much to sustain it in the lives of converts who said "I am of Paul," but whose Paulinism consisted mainly in applying the principle "All things are lawful," the Apostle was thus thrown back more and more upon his doctrine of *mystical union*. The man who in the self-dedication of baptism has died unto sin is no more subject to it. He lives a new life, a life of the Spirit given from heaven, a Christ-life animated and controlled by a new "mind" (νοῦς). If, then, the regeneration of the Spirit in baptism marks the beginning of the true life —the Christ-united, eternal life—in proportion as this is realized the mere "manifestation" which gives it outward expression at the Coming becomes of subordinate importance. No wonder there were, perhaps within Paul's lifetime, Greek disciples like Hymenæus

and Philetus, who erred concerning the truth, alleging that the resurrection is past already; and their word, if we may accept the witness of 1 Timothy 2: 17, ate like a gangrene at Ephesus.

It was indeed inevitable that in the generation after Paul an Ephesian evangelist, writing with the distinct object of supplementing the "bodily things" related by his predecessors with the "spiritual things" concerning Christ which Paul had taught, should recast the whole doctrine of the last things as we get it from Synoptic tradition, and base it primarily where Paul had based it, on a present eternal life which the believer enters from the moment that he has become "united by faith" with the eternal Son. For this reason the eschatological chapters of the Synoptists describing the doom of Jerusalem and coming of the Son of Man on the clouds disappear from the fourth Gospel. Their place is taken by the discourses of the upper room, culminating in the parable of the vine and the branches, a parallel to Paul's figure of the head and the members (Rom. 12: 4–8; 1 Cor. 12: 12ff.; Eph. 4: 1–16). The judgment is indeed in this Gospel "past already." Paul had said there was none for those who "are in Christ Jesus, who walk not after the flesh but after the Spirit." Our evangelist declares it to be a process of natural gravitation effected by the coming of light into the world, so that those whose deeds are evil are repelled from it, as those who do the truth are attracted to it that their deeds may be made manifest that they are wrought in God (John 3: 17–21). In Ephesians 2: 1–10; 5: 8–14 Christ's coming into the present world in which we live is already a liberation of its prisoners of darkness from the prison-house of sin and death, giving them both the light and the life of Christ so that as

children of light they "reprove the unfruitful works" of the darkness around them, thus participating in the Redeemer's judgment of the world. The Ephesian Gospel develops this. Here also the light which Christ brings effects the judgment (3: 17–21; 5: 21–27). Whoso hears His word, and believeth Him that sent Him hath eternal life, and cometh not into judgment, but hath passed out of death into life. And the saints take part in this judgment of the world, because the Spirit which is given them "convicts the world in respect of sin, of justification and of judgment" (16: 8–11).

Thus the fourth Gospel displaces the Synoptic doctrine of resurrection and judgment by a more spiritual Pauline conception of a liberating, life-giving Christ who has already entered our darkness and raised us from our condition of death in trespasses and sins by the indwelling of His Spirit. So completely is this the case that quite a number of critics are unwilling to admit as authentic the few verses in which something like the Synoptic conception is admitted. It is, of course, absurd to talk with Kreyenbühl of this being a Gnostic Gospel, whose author (Kreyenbühl proposes to regard the Gnostic Menander as its actual author) occupies the standpoint of Hymenæus and Philetus rather than of Paul. There is no more effective opponent of Gnostic illuminationism, immortality by mystical infusion of divine nature through gnosis, than the fourth evangelist. But it is true that the force of his opposition lies in his absolute loyalty to the Pauline principle that eternal life is attained simply and solely by moral assimilation to the "mind" of Christ. Here the whole emphasis lies upon the word "moral." For the rest the fourth evangelist does take the Greek view rather than the Jewish. It is the very strength of his

case that he assimilates all there is of truth in the position of his opponents. Like Clement after him he might call himself a Christian Gnostic.

Here, then, is the vital point. This evangelist's idea of union with God is not an intellectual, but a moral assimilation. The whole power of his Gospel consists in his having done for Petrine tradition what none of his predecessors had succeeded in doing—infusing it with the Pauline mysticism, the doctrine of moral victory by mystic union with the eternal Christ. The outward elements of Pauline teaching had in some measure penetrated Petrine story even in the Gospel of Mark. But Mark has no trace of the vital thing in Paul, this doctrine of mystic union with Christ, the being "in" him, the living his life, being "conformed to the image," morally first, but physically also, and so participating in Christ's heavenly nature that has shaken off the fetters of sin and death. In the fourth Gospel this is the very essence of the mission of the Redeemer. God gave Him "authority over all flesh that to all whom God gave him he should give eternal life. And this is life eternal that they should know the Father and the Son." But only those who keep His commandments can make this claim. Possession of the Spirit is a witness to the world that God has given those who have it eternal life "and this life is in his Son. He that hath the Son hath the life; he that hath not the Son of God hath not the life" (1 John 5: 10–12). But obedience is the test of gnosis. Those and only those have the life who obey the law of love.

The fourth evangelist never wearies of ringing the changes on this Pauline theme: "This is the life, even the eternal life which was with the Father, and which was manifested to the bearers of the glad tidings."

It is no other than the eternal Logos of God, for all being proceeds from it, and is sustained by it. But it is also the agent of redemption as well as of creation. It is the agent and expression of the God whose nature is love, and reproduces its like. But by its discriminative power in separating good from evil, light from darkness, it is the agent of judgment also. "In the Logos was life, and the life was the light of men, and the light shineth in the darkness, and the darkness overcame it not" (1: 4f.). In Matthean language this would be expressed by saying "the gates of Sheol, the kingdom of darkness in the under-world, did not prevail against it." Paul expresses it in Ephesians by representing the world of sin and death in which we live as the region invaded by the light-hero who leads us forth in triumph to share His resurrection. He quotes an ancient resurrection hymn to apply its imagery to us as "sons of the light" who share the conqueror's victory, "Wherefore he saith, 'Awake, thou that sleepest, and arise from the dead, and the Christ shall shine upon thee!'" (Eph. 2: 1–6; 4: 8–10; 5: 8–14). The figure was classic. Slavonic Enoch xlvi. 2f. shows us how contemporary Jewish apocalypse employed it: "When God shall send a great Light, by means of that there will be judgment to the just and the unjust, and nothing will be concealed." In *Bereshith Rabba* we read: "When they who were bound in Gehinnom saw the light of the Messiah they rejoiced in receiving him, and said: This is he who will lead us out from this darkness." You see the figure was not unknown.

Seeing how completely Paul in Ephesians, and this great writer of Ephesus after Paul have brought to the stage of this present world all that Jewish apocalypse describes as a conflict of the powers of light and

darkness in the infernal regions below and the heavenly above, it is perhaps no more than we should expect if some modern interpreters insist that such verses as John 5: 25, 28f.; 6: 39, 40, 44 must be due to editorial revision, because as they look at the matter, there is no longer room for a "raising up in the last day" when the work of resurrection and judgment has already been completed in this world. But this is to apply our own conception of logic too rigidly to the minds of other men. Almost the same might be said of Paul. Strictly speaking Paul's doctrine of present participation in the eternal life of Christ makes his doctrine of judgment to come, when "we shall all stand before the judgment seat of Christ, that every one may receive according to the deeds done in the body whether they be good or bad," superfluous. Why summon the righteous to hear again a verdict whose blessed fruits they have been enjoying for untold thousands of years? If "this is the judgment, that light is come into the world and men loved darkness rather than light because their deeds were evil," if because they hearkened not to the Son they do not see life, but already the wrath of God abideth on them (3: 19–21, 36), why have a new judgment and a second condemnation at the wind-up of all things?

In strict logic very little room is left for Paul's doctrine of the "manifestation of the sons of God." Even this slight remainder of the old Jewish conception of the final assize might, perhaps, have been dispensed with. But it was not. Paul clings to it loyally as an organic element of Messianism. And the fourth evangelist is no less loyal than Paul. If the old which is ready to pass away still stands side by side with the new which encloses and supersedes it in the epistles of Paul, there is room for something similar in the fourth

Gospel. Moreover the Johannine doctrine of a "raising up in the last day" is by no means wholly superfluous. It is probably true that the Appendix (ch. 21) with its reference to a possible tarrying of the Beloved disciple till the Coming, understands this Coming in a sense more like the Synoptic than that of the Farewell Discourse, where Jesus promises "If I go and prepare a place for you I will come again and receive you unto myself." In the Appendix the writer seems to be occupying the standpoint of Palestinian, Synoptic tradition according to which Christ brings to earth with Him the place which He has prepared, *i. e.* the New Jerusalem which descends from heaven to take the place of that which spiritually is called Sodom and Egypt, a glorified Jerusalem like that seen in vision by Ezekiel and Isaiah, prepared as a bride adorned for her husband. The Beloved disciple might be expected to be of those who are alive and remain and are to be changed, as Paul had taught, "in a moment, in the twinkling of an eye," into the immortal glory-body. In the Farewell Discourse the "place prepared" remains among the "many abodes" of the Father's house. The Christ returns after He has prepared it, not to bring it to His followers, but to bring His followers to it, they having meantime awaited His coming "in the tombs" (5: 28f.). Here the messianic millennial reign in the New Jerusalem is eliminated altogether. The author stands at the opposite extreme from the Palestinian seer who speaks in the name of "John" in the Revelation, and comes very near the standpoint of the Alexandrian Epistle to the Hebrews, where the army of the faithful go to the heavenly city, leaving behind the earthly scenes, in which they had always accounted themselves to be mere strangers and sojourners, realizing that it is not

the visible and tangible world that is really enduring, but "the city that hath the foundations, eternal in the heavens, whose builder and maker is God." Indeed it is hard to distinguish this from the doctrine so obnoxious to Justin Martyr, "that when we die our souls are taken to heaven." The only difference is that the fourth evangelist appears to think of our souls waiting the Coming to go to the heavenly "abode" in a body conducted by the Redeemer, whereas the Pythagoreans (if such be the belief of the heretics denounced by Justin) thought of them as going thither individually at the moment of death; or, perhaps, as Jewish teachers maintained regarding Paradise, carried thither by angels. There is, then, a difference between the conception of the author of the Appendix and that of the evangelist, and I would not exclude the possibility of a retouching of the Gospel here and there by the author who attached the Appendix. I do not see, however, any ground for the objections raised by Wendt and others to the verses above specified, because a "raising up of the dead," both righteous and unrighteous, "in the last day" seems to me the natural complement to what is said in the Farewell chapter about Jesus' coming again to receive His followers "unto himself," after He has "prepared a place for them."

The real difference between the Johannine and the Synoptic doctrine of immortality, even in that later form of Synoptic teaching which tries to incorporate the elements of Pauline doctrine by the method of vision and Bath Kol, lies elsewhere. It lies in complete submergence of the messianic factor embodied in the title Son of David. The conception of a millennial reign in a New Jerusalem, whether for four hundred years, or a thousand years, or "until all his enemies have been made subject unto him," has no

more place. It has become wholly eclipsed behind a purely universal hope in which all distinctions of race disappear behind our common humanity, the hope of departing to be with Him in whose footsteps we have sought to tread. In the Fourth Gospel the Greek conception of an immortality conditioned upon participation in the nature of the immortals has completely triumphed over the Jewish of miraculous resuscitation to share in the joys of a millennial reign. But the evangelist has not surrendered to Gnosticism. The divine nature in which the heir of immortality participates is not some unknown demi-god of ancient myth, heroic perhaps in some features of his story, but marked by human frailty in others; it is the nature of the risen Christ. And the union is not effected by ritual practice, by ascetic distinctions of food or occupation. It is not effected by culture of the intellectual nature or by mystical illumination. It is a moral union effected by the consecration of the will. It is a union of soul with the Creator and Father of all, but by no other road than that of the suffering Servant, "who humbled himself, and took upon him the form of a slave, and became obedient unto death, yea, even the death of the cross." It is because of this spirit of obedience "unto death" that God also hath "highly exalted him, and given unto him the name which is above every name, that in the name of Jesus every knee should bow, and that every tongue should confess that he is LORD, to the glory of God the Father."

XI

IMMORTALITY IN MOHAMMEDANISM

DUNCAN BLACK MACDONALD

IN Mohammedanism the idea of immortality is exceedingly hard to treat as a separate rubric. The fact of immortality runs through the whole religion and dominates all its theologies; but it is so taken for granted that it is not expressed in any well-known terminology. The theologians speak of the Resurrection, meaning of the body, and of the abiding in the Garden and in the Fire; but they handle the abstract, unceasing, continuance of the soul only when they are forced to deal with materialists, Pantheists or metapsychosists. The nature of the soul falls, for them, more naturally under ethics than metaphysics; its "how" is more important than its essence. Hence I fear you will find my present treatment far from systematic. It will pass over many questions which you would naturally expect me to discuss, and it will wander into many fields where you will equally naturally regard me, starting with such a subject, as a devious intruder. I will try to mention immortality at least every five minutes; but how devious I could be, and that not illegitimately, I trust you will understand when I say that I have been in doubt whether to begin or to end with the influence of Moslem eschatology on the mind of Dante. But, perhaps, after all, I had better begin with the influence of the mind of Mohammed on the eschatology of Islam.

In all the great historical religions there is a central, personal reality surrounded by instigating, modifying and developing influences, real and unreal, subjective and objective, and our difficulty in reaching an historical view of each religion lies in separating the central fact, psychological or material, from its environment. With regard to some religions we cannot but despair of ever accomplishing this. We have not, nor do I believe can we ever have, the materials to reconstruct the ideas and aspirations of the Mosaic or the Abrahamic worlds. The Christian world came into being in full history, and in some future time we can hope to see its origins laid clear and open, although at present, in the dust and hammering of reconstruction, the circumstantial looms more largely than the central. In contrast to both, the beginnings of the world of Islam lie in peculiar ambiguity. In one way its beginnings are documented with more historical certainty than even those of Christianity; but on another side a great part of the materials for its history is involved in the highest doubt and can be used only on subjective criteria; while there is especially an unillumined two centuries of development—following immediately the assured fact of the Koran—where we grope in a darkness of tendentious materials and subjective guesses.

Under these conditions we are always forced back in the end to Mohammed himself, as his mind is laid out before us in the Koran. In spite of uncritical and possibly, in details, intentional editing it is trustworthy throughout, and it gives us access to the central fact of Islam, the personality and religious experience of the Prophet. It is the attitude, then, of that personality toward the idea of immortality which I must now put before you. Thereafter will follow develop-

ments in later Islam; but the imprint of the Prophet himself was never effaced.

To Mohammed immortality was not an idea to be discussed; it was a fact to be accepted. Like the people surrounding him he was a frank animist,[1] in the sense of being an intuitive acceptor of a spirit world behind this in which we move. As part of it he accepted the existence, for each man, of a certain specific entity which we can conveniently call the soul, although he was hard put to it to find a suitable term. Semitic antiquity and contemporary Arab usage furnished him with two words but each was difficult. His "soul" was absolutely real; was individual, spiritual, abiding, and was the link between each man and the spiritual world; in the last analysis, the link with God. It could choose good or evil; could believe or disbelieve; could give itself to God or to Satan. God had made it with tendencies in these two directions. It is in the body but not of the body. The body is entirely material, clay of clay; but the soul, ultimately and mysteriously, comes from God. It, with all human life, is of the breath of God, and man is made in the image of God. To express such an idea Mohammed had the terms *nafs* and *rūḥ;* their exact equivalents exist in Hebrew and gave almost as much trouble to the advanced Hebrew thinkers as their Arabic forms to Mohammed. *Nafs* in its essence is an aspect of the idea of selfhood; a *nafs* is a "self." But it is not the spiritual aspect of the "self," but the "self" as it grasps at things, desires them, has an appetite for them. Using scholastic language, it might be called the appetitive soul. It has close kinship, therefore, to the ψοχή and is often practically

[1] See on this further, S. M. Zwemer, *The Influence of Animism in Islam.*

equivalent to our "the flesh," in such usages as "the temptations of the flesh." In that it goes beyond *ψοχικός* if *ψοχικός* means only "emotional, sensuous"—as the tendency seems now to translate it—for the *nafs* can be specifically sensual and must be sharply broken from its false cravings. The second word, *rūḥ*, should be the equivalent of *πνεῦμα* in its Hebraistic and New Testament usage; but either our conception of that usage is to be modified, or *rūḥ* for Arab antiquity and for Islam meant and means something different.[2] It is the old question of the nature of "spirit," a question round which the whole history of philosophy might be written. Is "spirit" essentially opposed to "matter," or is it merely highly refined matter, a phase of the material? It is evident that *rūḥ* for Mohammed was a puzzle; Christian and Jewish ideas had confused the primitive Arab conception; but for his contemporaries and for the most orthodox Islam since his time it was and is a phase of the material. It indicates the world of spirits, of angels, jinn, Satans, the invisible world, "the Unseen" of our occultists; but still it is material. Only Allah himself is spirit in our sense; but Arabic and Islam have no positive term by which to render that sense of spirit. You can say in Arabic that Allah is not this and is not that, but you cannot say in Arabic that Allah is a spirit.[3] If you attempt it you will produce a blasphemy at which all orthodox Moslems will stop their ears in horror. But both Mohammed and later

[2] In connection with my article "From the Arabian Nights to Spirit," in the *Moslem World* for October, 1919, Professor F. C. Burkitt reminded me that Hatch, in his essays on Biblical Greek, held that *πνεῦμα* in John, "however subtle, is still material."

[3] Of course the later scholastics made up contrasting phrases to express this idea but the plain mind viewed them with disapproval.

Islam did not hesitate to apply *nafs* to the human soul, and later Islam came to use *rūḥ* very much as a synonym. Yet so far as the evidence of the Koran is concerned Mohammed did not so use *rūḥ*. In the Koran it has always angelic and divine associations, and it is plain that Mohammed felt himself in difficulty as to its meaning and resented too close questioning on the subject. One, and I think the best, interpretation of Koran xvii, 87, makes Allah tell him to reply to such questions, "The *rūḥ* is my Lord's affair"—and not yours! But when he used *nafs* of the soul this evidently meant nothing as to materiality; he was simply using the vocabulary which he found at hand and which seemed to meet his need. Later orthodox Islam, however, felt tied down by it to a theory of the soul which Mohammed himself would probably have rejected.

Fortunately Mohammed was not an orthodox Moslem; also he was a most disjointed and chaotic thinker. The emotional reality of his faith was so great that the systematic expression of it counted for little with him. At fundamental paradoxes he never hesitated; he stated their two equally valid sides and left them there. Yet, I do not think that he saw them as paradoxes. They were two separate conclusions in his mind, one of which he held at one time and under certain circumstances, and the other at another time and under other circumstances, and in his mind they never collided. A logician might say that his feeling for disparate conclusions was very wide. And perhaps the greatest of these *paradoxa a-paradoxa,* if I may coin such a term, was the relation of God to man. On one side his religious position had led him to open a really impassable gulf between the two. The name for the Deity which he had chosen had become confused in the Arab mind

with all manner of polytheistic and animistic syncretisms. This is not the place to enter upon the goddesses who were the daughters of Allah and who linked Allah up with tribal deities and stone and star worship, or upon the jinn who were the kindred of Allah and linked him up with the fear, if not the worship, of Nature and of the wild. From all that Mohammed had to cut free. His new conception of the old Allah was Hebrew and Christian; but laid enormously greater stress on the transcendence of God. He could not risk the Wordsworthian pantheism on the verge of which the old Hebrews had trembled, nor the immanence which the Christian theologians had expressed in the doctrine of the Trinity. His Allah must be entirely apart from the world, the Creator from the Created. We can almost hear an echo in the Koran of the Arian hymns, "there was when it (the Creation) was not." In the absoluteness of this conception Mohammed revelled with a divine intoxication. A dialectic necessity had become a spiritual obsession.

But, on the other hand, the basis of all his Faith was his personal experience. God had revealed Himself to him and he had been able to receive the revelation. The human spirit, then, could meet and know the Divine. Not, observe, the prophetic spirit, but the human spirit. Mohammed had no delusion of greatness and of difference in himself. He held firmly to his dignity and rights as the Messenger sent by Allah to the Arabs; but he was sent because he was a human being, "sent of flesh to flesh." All human beings, by their created nature, are capable of prophecy, and all human beings do, as a matter of fact, at some time or other, enter into contact with the Divine. We may not all be sent with a message to others; but we can all know God for ourselves. The developments from this

on the part of Moslem mystics have been of the widest; for Mohammed, his personal experience led him to a fundamental spiritual fact.

For Mohammed, then, and for all Islam after him, there is a something in the nature of man capable of intercourse with the Divine. This fact was accepted and used by Mohammed without examination and without question; it has been the problem of later Islam to adjust the fact to theological system, and that has been done in different ways. To this something in human nature Mohammed applied the word *nafs*, one of the two terms I have already described to you. He implied that the other term, *rūḥ*, exists also in man because God breathed into man some of His *rūḥ* (Kor. xv, 29; xxxii, 8; xxxviii, 72). In old Arabic *rūḥ* meant apparently and in the first instance, "breath."[4] These terms were all that he had, and he used them much as the early Christians used inadequate or misleading Greek words. But he was also aided by the Jewish and Christian stories of man's creation, fall and possible salvation. With this connected, further, a doctrine of evil spirits, which suggests to us the Miltonic universe far more than that of either the Old Testament or the New.

God has created man as a symmetrical being. On his physical symmetry Mohammed is never tired of enlarging; it is part of the evidence in the vast analogy of nature for the power and the beneficence of God. But his soul also is symmetrical, and here Mohammed shows himself as an ethical genius handling the great paradoxes of life. God has made it of balanced good and evil; or, more exactly, He has instilled into it opposing instincts. That man is also in the image of God and that his life is given him by the very breath

[4] In old Arabic you blow a fire with your *rūḥ*.

of God came for Mohammed from the chaos of Biblical stories fermenting in his brain and did not modify this assured perception which he had reached personally, of the ethical struggle in man's soul. These Biblical pictures expressed admirably for Mohammed the difference between man and the lower animals; they made possible the assured fact of contact between God and man, and were in the sequel to give a point of departure for the speculations of all types of mystical theologians. But let me remind you in all this that while such phrases were working in Mohammed's mind and acting as stimuli and suggestions, the essential basis for him was his own experience and the conclusions to which his own observation of the facts of life had forced him. So now he saw the soul of man, here in the world, facing its eternal destiny, with a kinship to God, vague yet real, but also open to the influences, "whisperings" the Koran calls them, from the Evil One. And here Mohammed linked up with a very confused demonology; he found it confused and he did not disentangle it, and it is confused in Islam to this day. Shortly it may be put thus: Along with man and the angels and the jinn there exists another family of intelligent beings, the Head of which is called Iblīs, pretty evidently derived from διάβολος, and all the members of which are called Satans, used as a descriptive term. Whether these are a sub-class of the jinn or are fallen angels the Koran is in doubt, and with it Islam. They are spirits, immortal and evil; but although they, like the jinn, come under the plan of salvation, only the most eccentric Moslems have conceived that they could repent and be saved.[5] They are, there-

[5] There is a single exception. According to tradition Mohammed met a great grandson of Iblīs, accepted him as a Moslem and taught him various chapters of the Koran.

fore, under the curse of Allah and Moslems may curse them. Most orthodox Moslems do so; but, in all strictness, they may be required in the inquisition at the Last Day to give a reason why they have done so. Ever since the historic scene in the Garden of Eden, when Adam and his wife ate of the forbidden fruit, there has been a wager between Allah and Iblīs. Of the real meaning of that story in Genesis Mohammed had no idea; he took it and handled it as did Milton. The upshot is that God and the Devil are at war for the souls of men. God leads them aright through personal illumination of their separate souls—the Vision of the mystic—and by historical revelations through accredited messengers; and the Devil leads them astray through assiduous "whisperings" working on their twy-nature. According to the Koran the Devil has good hopes of getting them all before the Day of Judgment. There are other stories current in Islam to explain man's essential tendency toward evil, stories which corrupt or at least confuse the simple reality of Mohammed's own idea. It is deduced from a passage in the Koran (iii, 31) that Iblīs touches every infant at birth and thus infects him with evil. The only infants who have escaped this have been Mary and her son Jesus; Mohammed himself was purified from such evil at an early age. A more realistic legend tells how Adam and his wife were induced to eat one of the Satanic house and of how, in consequence, evil runs now in the veins of men with their blood. Mohammed would have smiled at such childishness; like the Old Testament he traced man's evil back to his created nature.

So the stage is set for the great drama on earth; the closing scene of which will be the final Judgment with its endless weal or woe. The Arabs to whom Mo-

hammed preached seem to have been accustomed to the idea of some kind of continuation of the personality after physical death. There is much evidence that they held, as did the Hebrews in general, that the whole individual was buried in the grave and continued a kind of life there. You will remember how existence in the grave is described in Job 14: 22, "Only his flesh upon him has pain and his soul within him mourneth." Exactly so in tradition Mohammed says, or is made to say, "A dead man is pained in his grave just as a living man in his house." In Hebrew this is often combined with the quite different idea of Sheol; but we do not find anything analogous to Sheol with the Arabs of Mohammed's time. It was not necessary, therefore, for Mohammed to demonstrate that the soul continued to exist after physical death. But it was necessary for him to demonstrate to his somewhat cynical contemporaries that it was their business to prepare for this existence; that it was not a negligible thing to be faced by all and the same for all, a shadow of life, a life that was not living; that there would come to each man a Judgment and that for that Judgment there would be a Resurrection of the entire man, body and soul. Beyond the two ideas of Judgment and Resurrection Mohammed does not seem to have formulated his belief as to the state of the soul after death. The old Semitic Life in Death in the individual grave seems to have dominated him to the end. Islam has added many vain imaginings, and a great part of its literature of edification deals with eschatology. That literature is full of the wildest and crassest contradictions, and from the evidently tendentious traditions of which it consists, the most opposed systems have been constructed. It has been found possible to demonstrate that all who have had the slightest believing rela-

tion to Islam and its Prophet will be saved, and also that the saved will consist of a small minority of belligerent ascetics who have combined a scholastically exact creed with a scrupulous adherence to the details of the canon law and a complete ignoring of the claims of human ties. But the theologians have recognized that these were pious opinions and were not to be held as of faith, and the more exact and systematic a treatise on theology is, the less space it gives to such matters. I shall follow their example, although I am fully conscious how much picturesqueness this course excludes. As a separate subject the devout eschatology of Islam would be a most interesting study in popular psychology.

I return, then, to Mohammed, face to face with his Arabs. Up to a certain point, as we have seen, he and they held the same view as to the situation after death. But while, for them, after a man was dead, there was nothing more to be hoped or feared, for him the whole future was dominated by moral earnestness and reality. God was ruling and working here and God would rule and judge hereafter. It was the business of man to prepare for that Judgment and to flee from that wrath to come. He could do so by submission to Allah and by acceptance of the message sent to him through Allah's messenger, the Prophet. That message was of warning and guidance; warning to arouse one's self to the real situation in the world—Mohammed has much to say about "reality," translated mostly "truth," in our versions of the Koran—and to enter into and follow the straight road, trodden by those to whom Allah had been gracious, those who had escaped his wrath and had not gone astray. Over all Mohammed's preaching the thunders of that Dies Iræ rolled. The terrors of the Judgment, the horrors of the Fire, the

joys of the Garden—all these he painted over and over again. This life is fleeting; the life of the world to come is abiding; Allah himself is the only reality; he rules and will rule. There is no escaping him; his judgments can be seen already in this world, and the final Day will crown them. Thereafter all will be over; the damned will abide eternally in the Fire and the blessed in Paradise, and Allah will be all in all.

Such, in broad outlines, was Mohammed's position upon the soul of man in its conflicts here and its final fate hereafter. But there remains much detail, some of which I must attempt to fill in. It will often be hard, in what follows, to distinguish between what was fully in the mind of Mohammed and that which was there only, in a sense, subconsciously; between what was a legitimate development and systematization of Mohammed's thought and the purely arbitrary superstructures of theologians. These last usually, or always, have as their basis some Koranic expression or other, a bit of free imaginative phrasing on Mohammed's part, but separated by them from its context and grotesquely wrested to form part of a system.

Let me put before you first an example of this latter method of development, which may be called theological fiction from its likeness to the legal fiction of constructive lawyers. In Koran vii, 44–46 there is a little picture of a company called "the people of al-A'rāf," or "the Heights," who look down from their "Heights" on both heaven and hell, expressing their desire for the one and their horror of the other and pronouncing on both the sentence of God. This statement of mine is a great deal clearer than the broken and enigmatic Arabic of the Koran which could hardly be rendered exactly. There is more, too, in the context, to which I can only refer you, which suggests to

me that the germ in Mohammed's mind was the picture in the parable of Dives and Lazarus, with its view of heaven and hell and of the uncrossable gulf between. It was exactly in this way that Mohammed was affected by, rather than consciously used, his vague scriptural memories. But Islam, having no such explanation open to it, has been of a divided mind. Earlier Islam saw in these people certain Judges whom Allah associated with himself in the final Assize—it is strange how even the most orthodox Islam has laboured to escape in one way or another from the limitation which it, itself, lays down, that all Judgment on that Day shall belong to Allah alone—and thus regarded them as prophets and early Caliphs, or as Prophets and the Twelve Imams, or as martyrs and Ṣūfī saints, accordingly as Sunnites or Shi'ites or mystics were the exegetes. But later Islam, at least from the time of al-Ghazzali (d. A. D. 1111), has struck out a bolder doctrine which if not now absolutely dominant is tenable for the most orthodox Moslem. It is that with which you are all familiar in Poe's early little poem, "Al-Aaraaf." These are souls abiding in eternal rest, remote equally from the active, positive joys of Heaven and from the pains of Hell, beings imperfect as to good works, having no claim upon Allah, but too good for the Fire.—You will remember the classic judgment of Andrew Fairservice in "Rob Roy," "Ower bad for blessing and ower guid for banning."—The doctrine is of a natural growth but it belongs to a dying down of the first rigours of a faith and to the coming into play of combined sentiment and reason. Exactly the same development has led to the limbo of the Roman theology, whether "limbus infantum" or "limbus patrum." In the Church of Islam it has come to be a perfectly orthodox and almost a dominant doc-

trine. But it was very far from the mind of Mohammed. His, rather, would have been the judgment of Patmos on the Church of Laodicea. "Because thou art . . . neither hot nor cold, I will spew thee out of my mouth." It is a case, as I have said, of theological fiction in the most extreme form. We shall see, hereafter, the working to somewhat the same effect of the doctrine of the mercy of Allah; but that is another doctrine entirely.

Another development, but this time quite according to the mind of Mohammed, was the doctrine of the Vision of Allah in Paradise. There are many phrases in the Koran which speak of the Face of Allah. In some of these the meaning is evidently, just as in the similar Hebrew and Greek phrases, Allah himself; but in others we are left with the feeling that the words are to be taken more literally and that the force of the picture requires the face, in its primary sense, just as in the prayer to "lift up the light of Thy countenance upon us." Further I think that there is evidence that the text (Matt. 18: 10), which says of the "angels" of children that they "do always behold the face of my Father who is in heaven" haunted the mind of Mohammed, like so many other disjointed fragments held in his memory. There has grown up, therefore, in Islam a doctrine that the recompense in Paradise will be twofold. There will be, first, the ordinary system of rewards for good conduct and obedience in life—ritual, canonical, theological, which is described so often and fully in the Koran. To this Allah is, in a sense, bound by the terms of his bargain with men; it is specifically promised in the Koran to those who fulfill certain conditions. But it was very early felt, and, I think, by Mohammed himself, that this did not at all meet the case of the especially chosen of Allah, of those

Saints of his who are, in the Moslem expression, "near" to him, whose lives upon earth have been lived in his presence and to whom the Garden itself, if without that presence of Allah, would mean little or nothing. All consideration of mysticism in Islam—let me here throw in—must be guided by this conception of the religious life as a "nearness" to God; the saint, in Islam, is not, as in our word, *sanctus*, a holy man; but one of the court of heaven here for a time on earth. Orthodox Islam has, therefore, formulated that there is a second recompense in Paradise for those fitted to enjoy it, which will consist in the Beatific Vision of Allah. The specific basis for this doctrine consists of an allusion in a passage of the Koran (lxxv, 23) and certain alleged traditions from Mohammed. Such traditions are, as you know, in high disrepute at present with the critical student of Islam; but in this case they give, I feel tolerably sure, if not the words, at least the mind, of Mohammed. Although the doctrine itself is not directly mentioned in the Koran, a couple of Koranic texts were early quoted in its support (Kor. x, 27; lv, 46, 60; lvi, 23–25; lxxxiii, 15) and when it was assailed on the rationalistic ground that, inasmuch as Allah is not in any place nor in space at all, the laws of vision cannot apply to him; a very odd grammatico-scholastic defense was found in yet another Koranic text (viii, 139). In the end, the doctrine, while accepted by all orthodox Islam, was brought under the technical rubric of *bilā kayfa,* "without how." That is, we must accept the doctrine as fact although we cannot explain its nature—must not, indeed, attempt to do so. It is, therefore, for Islam a theological mystery to the reality of which, in spite of its inexplicability, Moslems have been driven by the facts of their religious experience. In exactly the same way the facts of ex-

perience drive us all to the acceptance of a relationship between the mind and the body, while philosophy, and even modern psychology, have no answer as to the nature of that relationship. Yet they have seldom the candour to call it a philosophical mystery. I lay some stress upon this, not for the sake of a cheap jibe at the psychology before which we all, at present, fall down and worship, but to show that the theological positions of Islam have a genuine foundation in experience and have been and can be defended in accordance with the laws of analogy.

Yet another development was required by unresolved elements in the statements of Mohammed himself. In the descriptions in the Koran of the Garden and the Fire their inhabitants are regularly described as "abiding" in them. This expression Islam has all but universally understood to refer to an eternal abiding. It was left for mediæval scholasticism to point out that the root "to abide" does not necessarily connote eternity; but this, which strongly resembles the arguments we all know about æonial life in the New Testament, has not met with favour. Mohammed, it has been felt, while he believed in a very emphatic hell, believed also that those in it would remain in it to all eternity. But Mohammed had also a very Pauline doctrine of Faith, and managed to combine it with a very Petrine doctrine of Works. There were also greater sins and lesser sins, though the greater sins, in Islam, have never assumed the importance which mortal sin bears in the Roman theology. There is, too, the justice of Allah; but this side of Allah's character bears very little stress in the Koran. Even Mohammed seems to have felt that it would limit the absoluteness of Allah, as Fate limited Zeus, and to have shrunk instinctively from such conceptions. Similarly, he

never associated "reason" with Allah and later Islam has formally forbidden such a descriptive. Then there are the threats and promises of Allah; these he must keep by his very dignity as absolute ruler; his promises absolutely, his threats as modified by his clemency. Finally, there is the Mercy of Allah—reiterated over and over—certainly Allah's most prominent characteristic after his absoluteness of Unity and Will.

These elements, then, had to be reconciled in some fashion. It is not my business here to enter on the Moslem doctrines of Salvation, of Faith and Works, of Predestination and Free Will. My present point is that a doctrine of purgatory was required in Islam and that it duly appeared. Mohammed himself had not, I think, reached any such idea; but the complex of facts which he recognized led to it of necessity. The result for Islam has been that while "the People of the Fire" are the specifically and finally lost, the Fire will have also, for a time, other inhabitants to whom it will be Purgatory and who will eventually leave it and be admitted to the Garden. These are Moslems who have died guilty of some "great" sin of which they have not repented. As Moslems they cannot abide in the Fire; as unrepentant sinners they must be purified before they enter into the Garden.

That is the broad principle; but a multitude of qualifying possibilities enter. First, the Mercy of Allah, upon which there are no limits of justice or consistency, may pardon and cleanse even a great, and in his life unrepentant, sinner and pass him straight into the Garden. This unlimited Mercy and irresponsible Will of Allah were so stressed by one quite orthodox school that another equally orthodox school said that on these premises there was no reason why in the end all the sinners should not be in the Garden and all the believers

in the Fire. Secondly, the doctrine of early Arabia that the dead man, combined body and soul, inhabited his grave as in life he had his house was joined to the doctrine of the double judgment, as developed in the Christian Church; that is, of a lesser judgment of the individual at death, and of a greater judgment of all men together after the Resurrection at the Last Day. These two apparently most separate ideas produced, when brought together, the Moslem doctrine of the Punishment of the Grave. It is that the dead man is visited in his grave, on the night after his burial, by two angels who catechize him as to his Faith. If his answers are satisfactory he rests thereafter in his grave until the general resurrection, receiving a foretaste of the joys of Paradise. But if his answers are not satisfactory his grave becomes a place of torment, an anticipation of what awaits him in the Fire. But in this punishment of the grave it is possible that, if he was a believer, he may work out his purgatorial period and may, after the general judgment, be admitted directly to the Garden.

Thirdly, there entered, in gradually extending width, the doctrine of Intercession. This doctrine Mohammed had known and had rejected. For him it had been an illegitimate interference with the Will and choice of Allah. Especially as to the final fates of men must that Will be left unswayed by external influences. But later Islam has thought otherwise, and exercising its right to develop doctrine by Agreement, it has overridden the expressed word of the Koran and ascribed a power, and even right, of intercession to all men who by any chance stand in special relation to Allah, to Saints, Prophets and especially to Mohammed himself. Because of this, at one extreme, the smaller sins of a dead man may be removed by doles of food at

his funeral—the poor, and among them, certainly, some "near" to Allah, will make intercession for him —and at the other extreme, at the Day of Judgment itself, the Prophet himself will intercede for his whole People and lead them all, and as a whole, into the Garden. This is the Moslem Harrowing of Hell and marks the most complete overthrow of the Koranic doctrine of the Judgment. For, in the Koran, the Judgment is specifically Christian, in that it is individual and not by peoples or religious communities. Each man is to be judged by himself, on Allah's system of bookkeeping and weighing, and must answer for himself. He has sent before him good deeds to be put to his credit and evil deeds to be registered against him. He has been attended by angels who have written down the details of his conduct to be filed in the heavenly archives. He has made good business with his life or is a bankrupt in the eyes of Allah. The soul (*nafs*), given to him, he has purified or corrupted and it, that is he himself, must testify for and against himself. None can help him or intercede for him; by himself he must stand or fall. At the most he can appeal to the Mercy of Allah. "But for the Mercy of Allah," the Prophet said, or is made to say in a tradition, and this tradition is for my subjectivity psychologically probable, "not even I shall enter the Garden." It is plain how utterly opposed all this is to the triumphal procession of Mohammed into Paradise at the head of his People; so complete has been the victory of the solidarity of Islam over the ethical faith of its Prophet.

But all this time you have probably been waiting for me to deal with those supposed burning questions, "Does woman have any soul in Islam; and what is her position in the Garden?" The answer must be a little complicated. There cannot be the slightest doubt that

on the point of salvability Mohammed put both men and women on the same footing; women, for him, had a soul to be saved; although I think that he felt also that it would take a good deal of saving. But it is equally plain that in his picture in the Koran of the life in the Garden human women play no part; it is an entirely masculine Paradise. Where, then, are the believing women? The Koran does not tell us, and even the standard collections of traditions, containing those regarded as most authentic, have very little on the subject. There is more in such collections as deal with eschatology; but the fact is that Mohammed, and after him, the general body of Moslems, did not and do not like the subject and consider it only when driven by technical necessity. Yet Moslem writers and even theologians, as you probably know, are by no means squeamish in discussing the most intimate relations between men and women. Their literature like their Paradise is masculine. What, then, is the explanation of this reticence, first in Mohammed and later among Moslems in general? I can only make guesses, but I would risk the following. You will remember a passage in which Montaigne (Essais, Livre III, chap. 5) explains the attitude of respect which his code required him to maintain toward his wedded wife. It was an attitude which, to our mind, must have kept her a good deal outside of his intimate life. Montaigne, perhaps, was not a conspicuous example of Christianity; but his attitude was not, I think, individual in his time, and it goes a good way to make real to us, and graspable by us, the attitude of Moslems of honour toward their women of honour. It means not only a code which forbids, but also an attitude which shrinks from considering and which takes for granted. Montaigne's own statement was an infringement of it and an illus-

tration of the Pepys-like frankness of his Essais. This conception, as you will of course see, is vital to the status of women in Islam, and indeed in the whole East; but I cannot pursue it further here.

Again, you may remember the deceased old lady who came back through Mrs. Piper and testified that her new surroundings were "more secular" than she had expected. That is essentially the way in which the Paradise of the Koran strikes us; it is distinctly more secular than our current notions of heaven. Also it is more masculine, and, although we are accustomed to hearing Islam called a "masculine religion," this seems a rather violent extension. But the Paradise of the Koran and of Islam is—I do not speak here of the super-ecstatics of the mystics—simply the secular and masculine world of Moslems rather touched up, of course, as to its enjoyments. It is an idealized, glorified reflection of the social life of the Moslem men, into which their women of honour never in the slightest enter. Naturally when that life was expressed *sub specie eternitatis,* these women could have no part in the picture. How much evil this has meant for Islam I need hardly say. And the evil lies at Mohammed's own door. For the old life of Arabia, like the present-day life of the unsophisticated desert, was far more favourable to the easy social intercourse of men and women of good reputation. It would be difficult to construct a picture of pre-Moslem Arabia, in which such intercourse did not play a large part. And the matter goes farther. The early Moslems themselves observed a marked degeneration in the sexual life of Islam from that of the old pre-Moslem life. We can ourselves see the same reflected in the surviving literature. Rough and violent as the old life was—no more a beautiful life than our own ages of chivalry—it was

clean in thought and expression compared with that of Islam. The exclusion of respectable women from public social intercourse had its inevitable consequences, and that exclusion must be traced back to Mohammed himself. And it is that attitude which we see reflected in the pictures of Paradise in the Koran. But, again, as I said above, I can only touch on this subject here. An informed and honest History of Woman under Islam has still to be written.

But there is another side of the matter upon which I must enter because it has led already to an enormous amount of confusion. There is much evidence that amongst Turks, at least, and these not only of the uneducated masses, women are regarded as not having souls, at any rate on the same footing as men. This idea can be traced in European descriptions of the East, at least back to Lady Mary Wortley Montague (Letters, Everyman ed., pp. 140, 175). Her testimony admits the souls but surrounds them with qualifications. This will, probably, be more than confirmed by every missionary at the present day to the Turks. I have had such confirmation myself from several. Further, according to Lady Mary Montague, the future status of women in Paradise is connected with child-bearing, and this is confirmed by some of the few traditions in Arabic on the subject. We have, in fact, an echo of 1 Timothy 2: 15 as to women being saved through child-bearing, which, in turn, goes back to Genesis 3: 15, 16.[6] Others connect that status with the standing of the woman in the eyes of her husband in this world. Generally, I fear that Islam does not regard

[6] I need not say that I know the modern interpretation—to come safely *through* child-bearing (Moffat, Weymouth, etc.)—but I cannot accept it. It ignores the, to me certain, reference to Genesis.

the old maid—such few as it has—with favour, and does not assign her any high rank in the Garden. Finally, no Moslem theologian would dream of denying that women have souls, of exactly the same kind as men, and in exactly the same degree as men. The attitude of the Turks is probably a lingering relic of their pre-Moslem beliefs; there are many such contradictory survivals in the syncretisms of Islam.

But even after all this, the Moslems were left with that fundamental, philosophical question, "What is Spirit?" Into the ultimate developments to which that question led them, I cannot possibly enter. It would conduct us through all the forms of mysticism and into all the phases of Pantheism. It might bring us out into a Nirvana, where the individual vanishes entirely in the One, or into multitudinous Paradises, each the dream of its inhabitant. In avoiding such complications I hold by the clue of possible orthodoxy —what can a Moslem hold as answer to that question and still remain within the pale of normal Islam?

For Moslems the most absolute division of all existent things is into the Creator and his Creation. But what does this mean as to the difference between these two? Going beyond the question of *origin*, a gulf of fundamental *nature* had to be fixed. So the Moslem world passed, in its conception of Allah, the Creator, from a crass anthropomorphism to a vague and imaginative spiritualization, while its conception of the created world in all its parts—the solid earth, mankind in body and soul, the jinn, the Satans and the Angels—remained material, of one density or another. To this view, spirit was only breath—a highly tenuous matter. But, in spite of our modern occultists who assert that the soul of man weighs between two ounces and two ounces and a half, even Islam found itself unable, in

the long run, to maintain this materiality. The phenomena of thought, the experiences of religious emotion, the working of dreams convinced Moslem thinkers that there was in themselves a something akin to the Deity, if dependent upon the Deity, and absolutely different from their bodies. Their conception, too, of the nature of God expanded; an existence apart from space and from time entered their possibilities; "spirit" in the philosophical sense was reached. To their idea of God, thus clarified and made more precise, their idea of man had to be adjusted.

But, naturally, all Moslems could not and did not follow this development. Among ourselves the conception of spirit as highly attenuated matter is not, I fear, quite extinct, and the "etheric body," of which we hear now, probably owes some of its popularity to its freedom from metaphysical strain on the powers of thought. Among Moslem theologians the spirituality of spirit was taught by al-Ghazzali, at the end of the eleventh and the beginning of the twelfth centuries A. D.; but even then only in tractates intended for theological specialists. The absolute anthropomorphist remained—and still remains—for whom God was a gigantic man in the sky, and even the scholastic theologians who passed beyond such crudities declined to admit that the soul of man could be spirit in the same sense that God is spirit. For al-Ghazzali himself, however, man's spirit was derived from God and was the link between him and God. It is thus similar to God, though I doubt whether he would have said that it is the same as God. We are back at the old and vital distinction between ὁμοιούσιος and ὁμοούσιος. The category of space does not apply to the spirit of man any more than it applies to God, just as you cannot predicate knowledge or ignorance of a stone. On this

new view of the spirit of man the difference between it and God consists in the dependence of man's spirit upon God. This is what the Koran means when it says that Allah breathed into man some of his spirit and what the tradition means when it says that man was created in the image of Allah.

I have little question that in this al-Ghazzali reached what was really the mind of Mohammed, although Mohammed had not worked out his thought into clarity even for himself. Mohammed's own spiritual experience had been far too real and vivid to leave him in any doubt that there was an abiding connection between the soul and God. His polemic against polytheism might drive him to expressions which describe a God afar off; but he knew that God was working in his own heart and was nearer to him than breathing and than life itself.

In consequence, the position of al-Ghazzali has become a possible one to-day for the orthodox Moslem. Wahhabites may violently protest; scholastics may quibble and except; canonists may fear and doubt; the spirituality of the spirit is on its way to acceptance in Islam. And with it there has entered a threefold view of the nature of the world to come—of both the Garden and the Fire. Their pleasures and pains will vary according to the development of their inhabitants. For those whose physical natures only have been developed these will be of the senses; you remember, of course, that the resurrection of the flesh, for Islam, is literal; it is a natural and not a spiritual body which enters eternity. But there will be also, for those who have reached that degree, pleasures and pains produced by the picturing faculty in the imagination. We know how real these can be in dreaming. But in the world to come they will be continuous and under the control

of the will. This is the meaning of a tradition from the Prophet. "In the Garden there is a market where pictures (*ṣuwar*) are sold." And, third, the physical descriptions in the Koran can also be interpreted in terms of the reason, just as a dream interpreter deduces general ideas from the concrete details of the dream, which a dreamer asks him to explain. Thus the joys of Paradise can be turned into intellectual pleasures for those whose only true joys are those of the mind. For it is of the essence of Paradise that every man should find in it what he desires.

And these joys and pains, whatever their nature, will never cease, for the Garden and the Fire, with their inhabitants, continue eternally. Orthodox Islam definitely rejects any winding up of the whole matter by a sweeping out of existence of the creation. Some extreme heretical, mostly mystical, sects sought an escape from their difficulties by such a *tabula rasa* that would leave Allah throned alone as he had been before he made the worlds. But the instinct of Islam evidently felt that the continuing existence of the creation was as pressing a necessity as the existence of Allah himself. That is the end of it all—the Garden and the Fire and Allah continuing unchanged and unchangeable to all eternity.

XII

LIFE AFTER DEATH

E. Hershey Sneath

ONE cannot study the history of religions without being profoundly impressed by the fact that belief in the soul's survival after death seems to be almost universal. So eminent an authority as Sir James Frazer says: "The question whether our conscious personality survives after death has been answered by almost all races of men in the affirmative. On this point sceptical or agnostic peoples are nearly, if not wholly, unknown."[1] The antiquity of the belief is especially impressive. In a recent work on *Spiritism and the Cult of the Dead in Antiquity*[2] Professor Paton calls attention to the fact, that "The Paleolithic cave-dwellers of the Quarternary period in Belgium and France were contemporary with the mammoth, the cave-lion, and the cave-bear. Their skulls show that they were nearer the apes than any existing race of man. They were dressed in skins, and armed only with the rudest undressed stone implements; yet they placed with their dead ornaments, tools, arms, and food for use in the other life, and celebrated funeral feasts in their honour." He also says, "The same was true of the cave-dwellers of the Neolithic age.[3] . . . In the Neolithic caves of France the

[1] Frazer, *The Belief in Immortality*, London, 1913, Vol. I, p. 33.
[2] Paton, *Spiritism and the Cult of the Dead in Antiquity*, N. Y., 1921, pp. 2–3.
[3] D'Alviella, *Hibbert Lectures*, pp. 14–19.

skulls of the dead are trepanned. Whether this was intended to facilitate the entrance and egress of the spirit or to make an amulet for the survivors, it bears witness to some sort of cult of the dead. In the Neolithic caves of Palestine, that were inhabited by a pre-Semitic race, offerings of food and drink were deposited with the dead and their bones were used as amulets."[4]

Later, we find belief in the soul's survival a conspicuous factor in all of the more highly organized religions. This is evident from the perusal of the preceding chapters of this volume. It is apparent that it was prominent in the Egyptian religion—in both the Solar and Osirian faiths. The pyramid texts, which indicate a belief in the survival of kings after death, and the *Book of the Dead,* in which belief is shown to be much more democratic, furnish abundant evidence that the early Egyptians were much given to this belief. It was quite prominent also in the Babylonian and Assyrian religion as is manifest, for instance, in the poem *Ishtar's Descent to the Lower World* which is descriptive of the underworld or the abode of the dead. It is present, too, in much of the religion of India. The *Vedas* and the *Upanishads* reveal this. It plays a part, also, in the religion of Greece as the Homeric poetry and the Mysteries testify. In such an ethical religion as Zoroastrianism one does not wonder that belief in the future life should be a marked feature. Even in Confucianism,[5] which concerns itself so largely with the present life, it is more or less active.

This belief appears, also, in the development of the Hebrew religion. In the pre-Mosaic period essentially

[4] *Palestine Exploration Fund,* Quarterly Statement, 1902, pp. 347ff.

[5] Cf. Dawson, *The Ethics of Confucius,* N. Y., 1905, Ch. VII.

the same ideas on this subject prevail as among other Semites. Even after the establishment of Yahweh worship, many continued in their inherited faith concerning the future life. Gradually ethical considerations gave rise to the question of retribution. At first the attempted solution of the problem did not involve the individual's life after death. Family and tribal retribution met the moral demands. But from the time of Job down through the apocalyptic writers we find Jewish belief in retribution after death. It is, of course, part of the teaching of Jesus, and has been fundamental in the faith of His followers for nearly two thousand years,—the love, fatherhood and goodness of God, the worth of the individual, and the resurrection of Christ, constituting the guarantees of faith in immortality. Mohammedanism, also, proclaims this belief. It is involved in its teachings with reference to a Judgment Day, Paradise and Hell.

Thus the history of religion shows, that from very early times down to the present this idea of the future life has been conspicuous in man's religious belief; and, as religion has been one of the most potent forces in the evolution of the race, contributing in its nobler forms to the realization and conservation of the highest values of the individual and of society, belief in the life hereafter has made a most substantial contribution to human character and progress.

But not only has the idea of life beyond death engaged the *religious* nature of man, it has been a subject of profound interest to his rational nature as well. In the Introduction to his immortal *Critique of Pure Reason,* Kant tells us that there are certain great problems concerning which " reason prosecutes its investigations, which by their importance we consider far more excellent and by their tendency far more

elevated than anything the understanding can find in the sphere of phenomena. Nay," he adds, "we risk rather anything, even at the peril of error, than that we should surrender such investigations, either on the ground of their uncertainty, or from any feeling of indifference or contempt." [6] In the second edition of the *Critique* the great philosopher informs us that "these inevitable problems of pure reason itself are God, Freedom and Immortality." [7]

If we study carefully the history of philosophy with reference to the third problem mentioned by Kant, we find his statement abundantly verified. Almost from the dawn of speculative thought down to its latest utterance, we note this problem has seriously engaged the philosophic mind. Pythagoras and the Pythagoreans, Heraclitus and Empedocles, Socrates, Plato and Aristotle, Epicurus and Lucretius, Zeno and Cicero, Cleanthus and Chrysippus, Seneca and Epictetus, Plotinus and other Neo-Platonists, are conspicuous among those in Greek and Græco-Roman thought who were led to earnest reflection upon it, advancing reasons for or against belief in the soul's immortal destiny.

A religion that places such emphasis on immortality as does the Christian religion could not fail to enlist the services of its more philosophic sympathizers in furnishing reasons for its faith. Hence, all through early and medieval Christian history we find minds dealing with it from the standpoint of reflective thought. In the Patristic Philosophy prior to the Council of Nice we find men like Justin Martyr, Irenæus, Tertullian, Origen and Lactantius, earnestly

[6] *Critique of Pure Reason,* trans. by Max Muller, Vol. II, London, 1881, Int. pp. 2–3.
[7] P. 3.

engaged in the consideration of this subject. After the Council of Nice down to the rise of the Scholastic Philosophy the soul's survival after death is still a prominent subject in the writings of the Church Fathers. This is evident in the works of Gregory of Nyssa, Augustine, Nemesius and others. Later, Thomas Aquinas, probably more than any of the Schoolmen, devotes the attention of his powerful mind to a rational interpretation and defense of this article of Christian belief.

In modern philosophy it receives the attention of Malebranche and Spinoza, of Leibnitz and Locke, of Berkeley and Hume. It looms large in the philosophical controversies occasioned by Deism and Materialism in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. We note this in the writings of Samuel Clarke, Andrew Baxter, Bishop Butler and some of the French Encyclopædists. Later, in Germany, Kant, Fichte, Hegel, Schopenhauer, von Hartmann, Lotze and Fechner, could not escape the fascination of this problem, and their attempted solutions furnish, in some cases, encouragement, and in others, discouragement to the would-be believer.

Nor has contemporary philosophy been found wanting in this respect. This is evident from the monographs on immortality by Fiske, Sabatier, James, Howison, Royce, Holmes, Galloway and others. Philosophy is preëminently a rational discipline, and this long line of thinking men who "aimed to see life steadily and to see it whole," and most of whom thought that "to see it whole" involves a vision of life's continuance after death, demonstrates the truth of Kant's remark, "that we risk rather anything, even at the peril of error, than that we should surrender such investigations, either on the ground of their un-

certainty, or from any feeling of indifference or contempt." "Inevitable," indeed, is the problem, and inevitable will it continue to be with rational man until hope and faith issue into knowledge; for man, invested with reason, is bound to raise the questions of origin, nature and destiny.

The poets, also, have found this to be an "inevitable problem." A considerable portion of religious belief on this subject referred to in the preceding chapters is embodied in poetical writings. This is manifest in Brahmanism, in the Babylonian and Assyrian religion, in the religion of Greece, also in that of the Hebrews, and in the religion of Ancient Persia. In addition to this, the history of poetry reveals many poets interested in this momentous question. This is true of Virgil, Dante, Shakespeare, Milton, Goethe, Sir John Davies, Donne, Addison, Henry More, Pope, Cowper, Young, Burns, Byron, Shelley, Southey, Coleridge, Wordsworth, Browning, Tennyson, Longfellow, Whittier, Bryant, Lowell and many poets of lesser note. Some poets have approached the subject from the standpoint of reason, as the philosopher does, trying to determine if possible a rational basis for faith, and then embodying their reasoning and conclusions in verse. Some have approached it from the standpoint of mystical intuition in which they seem to be introduced to a transcendental world involving the soul's immortal existence. Others, as in the case of Wordsworth and Tennyson, deal with it from both the rational and mystical points of view. Still others simply embody in their verse an inherited or traditional faith. However the approach, the poet, like the philosopher, seems unable to escape the consideration of this vital subject. With him, as with his rationalistic brother, it is an "inevitable problem."

In the domain of science the continuance of life after death has not constituted a subject of much investigation. What Professor Ostwald says of the chemist and physicist of to-day doubtless applies to workers in these fields in the past. He says: "If a chemist or physicist of to-day is asked about his ideas on immortality, his first feeling will be that of astonishment. He meets with no question in his work which is connected with this one, and his reply may usually be classified under one of two heads. He may remember the religious impressions which have clung to him since his youth, kept alive by him or nearly forgotten, as the case may be, and he will then explain that such questions are in no way connected with his science; for the objects treated by his science are non-living matter. This is immediately evident in physics, and while there exists an organic chemistry, he will explain that any matter which is called organic in his sense is decidedly dead before it can become the object of his investigation. It is only the inanimate part of the world which concerns him scientifically, and any ideas he may hold about the question of immortality are his private opinions and quite independent of his science. Or he may dismiss his interlocutor still more shortly by saying from his standpoint of matter-and-motion: Soul is a function of living matter only. The moment life ceases in an organized body the value of this function becomes zero, and there is no further question about immortality."[8] Some see in the theories of the conservation of energy and evolution indications of the soul's immortality. Of late, Sir Oliver Lodge, Dr. Hyslop and other workers in the field of psychic research have thought that life after death is within the possibilities of scientific demonstration.

[8] Ostwald, *Individuality and Immortality*, Boston, 1906, pp. 4–5.

However, meager as have been the serious attempts at investigation of this subject and their results in the scientific realm, it seems destined to become more and more an "inevitable problem," and there are many who hope that sooner or later Science may be able to throw some light into "the dark valley of the shadow of death."

Thus we see how deeply concerned with this vital question religion, philosophy and poetry have been. They represent the highest activities of the human mind. The greatest religious prophets and teachers, and the greatest philosophers and poets but reflect the common interest. Death raises the question of survival in the mind of the average man. He cannot escape the question, "Whither am I going?" or the old interrogative, "If a man die, shall he live again?" There can be little doubt of the truth of Sir James Frazer's remark: "If abstract truth could be determined, like the gravest issues of national policy, by a show of hands or a counting of heads, the doctrine of human immortality, or at least of a life after death, would deserve to rank among the most firmly established of truths; for were the question put to the vote of the whole of mankind, there can be no doubt that the ayes would have it by an overwhelming majority. The few dissenters would be overborne; their voices would be drowned in the general roar." [9]

When we seriously reflect upon this widespread interest in life after death we are led to inquire into its ultimate sources in human nature. It is a most interesting problem in the Psychology of Religion. The more searching the inquiry the more does this interest and belief appear to be rooted in the entire psychical being of man. It seems to be the outgrowth of his

[9] Op. cit., p. 33.

constitution as rational, social, æsthetic, moral and religious. It surely is a demand of our rational nature. As rational, man inquires into the causes and *meaning* of things and life. It is not only impossible for many to form any adequate philosophy of life and human history, and, indeed, of the entire cosmic order, without viewing them in the light of

> " one far-off, divine event
> To which the whole creation moves,"

which event includes the soul's immortality. Without such a goal the entire universe seems " darkness at the core." So profoundly interested in this question is the rational mind that not less than twenty arguments for belief in the soul's immortality appear in the history of philosophic thought, and one of the most forceful of these is based on the ultimate unintelligibility or meaninglessness of life and the world-order if we cannot view them from the standpoint of some final end or goal that involves personal immortality.

But belief in life after death seems also to be rooted in man's social nature. It gives rise to, and affects belief in, the future life. In his book entitled *The Destiny of Man,* Fiske calls attention to the prolonged infancy of man compared with that of the animal. Jevons emphasizes the fact that because of this the parental affections must have been strong in primitive man to have enabled man to survive the struggle for existence. That these affections were strong is manifest in lamentations for the dead.[10] Many examples of these are cited by anthropologists.[11] Such examples, despite the fear of departed ancestors so common in

[10] Jevons, *Int. to the History of Religion,* Fifth ed., London, 1911, p. 46.
[11] Cf. Tyler, *Primitive Culture,* London, 1871, Vol. II.

primitive man, make it evident that belief in the future life is deeply rooted in the affections of man. These affections have such value as to impel him to demand their perpetuity. Especially is this true of love.

> "Alas! for love, if thou art all,
> And naught beyond, O Earth!"

So precious is this emotion that to rob it of its object forever and cancel the being capable of experiencing it, seems irreconcilable with its intrinsic worth. Indeed! with some minds it is questioned whether love were possible at all on the basis of its mortality; or if so, whether it would rise much above brutish passion. Evidently so it appeared to Tennyson:

> "Yet if some voice that man could trust
> Should murmur from the narrow house,
> 'The cheeks drop in; the body bows;
> Man dies: nor is there hope in dust;'
>
> "Might I not say? 'Yet even here,
> But for one hour, O Love, I strive
> To keep so sweet a thing alive:'
> But I should turn mine ears and hear
>
> "The moaning of the homeless sea,
> The sound of streams that swift or slow
> Draw down Æonian hills, and sow
> The dust of continents to be.
>
> "O me, what profits it to put
> An idle case? If Death were seen
> At first as Death, Love had not been,
> Or been in narrowest working shut,
>
> "Mere fellowship of sluggish moods,
> Or in his coarsest Satyr-shape
> Had bruised the herb and crush'd the grape,
> And bask'd and batten'd in the woods."

The demand of the social nature that love should be immortal is undoubtedly a powerful influence in determining belief in immortality. Its value is such that human nature protests against the extinction of its object and of itself. It feels that "love can never lose its own" and is itself worthy of immortal life.

Æsthetic considerations, also, have influenced man in forming this belief in life after death. The incompleteness of life without an immortal perspective is hostile not only to our rational and moral, but to our æsthetic nature as well. We have ideals of beauty that far transcend possible attainment in this life. Why should we be endowed with capacities to construct ideals of the beautiful and to strive after their realization if it be impossible in this life? Do they not point to another life in which they may be actualized? Such an answer to the question is the only one that will satisfy the æsthetic demands of human nature. Then, too, the beauty of the soul itself is such that Plato was led in the *Timaeus* to affirm its immortality on the ground that God is too good to destroy so beautiful an object. Whatever force such arguments may have, the point of psychological interest is, that belief in a hereafter has some of its roots in the æsthetic nature of man.

But belief in life after death is also the outgrowth of our moral nature. Without doubt it is one of the prime sources of this belief. No one can thoughtfully read the preceding chapters of this volume without being impressed by the fact that in religion itself it is the moral nature that is one of the main sources of belief in the soul's survival of death and of the conceptions and beliefs concerning the kind of life that awaits it. In some religions survival is a demand of justice. They insist that righteousness and well-being

should be synthetic and likewise wickedness and suffering. This is not always the case in the present life, hence there must be a life after death in which righteousness shall have its due and unrighteousness its deserts. This retributive element is more or less manifest, indeed, in all of the great religions. In some of them, however, the moral nature leads to demands of a higher character. It is conscious of the supremacy of moral values and demands the conservation of them as realized in personality. This is especially true of the Christian religion. It is one of the features of Jesus' teachings, and appears over and over again in the history of Christian thought.

Philosophy, also, reveals the fact that the moral nature is a prolific source of belief on this subject. The retributive element is quite prominent in philosophical thought on the future life. Plato, many Church Fathers and Schoolmen, Clarke, Butler, Kant and others make use of it. They argue that justice demands a future life. Virtue must have its due. It does not always secure it in the present life. The wicked, on the other hand, spread themselves like the bay tree and often flourish because of their wickedness; whereas the righteous often suffer because of their righteousness. A day of equity must dawn beyond this night of injustice. It is the demand of man's moral nature.

Closely related to this form of the moral argument is another aspect of it. It is the fact of the incompleteness of the moral life here as compared with the moral ideal. This ideal in the form of a highest good man's moral nature imposes upon him as something to be attained. Its realization is, of course, a progressive matter. But conditions are such that he cannot realize it in this life. Virtue implies a struggle, and however

earnest and sublime the struggle may be, it is not possible to attain this *summum bonum* in life's three score years and ten. To impose a supreme obligation on man without the possibility of its realization involves a contradiction. Kant in the *Critique of Practical Reason* urged this argument with great force. A recent writer presents the argument and estimates its value in these words: "The endeavour after a full and satisfying good must have a significance for human life as a whole. For it is from no arbitrary caprice or casual desire that man sets out on this quest and engages in this endeavour. His inner nature urges him to follow the upward way; and if he turns into the downward path, his conscience rebukes him for being false to his vocation. We have to ask ourselves the question, Is man by the spirit in him led to enter on a quest which is bound to be vain and doomed to end in defeat? Is the vision of the Good only a phantom light which lures the pilgrim into the morass? Is the goal fondly desired only a dream which fades in the sober light of waking reason? No one will come to an affirmative conclusion gladly, and if any one does so conclude, it must be at the expense of admitting that there is somehow a contradiction at the heart of things. For, consider what the conclusion means. It means that it is involved in the nature of man—and so in the constitution of the universe in which man comes into being—that he should form and strive after an ideal of good, and that it is equally involved in the nature of things that this endeavour is destined to final defeat. The situation would be analogous to that where an individual bestowed a precious gift, and at the same time took measures to render the possession of the gift ineffective. We cannot accept such an inconsistency in the constitution

of the world unless we are compelled to do so by a logic which admits of no other alternative. Any reasonable hypothesis which enables us to overcome this inconsistency, has a serious claim to be considered.

"From this point of view we can see that the postulate of personal immortality is no mere expression of subjective feelings. It is not the pure outcome of a personal wish, but issues from the need of harmonizing the facts of experience. The postulate is put forward to remove a real difficulty: it is a demand man makes on the universe in order that his moral world may be consistent and harmonious. Apart from this postulate the life of moral endeavour is destined to remain fragmentary and incomplete—nay more, the value already realized in the ethical life is doomed to be lost. All the good which a man has reaped in his own soul as the harvest of his moral endeavour will be annihilated when he ceases to breathe, and his career will close in darkness and silence. The postulate of immortality conserves the value already gained, and is a guarantee that the endeavour after the good shall come to its goal and fulfilment. These ends are not achieved within the present world-order, where the personal life is fragmentary; hence the postulate of a supramundane or transcendental realm in which the personal life is continued and fulfilled. This postulate is the legitimate claim man makes on the universe, and it is the solution of an urgent problem." [12] To the student of the Psychology of Religion this moral source of belief in the future life is very significant for his science, while it furnishes the ground for one of the most cogent arguments of the philosopher, and is one

[12] Galloway, *The Idea of Immortality*, Edinburgh, 1919, pp. 167–169.

of the strongest guarantees for the faith of the disciple of religion.

As the foregoing chapters prove, belief in a life hereafter is also deeply rooted in the religious nature. We have noted this in preceding paragraphs in dealing with the ethical aspects of religion. In some of the higher forms of religion it is manifest in the belief as based on the goodness and fatherly love of God, on the soul's love and desire for fellowship with God, and on a lofty conception of the worth of human personality—all of which are to be found, for example, in the Christian religion. Practically co-eval with religion, and almost co-extensive with it, belief in life after death is conspicuously an outgrowth of the religious nature of man. The psychologist who would adequately determine the psychological basis of the belief must inquire carefully into this source of its origin in human nature. The previous chapters make this statement abundantly evident.

It is clear, then, that belief in life after death has its roots in the entire psychical being of man. It is essentially a demand of the human spirit as rational, social, æsthetic, moral and religious. The soul in all of these forms of functioning protests against death as a finality. It demands life—higher, fuller, completer, never-ending life. What reason demands so powerfully in the highest form of its development as we find it manifest in Philosophy; what the social nature ardently longs for and demands in its noblest activity in the forms of friendship and love; what the æsthetic nature demands in its most refined aspirations and most earnest quest of the beautiful; what the moral nature demands in its sublimest efforts to realize the supreme values; what the religious nature demands in its profoundest love for, and holiest aspirations

after fellowship with, the Divine—the Father of the human spirit,—cannot be regarded as merely subjective. There must be a background of Reality to all of this—an objective correlate to these imperative demands of the soul. Human nature at its highest and best will abide no other conclusion. It must be so, "else why these yearnings after immortality, these fond desires;" these soul-reachings toward a far richer and completer acquaintance with, and realization of the True, the Beautiful and the Good than this mortal life will permit; these longings after a more intimate fellowship with the Father of our spirits in which communion we "shall see Him as He is"? The grave cannot gain a victory over such a being. The dust cannot be its goal. These earnest demands of the human spirit indicate its divine origin, its divine nature, and its divine destiny. As it is with Truth, so it is with the soul:

"The eternal years of God are hers."

A brief word might be added in conclusion as to the practical significance of belief in life hereafter. It undoubtedly is significant for human character and conduct. Whether viewed from the standpoint of belief in future retribution conditioned on our present life or from the larger and nobler point of view of the conservation of all that has real worth in this life and the attainment of a more complete intellectual, social, æsthetic, moral and spiritual development hereafter, such belief does, as a matter of fact, tremendously affect character and behaviour. There are some superior souls, like the late George Eliot, who find such a belief unnecessary for the support of the moral life. But this is not the case with the average person. With the large majority, "the dread of something after

death," and the hope of future reward, are influential factors in human conduct. Such motives are not, indeed, of the highest, nor is the conduct they impel of the noblest, but the morality thus determined is immeasurably better than the immorality that might have been had it not been thus restrained. However, there are many whose conceptions of virtue and of her immortality are of a far higher order, and whose character and conduct as influenced by these conceptions do great honour to our human nature and contribute much to the real progress of the race:

"Glory of warrior, glory of orator, glory of song,
Paid with a voice flying by to be lost on an endless sea—
Glory of virtue, to fight, to struggle, to right the wrong—
Nay, but she aim'd not at glory, no lover of glory she:
Give her the glory of going on, and still to be.

"The wages of sin is death: if the wages of Virtue be dust,
Would she have heart to endure for the life of the worm and the fly?
She desires no isles of the blest, no quiet seats of the just,
To rest in a golden grove, or to bask in a summer sky:
Give her the wages of going on, and not to die."

McDougall undoubtedly is right when he says: "Apart from any hope of rewards or fear of punishment after death, the belief must have, it seems to me, a moralizing influence upon our thought and conduct that we can ill afford to dispense with. The admirable Stoic attitude of a Marcus Aurelius or a Huxley may suffice for those who rise to it in the moral environment created by civilizations based upon a belief in a

future life and upon other positive religious beliefs; but I gravely doubt whether whole nations could rise to the level of an austere morality, or even maintain a decent working standard of conduct, after losing those beliefs. A proof that our life does not end with death, even though we know nothing of the nature of the life beyond the grave, would justify the belief that we have our share in a larger scheme of things than the universe described by physical science; and this conviction must add dignity, seriousness, and significance to our lives, and must throw a great weight into the scale against the dangers that threaten every advanced civilization." [18] In our struggles for the realization of the highest worths of human life there is something encouraging in the belief that we are striving for eternal values. It lends dignity to the struggle, gives impetus to our zeal, and enables us to continue the battle in the darkest hour,—even amid most discouraging circumstances and apparent defeat. The historian of moral progress would have a far different story to tell had man throughout his history been wanting in this belief. It has been not only an inspiring and sustaining force, but a veritable star of hope leading him through the long conflict between good and evil.

[18] Wm. McDougall, *Body and Mind,* New York, 1911, Preface, pp. xiii–xiv.

Printed in the United States of America

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